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ABSTRACT 
Communicating emotion can be a problem. Goleman (1995) invokes Aristotle to contend that 
“the problem is not with emotionality but with the appropriateness of emotion and its 
expression” (p. xiv). Disentangling the various factors involved in cross-cultural emotional 
communication and particularly misinterpretation can seem a herculean task, given that the 
literature remains divided as to whether emotions are universal or relative (see for example, 
Ekman, 1997, and Wierzbicka, 1999). This study explores through a phenomenological and 
mixed methods framework the differences in recognition and interpretation of emotional cues 
across cultures in dynamic communicative acts.  It uses focus group methodology to examine 
how South Korean English teachers and North American English teachers living in Korea 
interpreted video excerpts from a South Korean comedy released in 2003.  Research questions 
include: How well did out-group individuals interpret emotional meaning across cultures?  
Which channels for cues did each group use for interpretation? What happened when 
interpretations failed?   The ultimate goal is to gain insights for foreign language educators and 
their teaching practice. The study revealed that while basic emotions like anger were understood 
in similar ways by both groups, participants revealed stark differences in their understanding of 
more complex emotions like guilt and frustration. Consequently, such complex or subtle 
emotions were found to be one potentially important site for cross-cultural misinterpretation. 
While groups displayed differences in their identification of which emotions were being 
displayed, they displayed similarities in the cues that marked them. All groups reported that they 
focused most on non-verbal cues and frequently on situational appraisal, but only rarely on lexis 
or semantics. Moreover, the participants almost always relied on a combination of cues from 
multiple channels in identifying which emotions the actors were displaying. Last, display rules 
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did play a major role in cross-cultural misinterpretation.  Ultimately, foreign language educators 
can use these findings to train students to better interpret emotions, as well as to manage their 
own cross-cultural experiences. 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
And the same thought had occurred to me then that I carried with me now as I left the movie 
theater with my mother and sister: the emotions between the races could never be pure, even 
love was tarnished by the desire to find in the other some element that was missing in ourselves. 
Whether we sought out our demons or salvation, the other race would always remain just that: 
menacing, alien, and apart. 
Barak Obama, Dreams from My Father. Page 124 
 
 In 1988 at the Seoul Summer Olympics, South Korean bantamweight Byun Jong-Il 
waged a close, hard-fought preliminary round match against Alexander Hristov of Bulgaria 
(Alfano, 1988a; Callahan, 1988; Times, 1988; R. White, 2003, p. 652). In the heat of the battle, 
Byun was penalized two points for head butting—marring his performance in the match.  After 
the final bell, the hometown crowd was electrified, anticipating Byun’s victory, but it was 
Hristov’s arm that match referee, Keith Walker, raised in triumph. Drama such as this is common 
in Olympic boxing, what ensued immediately after the match, however, was unusual. Supporters 
of the Korean boxer stormed the ring. During the melee, referee Walker was attacked by two 
officials from the South Korean team. Byun Jong-Il himself, refused to leave the ring for 67 
minutes, delaying the other matches.  In fact, he did not leave the arena until the lights were shut 
down. Callahan (1988) described the end of the event this way, “When the smoke cleared, Byun 
was sitting in his corner. For over an hour he sat. After the lights were switched off, he lingered 
another long moment in the glow of a TV camera before clambering down. Remembering 
something, Byun suddenly bolted back into the ring, bowed to the four corners in courtly style 
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and departed” (Callahan, 1988). 1 
How are we to appraise this display in the international arena? Why did Byun do it? What 
do we imagine he was feeling at that time? Perhaps more important: Are we all imagining the 
same feelings? How are we to judge his character based on his behavior? Intercultural 
communication is a staggeringly complex yet fundamental question for foreign language 
education.  In this study, I hope to delve more deeply into an area that has not been extensively 
explored in educational research: the communication of emotion across cultures.  But first let me 
go back for a moment to the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics.  Certainly, Byun Jong-Il’s hour-long 
display of “the agony of defeat“ still lives in memory.  Moreover, the wide variation of 
interpretations of emotion and character extrapolated from Byun Jong-Il’s actions also reveal the 
difficulty of interpreting emotions across cultures. To explore just what people from around the 
world thought of Byun Jong-Il’s sit down strike, I searched the Internet and found an interesting 
range of adjectives applied to the emotional state of the boxer and the rest of the Koreans 
present. Terms like bizarre, bitter, bedlam, and quite often “sore loser” were applied. According 
to the New York Times,  “Anwar Chowdhry, president of the International Amateur Boxing 
Federation, called the incident the most disgraceful he has ever seen in the sport” (Alfano, 
1988b). Roland White of the UK’s Sunday Times named Byun Jong-Il the number four all time 
“bad loser in the history of sport” (R. White, 2003), worse than Hitler, but not quite as bad as 
Tonya Harding or John McEnroe!   
Yet, all of the interpretations were found by searching for the English spelling of “Byun 
Jong-Il” and, therefore, they were predominantly from the English language press—not the 
                                                 
1  Sport, in general, and Olympic boxing in particular, is an excellent metaphor for this topic. I can hardly think of 
another human endeavor so emotionally charged, yet governed by rational rules to restrain the emotion. 
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Korean press.  In a classic case of polar opposite interpretations, Koreans might interpret: “He 
had lost face [chaemyeon, 체면], and his refusal to leave the ring was his way of restoring it. 
Only after much coaxing did he begrudgingly leave. The coaxing helped to restore his feelings of 
chaemyeon and provided him a forum to appear gracious when he did finally leave and allow the 
games to continue” (Oak & Martin, 2000, p. 32). 
Nature and Purpose of this Project 
The topic of my study is the communication of emotion across cultures. In particular, this 
study strives to explore one of the central disputes within the academic study of emotion: Are 
emotions universal or culturally specific?  Central to this question is the character of display 
rules and cultural scripts—which regulate how emotions are outwardly demonstrated in social, 
“polite” conversation—actually function in natural, “normal” conversation, and, most 
importantly, how the emotions communicated in a culturally appropriate fashion via those 
display rules are perceived across cultures. Moreover, the success or failure of relations between 
cultures is almost always based on our appraisal of that culture, which is in large part based on 
the way we perceive their emotional communication: “Speech communities may differ in 
baseline rate of articulation, and in particular in strategic uses of pauses and silence, which can 
cause significant intercultural misunderstandings” (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 53). For good or ill, we 
humans tend to use those appraisals of a situation to determine the cultural script for the display 
of emotion. Differences in cultural scripts and display rules may well result in stereotypes about 
different cultures and the individuals from different cultures. At the root of the appraisals, and 
consequently, the stereotypes, lies an inextricable link to an emotional assessment of the 
behavior of individuals from the “other” culture. While this line of reasoning may seem obvious, 
academic research, in a wide range of individual and disparate fields of study including 
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psychology, sociology, anthropology, education, and linguistics, have turned a blind eye to the 
study of emotions and their communication.  Fortunately, however, the last decade or two have 
seen a significant upsurge in research in emotional communication. My hope is that this study 
can contribute to that expanding endeavor. 
Adding to the import of this study, the relations between the United States and Korea are 
marked by deep social, political, and individual connections—from the Korean War, through Los 
Angeles’ “Rodney King” riots, to the “inscrutability” surrounding the perpetrator of the massacre 
at Virginia Tech.2 Finally, foreign language education is itself a field, along with the fields it rose 
from—linguistics and applied linguistics—which has shown a particular disinterest in and 
disregard for the place of emotions as an element of communication.  
Emotion and appraisal 
Before proceeding further, allow me the opportunity to clarify the technical meaning of 
appraisal in regard to emotions. Within cognitive psychology the core concept of appraisal 
theory, is “the claim that emotions are elicited and differentiated on the basis of a person’s 
subjective evaluation or appraisal of the personal significance of a situation, object, or event on a 
number of dimensions or criteria” (K. R. Scherer, 1999, p. 637).  Thus, roughly stated, 
proponents of appraisal theory argue that the cognitive appraisal precedes emotion. In other 
words, appraisal is inherently “emotion antecedent appraisal.” I have used the term appraisal in a 
more vernacular and generic sense—using appraisal not only in terms of how emotions are 
created, but also in terms of how stereotypes come to be and how those stereotypes function in 
daily practice.  This sort of daily life interpretation of the notion of appraisal would include such 
                                                 
2  I firmly believe that Cho’s acts were in no way, shape, or fashion linked to his Korean heritage, but the public 
media strove valiantly both to ignore the cultural aspects, and alternatively to interpret their cultural import. 
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things as job performance appraisals (Bauer & Baltes, 2002; Dipboye, 1985; Tiedens, Ellsworth, 
& Mesquita, 2000) or appraisal of products as part of marketing or marketing research (Bryce & 
Olney, 1991; Karande, 2002; Qualls & Moore, 2006). Within the context of this dissertation 
proposal, I will generally use the more generic interpretation of the word.  For my purposes, 
what is most important to note about appraisal, is that all of these models, whether from 
cognitive psychology or professional and personnel psychology, point to an intense intertwining 
of emotion, appraisal, and stereotypes – which is antecedent to the others, or if there is an 
antecedent, is not nearly as important to this study as the fact that they work together—and how 
these mechanisms accomplish the end. 
Blind eye syndrome 
 For much of the 20th century, emotions as a research subject have proven a difficult, 
virtually unaddressed topic across many academic fields (Besnier, 1990; Ekman, 2003; 
Pavlenko, 2005; Planalp, 1999; Schumann, 1997; Turner & Stets, 2005).  Sociologists Turner & 
Stets (2005) seem genuinely perplexed as to why the issue of emotion has not been researched 
more fully in their field, “In hindsight, this late date is remarkable in the light of the fact that 
emotions pervade virtually every aspect of human experience and all social relations. How could 
sociologists have turned a blind eye to emotions?” (p.1). Applied linguistics, and in this instance 
the overlapping field of intercultural communication, is certainly in the early stages of research 
into the role and nature of emotion in intercultural communication.   Precisely why intercultural 
emotional communication is the victim of this blind eye syndrome is not a simple question to 
answer.  Certainly, the Western conception of emotion as the antithesis of logic and rationality 
does not prompt the academy to view emotions with a scientific lens. Besnier (1990) introduces 
his review of the literature on Language and Affect by referring to Lyons’ (1977) discussion of 
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the semantics which describes the idea that linguistic meaning consists of three components: 
descriptive, social and expressive.  Emotion lies in the final realm, which “has been consistently 
set aside as an essentially unexplorable aspect of linguistic behavior, a residual category to which 
aspects of language that cannot be handled conveniently with extant linguistic models were 
relegated to be forgotten” (Besnier, 1990, p. 420). Thus the avoidance of emotion in foreign 
language education (FLE) is unsurprising—where the primary focus is teaching the meaning of 
words and grammatical structures, and, consequently, emotions are rarely considered. Only one 
area of the emotional milieu has been explored in FLE—how emotions affect motivation (eg. 
Krashen’s affective filter). The more detailed questions about the communication of emotional 
state or emotional content have not been explored. Pavlenko (2003) points out that while several 
monographs and editions have been published recently that view the issue from a wide variety of 
academic perspectives, all of these collections approach the issue entirely from the 
monolingual’s perspective, or as she phrases it more precisely: 
My discussion so far demonstrates that emotions remain undertheorized in the study of 
bilingualism and SLA, and that the questions asked about the role of emotions in 
additional language learning and use are extremely limited. Researchers also continue to 
frame the issue as the relationship between languages and emotions leaving out 
languages of emotions or multilingual performance of affect.” [emphasis in the original] 
(p. 35)  
Clearly, the social sciences in general and foreign language education in particular have turned a 
blind eye to questions surrounding emotion.  
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The social sciences awaken to the study of emotion 
While much of the last century saw little effort in the area of emotions in intercultural 
communication, the waning years of the 20th century saw a “burst of new interest,” (Planalp, 
1999, p. 1), and “a great deal of work,” (Wierzbicka, 1999, p. 49), and saw sociologists make 
“up for lost time” (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 1).  These areas of research corollary to FLE have, 
recently, made significant inroads in exploring emotion in communication. Psychologist Paul 
Ekman (1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2003) has made a strong case for emotional universals, 
which is decidedly not my approach.  Yet, Ekman’s research provides what is perhaps the key 
element of this study: his finding that in many cases, “display rules for managing facial 
expressions” (1999b, p. 312) come into play during the expression of emotions in social 
situations. Other researchers have looked at emotions ranging through social, moral, 
psychological and developmental models (see Damasio, 1994; Ekman, 2003; Ekman, Friesen, & 
Ellsworth, 1972; Greenspan, 1997; LeDoux, 1996; Planalp, 1999; Turner & Stets, 2005).  The 
cumulative impression left by these research studies is that the assumption of a polar difference 
and divide between emotion and cognition is simply inaccurate. We cannot help but conclude 
that emotion and cognition are intricately intertwined – just as Schumann (1997) has concluded 
that the same integrated emotion/cognition character exists in communicative events.  
 In contrast to this contemporary integrated approach, studies that are influenced strongly 
by linguistic approaches have maintained a positivist perspective/methodology in considering 
emotions in communication, primarily investigating paralinguistic expressions (Birdwhistell, 
1952; Feldman & Rimé, 1991; Hall, 1959; K. R. Scherer, 1982; K. R. Scherer & Ekman, 1982). 
In general, these studies look for one-to-one interpretations of paralinguistic cues. Within a 
similar vein, a significant number of studies have explored the nature of ‘vocal cues’ for emotion 
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in intercultural communication (see Pavlenko, 2005 for a review of these studies). Many of these 
vocal cue studies have attempted to integrate different elements, and at least one of these studies 
allowed for not only audio cues but video cues as well (Nakamichi, Jogan, Usami, & Erickson, 
2002). The limited methodological options used to date will be critical to my methodological 
proposals. 
Finally, some linguists have explored more interactive and elaborate interpretations of 
emotion in communication, for example, emotional scripts (Planalp, 1999; Wierzbicka, 1999)—
which bear a close resemblance to the study of display rules in practice.  In spite of the increased 
interest and research into language and emotions, even those fields that seek to integrate areas of 
communication, such as sociolinguistics and pragmatics, keep language and emotion segregated. 
They rarely consider emotions as a critical element of what is communicated in conversation: 
what Pavlenko (2005) called “languages of emotions or multilingual performance of affect” (p. 
35).  The study of emotions within intercultural communication has clearly suffered from a blind 
eye syndrome, and one goal of this dissertation is to shed some light on the issue. 
Foreign language education rarely considers emotion 
While many foreign language teachers consider emotions critical as an element of both 
the curriculum and the methodology of foreign language education, the curriculum they teach 
often does not. As case in point to the national standards for foreign language education 
produced in part by the American Council of Teachers of Foreign Languages places the 
education of emotions front and center—in their very first curricular standard: “Standard 1.1: 
Students engage in conversations, provide and obtain information, express feelings and 
emotions, and exchange opinions” (ACTFL, 2005, ¶ 5).  Unfortunately, however, that instance is 
the only mention of emotions in the main standards.  Therefore, in a similar sort of oversight as 
  9 
 
in the university research fields mentioned above, the applied field of foreign language education 
also recognizes the importance of emotions as part and parcel of the foreign language classroom, 
yet simultaneously turns a blind eye to what emotional communication means and how to 
accomplish the instruction of intercultural emotions. 
 The reasons for this oversight are varied and difficult to pin down. One place to look for 
this oversight would be within the metaphorical parents of foreign language education the 
academic fields of linguistics and applied linguistics. Both of these fields, as anyone who has 
taken an introductory linguistics course can attest, are products of a highly analytical and rational 
approach to foreign language (Besnier, 1990), and, consequently,  just do not turn their attention 
to emotions as an element of the language. Similarly, the differences between native language 
education, second language education, and foreign language education are well documented. The 
amount of curricular time spent in each, the amount of daily life spent on native language versus 
second language versus foreign language, as well as the intrinsic and extrinsic goals of the 
students, require compromises in learning time invested– resulting in the education of emotion in 
the foreign language class being left on the back burner, if not on the chopping block.  
This is not to say that emotions are not considered at all within the realm of foreign 
language education. Indeed, a great deal of attention has been directed at emotions within some 
aspects of foreign language education. Beginning in the 1980s with Krashen’s (1982) notion of 
the affective filter and Acton’s (1984) oil well “gusher” of emotion, language educators turned 
their eye to emotion, but that attention focused almost exclusively on emotion as something that 
assists or hinders learning rather than as something that needs to be learned. Perhaps, Krashen’s 
influence explains why the term “affect” is used much more often than the term emotion within 
the literature of FLE.  The study of affect in language education has led to some extensive study 
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of motivation for foreign language learning (see Gardner & Lalonde, 1985).  The Cambridge 
publication, Affect in Language Learning, edited by Jane Arnold (1999) covers a wide range of 
topics from anxiety, to neurobiology, to self-esteem, to group dynamics, to personal 
development, to cooperative learning, to culture and humanism, but none of the topics 
approaches the question of emotions as something that we learn and, consequently, that we might 
be taught. One final plausible explanation as to why foreign language education does not address 
the issue of emotion as part of the curriculum may be found in the cultural variability of 
emotional expression. Simply put: “Studies to date … have little to offer either classroom 
teachers or other scholars by way of information about particular languages” (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 
75). In our desire to be both sensitive to other cultures as well as politically correct, the task of 
“teaching our students appropriate emotion” may become a slippery and insurmountable slope. 
History of Korea and the United States 
 Any study in language and intercultural communication must narrow the languages 
involved. I propose to work with Korean and English, and more narrowly American English.   Of 
course, this choice is in part one of convenience for the researcher, but to a greater extent, the 
intercultural relationship between Korea and the United States needs to be explored in terms of 
the critical element of emotion within intercultural communication. Misunderstandings abound 
on both sides of this cultural divide. While the history of relations between the United States and 
Korea is not long in absolute terms, the more than 100 years of relations between the US and 
Korea have been both turbulent and important: 
Korean Americans are celebrating year 2003 as the 100th anniversary of Korean 
immigration to the United States. However, Korean American history goes back further 
than that to 1882, when the U.S. signed a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with 
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Korea, allowing each country to establish a diplomatic mission in the other's country. 
From then on, Koreans began to arrive in the U.S. as diplomats, political exiles, 
merchants, or students. (J. H. Kim, 2003) 
The Korean War, or “conflict,” was America’s first full-scale war in the Cold War era, and 
provided in the first point of interaction in the collective psyche of the vast majority of Koreans 
and Americans. While the one million Chinese casualties and perhaps 150,000 American and 
UN casualties were a terrible price to pay, they pale next to the four million Koreans killed. The 
Korean War was simply devastating for the Korean people: a war that left the country 
decimated—not only the poorest country in the world, but divided against itself. Of course, in the 
aftermath of the Korean War, Korea experienced a continued US military presence (which some 
have called an occupation), a heavily militarized demilitarized zone, a series of dictatorial 
governments, and, in contrast, the greatest economic recovery of any nation in history in South 
Korea matched by appalling poverty in North Korea. 
Of course, the shared history of Korea and America did not simply occur unidirectionally 
from a beneficent America: Korean immigration to the United States has had a tremendous 
impact in both countries.  Korean-Americans represent about 0.4 percent of the US population. 
As a subset of the United States’ Asian American population, they are slightly more than 10 
percent.  Importantly, the Korean-American population is increasing at a rate of about three 
times that of the general population ("U.S. Census Bureau," 2007). However, the integration of 
Koreans into American society has not been without stress and strain.   
Immigrant Koreans have found themselves inserted into the “demilitarized zone” of 
America’s black/white racial conflict. The oft cited and most serious case of miscommunication 
between Korean-Americans and African-Americans occurred during the Rodney King riots in 
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Los Angeles in the early 1990s. The broad details of the riots that followed the Rodney King 
decision are, of course, familiar, as well as their inter-ethnic implications.  However, the troubles 
between Koreans and Blacks began earlier. Many analysts set the starting point for the 
difficulties at the point when several Korean merchants were shot and killed during different 
robberies and then a black teenage girl was shot and killed by a Korean grocer. The tensions 
were exacerbated when the Korean grocer in question was sentenced not to time in prison, but 
merely to probation and a fine. Rodney King’s trial came on the heels of these events. With such 
dramatic life and death events occurring, cross-cultural tensions were strained to the breaking 
point. Few who knew this situation in East Central Los Angeles were at all surprised when the 
community exploded in self-destruction.   However, my purpose is to analyze the intercultural 
interaction between Koreans and African Americans through this event. Kim (1993) reports that, 
“About half the approximately $770 million in estimated material losses incurred during the Los 
Angeles upheavals was sustained by a community no one seems to wants to talk much about 
[Korean Americans]”  (p. 1).   Of course that economic loss is “only money,” yet the relative 
economic loss is significantly disproportionate to population. In some small enclave 
communities Asian Americans constitute the majority, but the Korean Americans are not the 
majority in any community—even in Koreatown where they constitute about 25 percent of the 
population.  What made it OK to loot and destroy Korean property? One explanation is cross-
cultural miscommunication.  When Bailey (2000) examined the envirnment and communication 
in that part of Los Angeles, he concluded, “Face-to-face interaction between Korean immigrant 
retailers and African-American customers in Los Angeles often leaves members of each group 
feeling as if the other has behaved in insultingly inappropriate ways” (p. 86). 
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Because the social and political interaction between Americans and Koreans has been 
dramatic and emotional, we would naturally assume that the language interaction between 
Americans and Korean is marked by the presence of strong emotions, emotional language, and 
the communication of those emotions. Indeed, such strong emotions are reflected in the events 
outlined above. Moreover, when the relationships between people of two cultures are caught in 
such emotional situations, we know that the individuals will be making judgments and 
attributions based on their interactions. Consequently, the accuracy of the assessments that 
people on both sides of each conversation are making will become critical to the future state of 
interpersonal interactions across the two cultures and, by extension, broader issues of effective, 
productive, and positive intercultural communication.   Therefore, one of my purposes in 
conducting this research is to determine how well individuals assess and process the emotional 
intent of speakers from both their own language, in this case Korean, as well as another 
language, in this case American English.  
Current Status of Research Conclusions 
 Chapter two will address in much greater detail the research conclusions on the topic of 
emotional communication in foreign language education, but broadly speaking two major trends 
mark the research on this topic: the nature vs. nurture debate, and the different perspectives of 
the individual fields conducting research in this area.  
Nature versus nurture 
The nature versus nurture debate is in many ways fundamental to many fields in the 
social sciences; therefore, to find a nature versus nurture debate in the study of emotions is not 
surprising. On the nature side of emotions is the argument for emotional universals: the major 
proponent of which is Paul Ekman (Ekman, 1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; Ekman, et al., 
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1972). The vast majority of Ekman’s research into the emotional universals has been through the 
exploration of facial expressions—an idea of which dates back at least 135 years to Charles 
Darwin (1998). Ekman concludes through a series of forced choice experiments that only a 
limited number of universal and basic human emotions exist. Specifically, he proposes, “that the 
following list of emotions will be found [to be “basic”], and to be distinguishable one from 
another: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, 
guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness/distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame” 
(Ekman, 1999a, p. 55). Indeed, few if any involved in the field would argue that no biological 
component to emotions and their expression exists, but there remains a heated debate about the 
level and variability of emotions across cultures.  
Thus, in contrast to the universalists’ naturalistic perspective, much of the work in 
emotional expression in the middle part of the twentieth century from the anthropological and 
sociological perspectives, particularly that research which explored across cultural boundaries, 
pointed toward socialized variability in emotional expression. Margaret Mead (Ekman, 2003), 
along with Hall (1959), Birdwhistell (1952), and others were the primary proponents of this 
perspective. More recently, the debate has heated up again with the heirs to both the nature and 
nurture perspectives on this issue. Recent anthropological/sociological endeavors in the study of 
emotions have included such topics, approaches, and personalities as, Lutz’s (1990) exploration 
of engendered emotion, Pavlenko’s (2005) important research into bilingual and multilingual 
individuals expressing emotions differently across cultures, Planalp’s (1999) study of the 
processes—social, moral, and cultural—involved in communicating emotion, Saarni’s (1989) 
work with socialization and competence particularly with children, Tannen’s (1990) popular 
works in communication particularly with gender differences, and Wierzbicka’s (1999) extensive 
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writing about the language of emotions in different cultures. The first chapter of Wierzbicka’s 
Emotions Across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals provides an excellent 
summary of the nature versus nurture debate, and indeed her own disagreements with Ekman. 
Wierzbicka (1999) writes, “Undoubtedly, the ‘emotion lexicons’ of different languages show 
similarities as well as differences . . . but it is essential to recognize the diversity, too, and to 
abandon the idea that all languages must have words for something as ‘basic’ and as ‘natural’ as 
‘sadness’, ‘anger’, ‘fear’, ‘happiness’, ‘disgust’, and ‘surprise’” (p. 25). 
 While researchers on either end of the spectrum often seem to be at loggerheads there is 
at least one other explanation that may serve to resolve the differences between the two groups. 
That perspective could be called the brain evolution perspective.  We are all aware that while 
some elements of our emotional experience have physiological components (e.g. autonomic 
responses to fear), the processing and comprehension of those emotions resides entirely in the 
brain. Given that fact the neuro-physiological character of the brain is likely to have tremendous 
impact on emotions and our understanding of them. Moreover, as Cziko (1997) explains, the 
human brain developed over millennia in ways that should effect all aspects of human 
experience. First we have really big brains: 
The neocerebellum ("new cerebellum") is added to the cerebellum, looking much like a 
fungal growth at the base of the brain, and the neocortex ("new cortex") grows out of the 
front of the forebrain. In most mammals, these new additions are not particularly large 
relative to the brain stem. In primates they are much larger, and in the human they are so 
large that the original brain stem is almost completely hidden by this large convoluted 
mass of grey neural matter. (p. 54)  
On top of the simple volume differences, Cziko (1997) contends that the new hierarchical 
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character of the brain might directly impact this dual perspective on emotions, suggesting that 
the neocortex “took over control from the previous additions and in effect became their new 
masters. Accordingly, the initiation of voluntary behavior as well as the ability to plan, engage in 
conscious thought, and use language depend on neocortical structures” (p. 54). Thus, if we 
follow the basic premise of the brain evolution model, basic emotions are found in lower 
organisms and under the control of “previous additions” to the brain, while more complex human 
and secondary emotions are only found in humans where they are under the control of the 
neocortex and governed by “voluntary” (and by inference social) behavior and conscious 
thought. Consequently, the two perspectives may not at all be incompatible. 
A wide variety of perspectives from the field  
In any study, the goal of narrowing the breadth of research to be considered in the 
literature review is critical. Yet, both the fields of educational psychology and foreign language 
education are, by their very nature, synthetic and hybrid fields of study. Moreover, educational 
psychology and foreign language education exist much more in the realm of applied research 
than in the realm of basic research. Consequently, this research project will rely heavily on 
influences from a wide variety of more self-contained fields of study—in no small part because 
the topic has been under researched.  I have already indicated several of the important areas of 
research in emotion and communication across cultures in the previous sections of this 
introductory chapter. Clearly, input from the fields of psychology, anthropology, sociology, 
linguistics, and communication studies along with specific research into individual’s ability to 
both express and perceive emotional cues across cultural boundaries will be critical for this 
study.  
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Significance of and Justification for Conducting the Study 
Two key factors provide justification for and increase the significance of this study: the 
economic, political, and social connections between Korea and the United States, and the manner 
in which these globalizing influences are particularly associated with English education in 
Korea.  In terms of the connections between Korea and the United States that represent 
globalization,  the New York Times reports that the chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben S. 
Bernanke, stated that the “pace of globalization today was faster and more sweeping than at any 
time in world history” (Andrews, 2006), which has a significant impact on all intercultural 
communication projects. Within the economic realm, as a key aspect of overall globalization, the 
trade relationship between the United States and Korea has been very important with Korea 
remaining a top ten trading partner for years("Foreign trade statistics," 2007). Of course, those 
trade figures are based on South Korea’s trading relationship. North Korea’s relationship with 
the US is significant not as a political and economic ally, but as a political and economic 
adversary. President G. W. Bush stated in the 2002 State of the Union Address, “North Korea is 
a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. … 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil” (Bush, 2002). 
 Directly to the US-South Korean relationships, the intertwining of globalization forces 
with English education in Korea has resulted in the phenomena of “English fever.” That 
phenomenon springs from the passion of South Koreans to learn English and acquire an 
American university education—often continuing through graduate school.  The Korean national 
curriculum requires English training from elementary school and throughout public education, 
and most universities continue required English courses through university.   Private institutes, 
팍완, hagwon,  are multimillion dollar businesses and provide English training  for preschool 
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children up to retirees (S. Krashen, 2003; Park, 2009). The phenomenon of 조기유핰, chogi 
yuhak, or early study abroad, which refers to parents taking their children to other countries for 
educational purposes in their public school years, particularly in the pre-adolescent and early 
adolescent years has caught national and international attention. Tens of thousands of Korean 
public school aged students are studying abroad each year (Ministry of Education Science and 
Technology, 2009, 2011). That passion for study abroad, particularly for the purposes of learning 
and improving one’s English language skills, continues through university as well as Alexander 
Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea explains “the U.S. has more Korean students than 
from any other foreign country, including China and India.  In 2005, more than 87,000 Korean 
students chose to study in the United States, making Korea our number one source of foreign 
students” (Vershbow, 2006). America’s bi-lateral relationship with Korea is critical; therefore, 
understanding the emotional communication embedded in this relationship is critical to foreign 
language education. 
Guiding Research Questions 
The primary research question of this study is as follows. Display rules “are cultural 
norms that dictate the management and modification of emotional displays depending on social 
circumstances” (Matsumoto, Seung Hee Yoo, & Fontaine, 2008, p. 58). They represent a 
disconnection between what ought to be felt and what ought to be shown and are inherently 
culture specific. We can anticipate miscommunication across cultures when those required 
displays are in direct opposition to what is felt. This study will examine in-group conversational 
data about emotional communication using methodological approaches from the research bases 
of nature and nurture perspectives on emotion, in hopes of better understanding how (and how 
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well) we interpret emotional cues across cultures. In that examination, several sub-questions 
need to be addressed: 
• How well do out-group participants’ interpretations match those of in-group 
members? 
• Which of the various channels for interpreting emotions are used by each group? 
• When differences arise, how are they characterized? 
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CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before Beginning 
 A fundamental question that needs to be addressed before conducting research into 
emotional communication across cultures is whether or not “emotional communication across 
cultures” is germane to educational psychology. I have already suggested that psychology has in 
the last half-century reframed our academic perspective on emotion and the study of emotion to a 
large extent.  The “traditional” characterization of emotion has been as a virtually pathological 
entity antithetical to cognition, “in the West, emotion, . . . , has typically been viewed as 
something natural rather than cultural, irrational rather than rational, chaotic rather than ordered, 
subjective rather than universal, physical rather than mental or intellectual, unintended and 
uncontrollable, and hence often dangerous” (Lutz, 1990, p. 69). Parkinson, Fischer, and 
Manstead (2005) emphasize that this interpretation is particularly associated with social norms, 
“Western culture imposes relatively strict norms about social conduct, and when these norms are 
transgressed, the reaction is often interpreted as ‘emotional,’ and hence as irrational” (p. 48). As 
Hochschild (1979) puts it, “social psychology has suffered under the tacit assumption that 
emotion, because it is unbidden and uncontrollable, is not governed by social rules” (p. 551). 
Only recently has the paradigm shifted toward emotion as an integrative and healthy cognitive 
process.  Moreover, I will suggest that educational psychology has yet to catch up with this 
paradigm shift. Simultaneously, language acquisition has exploded as a field of study with the 
creation of psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, and neurolinguistics into important fields of study 
that are moving dramatically away from the purely analytical “grammar and translation” focus in 
linguistics which dates back to the study of philology.  In a like manner, Americans have—and 
by inference, American education has—“long been unsure of how to handle their emotionality 
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and are given remarkably little explicit tutoring in this complex task” (Greenberg, 2002, p. ix). 
Finally, America’s formal education system has undergone its own paradigm shift regarding the 
place and importance of language and literacy, in part because of fundamental changes in our 
understanding of first language acquisition, as well as dramatic increases in the number of 
students in our schools with limited English proficiency. Sadly, foreign language education 
methodologies and practices lag even further behind these advances both in linguistics and in 
curriculum and instruction. Consequently, the presence of these gaps in educational psychology 
and foreign language education makes the topic of emotional communication across cultures an 
excellent fit for educational psychology research. 
Centering the Question Amidst Many Fields 
  Starting from the position that issues surrounding the communication of emotions across 
languages and cultures are very sparsely addressed in the educational psychology and foreign 
language education literature, my approach in this literature review is to examine those issues 
from a variety of perspectives to arrive at some sense of both the consensus and the 
disagreements on the topic.  To center the questions and survey the literature, I will do my best to 
respond to the following questions: What is our historical perspective on emotion? What is a 
current plausible definition of emotional communication? Which academic fields have explored 
the questions intertwining emotion, language, and culture—how peoples’ emotions are displayed 
and read across cultures—in ways that informs foreign language education and educational 
psychology?  
History 
Modern research into emotion begins in the Age of Enlightenment.  Charles Darwin and 
Guillaume-Benjamin Duchene de Boulogne conducted what is generally agreed to be the first  
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“scientific” research into emotions when they set out to determine how emotions are revealed on 
human faces (Darwin, 1998).  Darwin’s research was a careful anthropological examination of 
children’s faces, while Duchene conducted clinical research on adults in a medical setting.  
Simultaneously, early psychologists were building the foundations of how emotions shape our 
personalities.  They established, for example, that our recognition of the autonomic responses 
(E.g. fight or flight instinct) within our bodies is how we recognize emotions and give those 
‘feelings’ their name.  Indeed, contemporary neurobiological research continues to support these 
notions, down to the specific emotional neural pathways in the mammalian brain (Panksepp, 
2011). Unfortunately, Darwin (1998) himself “did not explain the origin of emotional 
expressions in terms of their communicative value” (p. xxxiii from introduction by Paul Ekman).  
Furthermore, the natural and universal—or in contemporary terms, genetic—implications of 
Darwin’s research ran contrary to the traditional notions of emotions as an entity which could 
take our better reason.  In addition, the rising democratic view that humans should be able to 
control their own emotions began to dominate the layman’s conception of emotion. 
Consequently, what little research was conducted in the intervening decades downplayed the role 
of emotion: 
There is a long history of casting a disparaging intellectual gaze at the emotions. A 
tradition that dates back to Plato (1956) and continues through Freud (1924/1960) and 
still resonates today, understands the emotions as rendering one vulnerable to 
thoughtlessness. The emotions were conceived as powerful, but also brute, disorganizing 
and stuporous (Sartre, 1948). This conception has had a stranglehold over our sense of 
who we are with regard to this very important part of ourselves. It has led many an 
investigator to leave emotion out of their sphere of inquiry, since they were viewed as 
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mostly noise. (Schulkin, Thompson, & Rosen, 2003, p. 15)  
As Schulkin, Thompson, and Rosen (2003) indicate, a serious study of emotion starts at a 
disadvantage in the intellectual world, because of a fundamental predisposition in academia to 
view emotion as the antithesis of reason, logic and research—“as mostly noise.” Those who 
research emotion approach the study from a variety of different perspectives and are often at 
odds as to the fundamental meaning of “emotion” to such an extent that “consensus about the 
definition of emotion eludes us” (Campos, Campos, & Barret, 1989, p. 394). Kleinginna and 
Kleinginna (1981) document fully 92 distinct definitions of emotion that they group into 11 
different categories. From the breadth and variety of those definitions we can infer that, 
“emotion” is the sort of thing that we can all recognize when we see it, but we cannot define with 
a single consistent voice.  
 During the early Industrial Age, prior to the turn of the twentieth century and the start of 
the Modern Period, “emotions were commonly conceived of as discrete, episodic and purely 
affective states of consciousness, states whose connection to cognition, physiological activity, 
and conduct was that of either cause to effect or the converse” (Deigh, 2001, p. 1247). According 
to Deigh, Freud and James introduced “innovations of the highest order” in the psychological 
study of emotion. For Freud, “Emotions are synonymous with "psychic energy" and are linked to 
instinctual, largely unconscious drives, which must be made conscious ("where id was there ego 
shall be") in order to be "tamed" and socialized” (Hudlicka, 2004). Echoes of this Freudian 
characterization are apparent in the current concept of Emotional Intelligence. In Goleman’s 
(1995) seminal assemblage of work on emotional intelligence, he harkens back to Aristotle, “In 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s philosophical enquiry into virtue, character, and the good life, 
his challenge is to manage our emotional life with intelligence . . . the problem is not with 
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emotionality but with the appropriateness of emotion and its expression” (p. xiv, emphasis in the 
original).  
Similar contemporary echoes are seen in the fact that Freud focused extensively on 
anxiety as the most important emotion. For Freud, anxiety signals a repressed emotional 
experience that needs to be dealt with.  As indicated by the epigram at the beginning of this 
section, Freud took a rather disparaging attitude toward the study of emotion and his perspective 
has had tremendous influence on psychologists that followed in his footsteps. Indeed, even in the 
late twentieth century, scholars, like Jack Block of UC Berkeley, still take this Freudian position 
on emotion with blunt statements like: “the basic emotion is anxiety and that one tries to avoid 
anxiety.” ("EQ Today - What Are Emotions?," 2002). 
The Shift 
 The final decades of the twentieth century saw a dramatic shift in our paradigms of 
emotion.  Starting with a trickle of “new” research in the 1980s and reaching a watershed 
moment in the mid-1990s, the sources of emotion have been clearly identified in the brain, and 
the integration of emotion and reason has become undeniable.  Five texts are significant markers 
of this paradigm shift in both the popular and the academic consciousness: Howard Gardner’s 
(1983) Frames of Mind, Daniel Goleman’s  (1995) Emotional Intelligence, Stanley Greenspan's  
(1997) The Growth of the Mind, Joseph Ledoux’s  (1996) The Emotional Brain, and Antonio 
Damasio’s  (1994) Descartes' Error. Significantly, each text marks an important perspective for 
this study.  In 1983, Gardner took the first giant leap in changing the paradigm when he broke 
the narrow hold that IQ testing—which focuses almost exclusively on logic and language—had 
on our concept of intelligence. His theory of multiple intelligences states that “intelligence” is a 
complex and integrative process which is both multiple and fluid—more akin to a variety of 
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talents with relative levels of both nature and nurture components. Therefore to relate 
intelligence to a single skill or with a single number (IQ) is simply not possible. In particular, 
this notion of multiple in conjunction with intelligence opened the door for Goleman’s 
enormously popular work which turns the traditional opposition of emotion and reason—and the 
traditional view that Goleman’s title is an oxymoron —on its head through a careful collection 
and review of a vast range of groundbreaking work integrating emotional and intellectual life. 
Similarly, psychiatrist Greenspan presents a developmental model of the mind that integrates 
social, emotional, and intellectual skills and capacities. Ledoux’s work has linked the systemic 
workings of emotions to the amgydala in the brain and made it impossible to imagine emotions 
as anything other than a brain function—albeit with direct and rapid effects in the body.  Finally, 
neurologist Damasio presents a physical and cognitive justification of the function and 
integration of emotion within the brain and the integration of emotion and reason as related 
cognitive processes. These works and the wide variety of research that they review characterize 
the paradigm shift and most importantly lay the foundation for a new perspective on emotion and 
reason—an integrated model which needs to be addressed in educational psychology and foreign 
language education.  
Defining Emotion 
 Research into the topic of emotional communication certainly faces some definitional 
problems. Turner and Stets (2005) address the definitional issue broadly: “What are emotions? 
Moreover what do we mean by notions of sentiments, moods, affect, feelings, and other terms … 
surprisingly there is no definitive answer to these questions” (p. 2). Prior to the paradigm shift in 
emotion research much of the work that was closely aligned to the fields of language and 
communication tended to be descriptive and sought to focus on causes and elements of emotion 
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and emotional expressions—rather than interactive emotional communication. For example, 
Collier (1985) takes the reductionist approach seeking to divide the elements of emotional 
expression into constituent parts: 
Emotions differ from other psychological states in that the body is noticeably involved. 
…  Emotional expression is often treated as an aspect of verbal and non verbal 
communication. …  Most researchers are aware that channels of emotional expression (as 
separate sources of information) are necessary abstractions that do not exist during 
normal social interaction. (pp. 2-3) 
The critical points for our definition of emotion are the lack of distinction between feelings and 
emotions, and the breakdown of emotional expression into the “channels” that he uses to 
structure his text – they include touch, body movement and posture, facial expressions, eye 
behavior, personal space, tone of voice, grammatical features, and verbal content.   Somewhat 
paradoxically, Collier, while studying these channels, agues against their presence in “normal 
social interaction,” bluntly stating that the channels are “abstractions” that “do not exist.” Indeed, 
his contradictory stance opens the door to precisely the sort of research I am attempting here. In 
this study, we will look at each of these channels when necessary, but try to focus on the holistic 
impression of each emotional communication incident. I find it critical to point out that a 
distinction between feelings and emotions does indeed exist, and that distinction is an important 
element of the social aspects of emotional communication.  Wierzbicka (1999) draws our 
attention to the vital contrast between “feelings” and “emotions”—the first bound to the body 
and therefore universal, and the second a broader and culture bound notion:  
Thus while the concept of “feeling” is universal and can be safely used in the 
investigation of human experience and human nature, … the concept of “emotion” is 
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culture-bound and cannot be similarly relied on. … But there is absolutely no reason why 
we should make such choices, linking “emotion” either with bodily processes, or with 
feelings, or with thoughts, or with culture.  The very meaning of the English word 
emotion includes both a reference to feelings and to thoughts (as well as a reference to the 
body), and culture often shapes both ways of thinking and ways of feeling. (pp. 4-5) 
 Thus, while some elements of the “pre-paradigm shift” definitions of emotion do have 
usefulness in this study, other elements need to be reconsidered. 
 In attempting to summarize and find a consensus among those ninety-two definitions of 
emotion mentioned earlier, Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) provide the following definition of 
emotion: 
Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective factors, 
mediated by neural/hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affective experiences 
such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate cognitive processes such as 
emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes; (c) activate 
widespread physiological adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior 
that is often, but not always, expressive, goal directed, and adaptive.  (p. 355) 
Certainly, Kleinginna and Kleinginna were guilty of trying to cover all of their bases, so an 
element of the “kitchen sink” is apparent in this definition. However, they provide a good first 
stab at creating the operational definitions necessary for this research. Akin to Kleinginna and 
Kleinginna’s definition, another important and more contemporary perspective on emotions—
particularly critical in terms of emotion as a social, communicative event—is the conception of 
emotion as a process. Planalp (1999) summarizes both the definition and that critical elements of 
emotion as a process: 
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Process theories of emotion can be formally represented in several ways – with diagrams 
of prototypes, flow charts, or simple verbal descriptions – but they all describe emotion 
as a process made up of several definable subparts or components that operate together to 
produce emotion.  Although theorists may disagree about what specific components are 
essential to emotion, five appear in most theories in one form or another: (1) objects, 
causes, precipitating events, (2) appraisal (3) physiological changes, (4) action 
tendencies/action/expression, and (5) regulation. (p. 11) 
All of Kleinginna and Kleinginna’s items appear to be contained within Planalp’s process 
definition.  Planalp, however, adds the precipitating impact of external reality, as well as the 
subsequent and socially mediated effects of self-regulation. 
 One other salient distinction in defining emotions will be important for our analysis—the 
notion that our conception of emotion exists on multiple levels. Parkinson  (1995) recognizes 
that emotions need to be understood on a variety of levels. He offers three common sense levels 
of emotion:  
Thus, according to common sense, there are three apparently separate levels of 
phenomena relating to emotion, the individual (experience of emotion), the interpersonal 
(communication of emotion), and the representational (ideas about emotion), but its 
essence is still properly considered to live at the first level inside of private psyche. Each 
of the upper levels in some sense is considered as dependent upon this basic level and 
you give only a degraded and inaccurate picture of what goes on there. …  Although no 
academic analysis of emotion would import wholesale such a theory of emotional 
functioning, the intuitive conceptions still get smuggled into psychological discourse 
somehow.  (p. 14)  
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Studying the first level—internal and individual experience--is inherently problematic. Parkinson 
(1995) himself reminds us that part of the issue in clearly defining the internal level of emotion is 
corollary to Wittgenstein’s (1958) “beetle argument” regarding private language as a language 
game – or more properly not a language game. Wittgenstein presents a beetle in a box as a 
metaphor for the mind or any other purely interior mental process (which would include 
emotions). Even though everyone has a box with something inside it, we have no way of 
ascertaining precisely what is inside another person’s box; therefore, “if we construe the 
grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘objective and designation’ the subject 
drops out of consideration as irrelevant”  (p. 100). Parkinson’s (1995) point, then, is that while 
“[i]n the common sense individualistic view, emotion may be expressed to other people, but it is 
not necessarily communicated in any way” (p. 17).   While some elements of a methodological 
problem of studying this level will be addressed later in this paper, examining the problem itself 
is one of the major purposes and goals of this research.   Thus second and third levels that 
Parkinson describes are less problematic for this research, because the interpersonal level is the 
subject of the study, and the representational level is the method and product. 
 Finally, some definitions become so broad that they cease to be useful for our analysis in 
the realms of foreign language education and educational psychology.  From a sociological 
perspective, Turner and Stets (2005) offer such an inclusive definition, “in the emphasizing the 
term emotions in this book, we are asserting that this concept subsumes the phenomena denoted 
by other labels – sentiments, affect, feelings, and the like – which are often employed by 
theorists and researchers” (p. 2).  This sort of definition that accepts anyone’s definition of 
emotion simply goes too far and does not allow us to narrow the topic sufficiently to conduct a 
reasonable and efficient study.  
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Academic Perspectives Outside of Educational Psychology 
 While emotion has proven difficult for researchers to define, the importance of emotional 
communication is undeniable:  “the interpersonal communication of emotional states is 
fundamental to both everyday and clinical interaction. One’s own and others affective 
experiences are frequent topics of everyday conversations, and how well those emotions are 
expressed and understood is important to interpersonal relationships and individual well-being” 
(Fussell, 2002, p. 1). Moreover, Goddard (2002) warns us of the risk of becoming too 
ethnocentric: “the tendency for people to assume that the folk taxonomy embedded in their 
mother tongue represents a reliable guide to an independently existing, objective reality” (p. 22). 
My goal in the next section of this literature review is to establish the framework within which 
previous work has been conducted into the topic of emotional communication across cultures—
theory and research for several academic fields.  Trying to bring together research from these 
disparate academic fields is not an easy task and not one that I undertake lightly, but it is clearly 
a task needs attempted, as Scherer (2003) reminds us, in general emotion research has “one 
major shortcoming – lack of interaction between researchers from various disciplines working on 
different angles and levels of the problem – [and that shortcoming] remains unresolved” (p. 250). 
A second, and for me equally important, reason to bring together disparate academic paradigms 
for this approach is that little research has been conducted into emotional communication within 
the fields of educational psychology and foreign language education.  A third reason is that 
“collaboration, or at least triangulation of the data from different paradigms, is also necessary to 
address the third shortcoming of the current work [in communicating emotionally across 
cultures], the overreliance on studies conducted in laboratory contexts” (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 76).  
Thus, the first section of this review will establish where such study has been conducted. The 
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particular fields in which research can shed important light on this study include cognitive 
psychology, and the distinctly different approaches and findings of anthropology, sociology and 
social psychology, as well as many of the subfields of linguistics and communication studies.  To 
categorize the literature in each of these academic areas, I will explore four divergent yet 
interrelated questions regarding the research into emotional communication for each field: 1) 
what is the philosophical perspective on emotion and communication in that field, 2) 
methodologically speaking, how has each field conducted research into emotion and 
communication, 3) what sorts of results were found in the research—which will answer 
questions about how cultural differences in emotional display are expressed as well as the more 
unitary question of how emotion is communicated, and 4) how will that research impact this 
study?  
 Before embarking on an exploration of the literature, a final definitional issue affecting 
both our understanding of emotion and this research in particular is embedded in the question of 
if and how humans communicate emotion to one another. Research to date has yet to provide a 
clear framework for precisely which conversational acts produce what sort of effect. This 
missing framework in turn presents us with a real quandary in determining just exactly what an 
emotional communication is. Is it just some difference in prosody or some other behavioral act? 
Or is it the act of attribution? Do we interpret those clues as personality traits? Do we interpret 
them as emotional states? Are they temporary? What happens when the person is, actively and 
intentionally, doing some sort of manipulation with the emotions they are trying to communicate: 
for example berating or flirting? When is the emotional communication intentional and when 
spontaneous?  Pavlenko (2005) passes along the following terms to help us categorize emotional 
events: emotional communication and emotive communication. “In emotional communication, 
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interjections “wow!” or “really?” are uttered in a genuine surprise, while in emotive 
communication the same the interjections are uttered in a ritualized manner, to express 
conversational engagement and support” (p. 49). Thus far in this paper, I have used the term 
“emotional communication” as a super-ordinate term covering both categories; however, the 
second category of emotive communication is the primary focus of this research. Emotive 
communication is clearly related to the notion of display rules: by definition, display rules are 
among the communicative conversational tools of the specific culture. 
Cognitive perspectives  
Philosophical foundations of cognitive research in emotion.   
In that traditions and metaphors of many cultures emotions have been attributed to organs 
in the human body other than the brain. In the Hindu tradition, a series of chakra in the body are 
the sources of emotion.  In traditional Chinese medicine, the emotions are associated with 
elements and the elements in turn with organs, connections which one Chinese medicine website 
describes as follows: “The Liver is associated with Wood and therefore with Anger, the Heart 
with Fire and Joy, the Spleen with Earth and Pensiveness, the Lung with Metal and Grief and the 
Kidney with Water and Fear” (Zhao & Morgan, 2004, p. ¶ 5). In Western traditions, both the 
heart and the spleen have been implicated as sources of emotion. Modern science tells us that a 
critical distinguishing element of emotion is the body’s reaction—Planalp’s (1999) 
“physiological changes”—to the emotion-producing stimulus. Our hearts race, we feel nauseous, 
or we break out into a cold sweat: folk theories thus attribute emotions to the other organs than 
the brain. Our modern understanding of emotions links them directly to activity in the brain; 
consequently, the fields of psychology and neurology have been active in research into emotions.   
I will consider both fields together trying to make careful distinctions between the two as we 
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move along. 
 Here again, I take the risk of over-generalizing regarding the philosophical approach of 
psychology. At a very fundamental level, psychology attempts to understand that the workings of 
the human mind, or “psyche,” by observing and analyzing overt behaviors. In analyzing those 
behaviors, a primary goal is to determine which emotions, if any, are basic, universal, and 
fundamental emotions for every human. As part of mainstream practice, one would not consider 
social and cultural issues to be primary in psychological research. Although both social 
psychology and cultural psychology are active fields of research, neither has been particularly 
active in research into emotions and communication. The various fields of neuroscience have a 
significantly different philosophical perspective in research. The primary focus has been to 
determine if and how all the brain respond us differently to different emotionally charged 
stimuli, which we would expect to produce different cognitive and physiological responses. 
Methodological preferences within cognitive research in emotion. 
Within psychology, recent research has been dominated on one hand by basic emotion 
studies from, notably, Ekman, Izard, and others (Ekman, 1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2003; 
Ekman, et al., 1972; Izard, 1977, 1991, 1994; Oakley, 1992), and on the other hand by appraisal 
studies most notably from Ellsworth and Smith, and Scherer (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Gehm & 
Scherer, 1988; K. R. Scherer, 1993, 1999; K. R. Scherer & Ellgring, 2007; Schumann, 1997; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). Ekman’s (Ekman, 1993, 1999b, 2003) studies of the facial 
expression have been extensive and highly influential. The basic methodology of these studies is 
a forced choice task with photographs of faces displaying staged expressions of emotion.  Prior 
to beginning the research, Ekman needed to select which emotions to have modeled, then 
photograph, and finally to show to the subjects. Ekman (1993) states that these emotions and the 
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particular facial movements that are indicative of them meet “a priori criteria for what 
configurations should be present in each” (p. 305). However, Ekman, and simultaneously Izard, 
discovered that some models were better at creating the configurations for being photographed 
then others were. Consequently, the researchers chose to select the “better” photographs. In 
Ekman’s case, the researcher selected based on those a priori criteria, while in Izard’s 
studies(1977, 1991, 1994) American undergraduate students were asked to judge the 
photographs, then the ones which showed the highest rate of agreement on emotion expressed 
were used. The next step was to show the photographs to people from different cultures. The 
“forced choice” aspect of the study comes in the fact that these subjects were only given a small 
number of emotional words to choose from for each photograph. Generally, six (or so) emotion 
words were used in the list, including: happiness, anger, fear, sadness, surprise, disgust. 
In studies of appraisal theory, the primary methodology has been the use of surveys of 
recalled events to analyze individuals’ appraisal mechanisms and which emotions are associated 
with which sort of appraisals. More descriptively, the respondents would be asked to recall an 
emotionally charged situation that they had experienced, then they are asked a series of questions 
regarding that event. The questions are directly associated with the elements of appraisal in the 
theory the researcher is attempting to validate. For example, Ghem and Scherer (1988) asked 
questions to check five elements of their hypothesis: novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, goal 
significance, coping potential, and norm compatibility. What is philosophically and 
methodologically important with this particular set of research is, first, the desire to test appraisal 
theory – often in a specific version of appraisal theory, and, second, the use of recalled emotional 
experience (Schumann, 1997). 
A second field of study is important research into emotion and communication with a 
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broadly cognitive perspective is neurobiology. Like the field of psychology, the primary focus of 
emotion research within the field of neurobiology is on the study of “basic” emotions – that is, 
neuroscientists begin with some fundamental assumptions about the existence of basic emotions 
in order to search for them; moreover, these have neuroscientists have sought to pinpoint the 
locations within the brain where emotions in general are processed and where specific and 
“basic” emotions are processed. As research in their neurobiology is quite distinctly in the 
medical field, the research methodology differs significantly from the research used in 
psychology. Research in neurobiology is driven by technology, which has seen quantum leaps in 
recent decades, as well as a quantitative approach to analyzing research data.  
Historically, the relationship between brain function and language use has been studied 
inferentially through work with individuals who suffer from aphasia – a loss of language skills 
due to brain damage typically caused by physical injury or disease (Sacks, 1985).  Quite 
commonly, these studies of aphasia implicated damage to emotional communication processing, 
as well. The location and extent of that damage is then related to the specific type of 
communication function loss.  By relating the damaged area and specific function lost, 
researchers then infer that the specific area where the brain damage occurred is responsible for 
that specific function. Such procedures suffer from a number of admitted flaws.  Rarely does 
brain damage occur in a sufficiently precise way to produce the desired effects--e.g. an inability 
to communicate non-verbally.  Also, since identical brain injuries are virtually impossible, how 
individual differences affect the manner in which different people process and store 
language/emotion information in their brains had, therefore, been virtually impossible to study 
through these inferential and secondary methods.  Moreover, natural processes in the brain allow 
areas neighboring damage to take over some of the function of the damaged area.  Diamond and 
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Hopson (1998) cite several examples of brain damage that does not match such maps of the brain 
in a wide variety of ways.  Because of these weaknesses in traditional studies of neurobiology 
and communication, recent breakthroughs in technology, such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) are critical, dynamic, and breathtaking 
opportunities to peer into healthy, active brains and watch them at work in ways that would have 
been unimaginable only a few years ago.  Indeed, these tools have helped dispel some long held 
myths about how we process language in our brains.  From a process perspective, the primary 
message of neurological research into language, emotions, and communication has been as 
follows. First, the subjects are placed inside of these large brain scanning machines (fMRI or 
PET). Next, the subjects are shown some type of stimulus for either language or emotional 
response –e.g. slides of words or video of emotionally charged situations. The machines record 
the neural activity as well as the location of that activity with different levels of specificity. 
Finally, the neural activity data is translated by computer into images, which are then read and 
interpreted by the neurologist (see figure 1). The images indicate where the most activity is in the 
brain while a particular event is occurring. From this information, we interpret which part of the 
brain is involved in a specific function. Recent advances in the overall technology particularly in 
regards to computer processing have allowed neuroscientists to go beyond the sorts of two 
dimensional still images of the brain that we can see in figure 1 to provide three-dimensional, 
“movie like” images of the brain activity (see 
http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/education/fmri/introduction-to-fmri/ (Devlin, 2008) for a description).  
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Figure 1. A brain scan image showing emotional response. The online caption reads 
“This figure shows functional magnetic resonance images, fMRI, (top row) and positron 
emission tomography, PET, images (bottom row) from two individuals. Information from 
the fMRI helped identify the precise location of the area of the brain called the amygdala 
while data from the PET scan revealed activity in the amygdala.” 
(http://www.news.wisc.edu/packages/emotion/media.html, ("Brain and Emotions 
Research at UW-Madison: Photos, images and animations for media," 2001) 
In summary, critical methodological perspectives from neurobiological research are markedly 
different from the techniques suggested for this study. Where neuroscience relies heavily on 
quantitative methods, the study will incorporate qualitative methods, and where neuroscience 
relies heavily on technological tools and analysis, the study will use ethnographic tools 
particularly focus groups. 
Critical findings within cognitive research in emotion. 
Facial expression research in the study of emotion has generated a significant body of 
work. Indeed in the more than 30 years since the initial studies were conducted, a great deal of 
criticism and analysis of both the results and the methodology have occurred in the literature. 
Some good portion of the interest in the topic and the studies can be attributed to the fact that the 
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findings ran counter to the prevailing academic perspective that facial expressions associated 
with emotions were socially constructed. Moreover, that “prevailing academic perspective” ran 
counter to the commonsense interpretation that emotions are written “all over one’s face,” or as 
Ekman (Ekman, 1993) writes, “That this contradicted what every layman knew made it all the 
more attractive. Psychology had exposed the falseness of a folk belief, a counterintuitive 
finding” (p. 384). In summary, Ekman concludes that those six emotions are universal across 
cultures of all sorts Western, Eastern, and even several preliterate cultures: 
 Our evidence, and that of others, shows only that when people are experiencing strong 
emotions, are not making any attempt to mask their expressions, the expression will be 
the same regardless of age, race, culture, sex and education. That is a powerful finding. 
(Ekman, 1998, p. 391, cited in Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 59). 
Indeed, those results are a powerful finding; however, the caveats themselves represent equally 
interesting and powerful representations up how people communicate with emotions—the sorts 
of loopholes one could drive a truck through. To reiterate, the two significant caveats are: first, 
the strength of the emotions, and second, whether they are making an attempt to mask their 
emotions. Both of these caveats are critical to this study, and I will discuss them in more detail 
shortly. The important conclusion from this body of research is fairly straightforward. A weak 
interpretation, and therefore “universally” accepted, would be that, and statistically significant 
ways, several basic emotions are universal to the human species, because people can recognize 
the facial and vocal expression of those emotions across cultures from Eastern and Western--
from preliterate to literate. 
The second strand of research within psychology, appraisal studies, also presents some 
interesting and important findings in understanding how human beings deal with emotions. 
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Scherer’s studies (Gehm & Scherer, 1988; K. R. Scherer, 1993) have shown that different sorts 
of appraisals analyzed through  “stimulus evaluation checks” are indeed well correlated to some 
basic emotional phrases. Indeed, Scherer (1993) conducted a novel study in which a computer 
was programmed to predict the emotion that subjects were recalling. In other words, subjects 
were asked to recall an emotionally charged experience, then responded to the evaluation checks, 
and in the computer used to the previous correlations to predict which emotion the subject was 
recalling. The computer’s accuracy was quite high ranging from 65 to 80%; thus, Scherer 
concludes: “with 14 emotion alternatives one would expect 7.14% accuracy if the system 
operated on chance level, this result seems quite respectable” (p. 347). 
In their studies of appraisal Smith and Ellsworth (1985, 1987)  also looked at various 
dimensions of appraisal using a questionnaire to analyze the informant responses. One of their 
studies (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987) is particularly notable in the fact that the researchers analyzed 
not recalled experiences but a stressful experience – taking an examination – both before and 
after that experience. A particularly interesting finding of the study was that “subjects usually 
experienced blends of two emotions both before the exam and after feedback, but the patterns of 
appraisal were very similar to those found in” their previous research (Schumann, 1997, p. 15).   
Also notable is the distinction that “lived emotions” produced blends of emotional experience 
while in recalled experiences, psychologically at least, the participants’ emotions can more 
readily be separated, psychologically at least, into individual basic emotions. 
Research in that second field of study, neurobiology, has produced important results for 
our understanding of emotion and communication. Neurobiological research, in significant part 
due to those recent advances in technology, has produced findings that inform this study in 
several ways: an accurate picture of the neurological basis of language processing, a better 
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understanding of the neurological basis of emotion, and particularly in how language use, as well 
as linguistic and emotional processing work together to create emotional expressions and 
emotional understanding. 
To begin with, findings regarding the locations of language processing, through those 
technological advances, have facilitated key changes in perspective by allowing us to “see” the 
locations and functioning of language use within the human brain dynamically and in real time.  
Perhaps the best example is the abandonment of the “single circuit” notion: “until recently, 
scientists thought that all language skills—reading, writing, and rhyming—were contained 
within a single brain circuit.  They were wrong” (Begley, 1992, p. 69); thus, traditional tried (but 
untrue) notions are being turned on their head. Similarly, the logical notion that the brain 
processes the sounds in order to store words proves untrue, and moreover, researchers currently 
believe that people can store the information about words via either auditory or visual signals 
(Begley, 1992).  This fact is supported by extensive anecdotal evidence about foreign language 
learners who are able to read and not speak, and vice versa.  Perhaps more importantly Raichle’s 
research indicates that a speaker’s auditory centers do not process sound when that speaker is 
speaking--“you don’t process what you say in the same way that you hear what others say” 
(Begley, 1992, p. 69). Our brain functions in many ways defy the very logic that we create using 
those brains.  In support of critical period theory, but contrary to the notion that the brain is a 
static entity, researchers have discovered that language processing is nowhere near as localized 
as was once thought.  Further evidence indicates that many different areas of the brain are in use 
when learning and when using language.  Mills, Coffey-Corina and Neville (1993, 1997) show 
that language is processed throughout the brain in infants and later becomes localized in patterns 
that are similar for healthy adults, yet still in broader areas of the brain than in the single circuit 
  41 
 
notion. Similarly, a study by Buchanan et al. (2000) presents “findings [that] illustrate bilateral 
involvement in the detection of emotion in language while concomitantly showing significantly 
lateralized activity in both emotional and verbal detection, in both the temporal and frontal 
lobes” (p. 227). Similarly, the results of McNeeley and Parlow’s (2001) study supports the 
suggestion that “verbal and nonverbal processes may be lateralized to the left and right 
hemispheres, respectively; however, distinct (i.e., unrelated [and unlateralized]) mechanisms 
underlie these differences in lateralization”  Ultimately, Damasio  (1994) provides what is 
currently the best idea of the language data storage process.  His research determined that the 
brain stores different aspects of a concept in different regions at the rear of the cortex.  Other 
areas, which he calls convergence zones--located more toward the front of the brain--seem to 
access the different pieces of information, combine them, and enable us to recognize the concept, 
but this process is not available to our conscious awareness. 
Because we clearly cannot be conscious of our learning and thinking processes—at least 
when we are considering which areas of the brain are managing which skills and how they 
handle that management—we will need to rely on this rapidly growing field of neurobiological 
research to design our foreign language instruction to meet the learning and thinking within 
students’ brains.  Regardless of the potential of “brain scans” and other technologies, we still 
have far to go to understand how the brain learns language and much work to do to develop 
methodology to match that learning. The most important factor for this study is the new 
understandings that are developing out of this research regarding the connections between 
language processing and emotional processing in the working brain. 
The technological advances that allow us to better understand language processing also 
aid our understanding of emotional processing.  Similarly, more holistic notions are supplanting 
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older notions of emotional processing as Schumann notes: “But what emerges is the notion that 
processes that may be seen as separate and independent at the psychological level may be united 
or at least highly integrated at the neural level” (Schumann, 1997, p. 237).  From Schumann’s 
perspective, cognition and emotion appear separate in our daily lives, but are intertwined within 
our brains.  If this is the case, we need to carefully consider what impact that fact has on foreign 
language teaching.  
 Basically, the amygdala, in the evolutionarily older areas of the brain near the brain stem, 
processes much of what we call emotion.  It has direct links to the hormone producing 
hypothalmus, which when activated makes us “feel” our emotions through enhanced bodily 
functions--heart rate, pupil dilation, etc.  Those processes, however, are interrelated with 
cognitive functions, as well as memory.  Ledoux (1996) and Greenspan (1997) are primarily 
concerned with how we feel emotion, i.e. the mechanical nuts and bolts of emotion.  Schumann 
(1997) and Goleman (1995), on the other hand, explore how these emotions are interpreted in 
society.  While these issues can be considered problems of pragmatics--the study of the 
relationship of language to the environment in which it occur--to a certain extent, my approach 
here is to start form the emotions rather than the situation or the language.  In either approach, 
the communication and recognition of emotional clues, as well as the culturally specific 
negotiation associated with them (whether appropriate or not), are certainly processed to a great 
extent in the prefrontal lobes and other areas of the cortex.  This processing occurs 
simultaneously with the language processing in the rear of the brain described by Damsio (1994), 
which leads us to consider how the two processes are related as elements of a holistic 
communication process. 
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 Through these lines of research we see the familiar, traditional paradigms for language 
processing in the brain that language processing--specifically grammatical processing--occurs in 
the left hemisphere of the brain disproved.  Several researchers (Brownlee, 1998; Mills, et al., 
1993, 1997; Mollica & Danesi, 1995) have shown that prior to three years of age such 
grammatical processing occurs throughout the brain, but then moves to a very tight area of the 
temporal lobe just above the left ear.  Ultimately, the memories of words and their meaning 
appear to be stored throughout the cortex, particularly toward the back of the brain, grammar 
functions are processed in the left side almost exclusively.  Some portions of the language 
learning and using process can be localized (E.g. grammar rules), but many other important ones 
(E.g. lexis) are spread throughout the brain.  Furthermore, they overlap and co-reside with areas 
that are involved in emotions.  Integral to the remainder of this essay, the right temporal lobe 
contains the information regarding emotional content of language--cadence, pitch, and rhythm.   
Impact of cognitive research in emotion on this study. 
The impact of cognitive research in emotion on this study involves both the critical new 
insights that this research provides as well as the gaps and weaknesses of this research.  This 
short section will explore each in turn: how psychological and neurobiological research has 
provided useful insights, and how that same research has revealed gaps and weaknesses in both 
assumptions and methodology. 
 On the psychological side of cognitive research, the idea that facial expression and vocal 
inflection can, to a great extent, convey information about emotions is critical. Moreover, cross-
cultural research that has shown both similarities and differences in emotional expressions 
reveals that the question of basic or universal emotions is still unanswered. As I have related, 
Ekman’s own definition of our ability to recognize basic emotions carries with it several caveats, 
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specifically, the relative strength of the emotion expressed, and the masking of those emotions 
(Parkinson, et al., 2005). This research will attempt to address both of those caveats – in my 
interpretation “gaps” – by presenting dynamic video expressions of more naturalistic emotional 
displays, while allowing research participants to rate their interpretation of those factors.  
 One weakness often pointed out regarding facial expression research is the relative 
inability of the pre-literate civilizations to accurately name expressions in the forced choice still 
photo studies.  Parkinson, et al. (2005) review several studies and articles that bring into question 
the relative accuracy of preliterate civilizations in judging emotions, as well as Ekman’s 
suggested solutions to this problem. They conclude: 
It is clear that emotion relevant faces are interpreted with some consistency across 
cultures, suggesting a universal link between facial position and at least some aspect or 
correlate of the emotion. However, it is also apparent that variation exists both within and 
across societies in the extent of this consistency. This suggests at a minimum that cultural 
expertise and socialization play some role in the attribution of emotional meaning to 
facial expressions. (Parkinson, et al., 2005)  
Their conclusion that socialization and cultural expertise are important to provide excellent 
reason for this research to further define and explore how social and cultural factors play a role 
in emotional expression and particularly in how we might find ways to incorporate those factors 
into foreign language education. 
Additionally, the idea that masking of emotions frequently occurs in social interaction is, 
of course, critical to cross-cultural communication. Display rules are by definition this sort of 
masking. In general, few would argue that cultures do not in some way regulate the display of 
various emotions: “a culture that disapproves of anger (e.g., Briggs, 1970) may encourage its 
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members to cover up or suppress any expression of this emotion on the face” (Parkinson, et al., 
2005, p. 63). However, Parkinson et al. continue to state that many in the field have argued that 
display rules should not affect the comprehension of someone else’s expression of a basic 
emotion – and additionally that conscious mechanisms of decoding display rules would be 
inefficient and improbable unless those mechanisms became very intuitive for the members of a 
culture. Indeed, when display rules differ across cultures in dynamic cross cultural conversation, 
particularly given “that display rules sometimes become so ingrained that their operation goes 
unnoticed” (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 63),  we would expect cross-cultural misunderstandings 
based on the fact that the person from the other culture was too emotional, not emotional or 
expressed emotions in a peculiar way based on our own culturally modified appraisal of the 
appropriate expression given the situation. Because culturally established emotional masking and 
display rules are admitted factors in the expression of emotions and clearly the most likely 
source of miscommunication of emotion, I will attempt to explore those issues more fully in the 
study. 
 Also under the umbrella of cognitive psychology research, appraisal theory and studies 
provides both a foundation for and openings for the study I am conducting. The survey-based 
methodology of this research is much more in the direction of the sort of qualitative approach I 
will take.  Many social and cultural mechanisms, preferences, and attitudes are embedded within 
the assumptions of survey research – moving away from notions of basic, universal, or genetic 
character of emotion and emotional expression. That our appraisal and evaluation of the situation 
we encounter is highly predictive of the emotions that we experience and express is an important 
factor in explaining the sorts of cross-cultural misunderstandings that I intend to explore.  By 
presenting more detailed information about the situation in which the emotions are expressed I 
  46 
 
hope to discover if cross-cultural interpretation of the emotions expressed is more or less 
problematic.  Certainly, the finding that appraisal characteristics are both descriptive and 
predictive of emotional expression (Gehm & Scherer, 1988; K. R. Scherer, 1993) will be useful 
in this study. 
One gap in appraisal studies that is also present in facial expression studies is the effect of 
mixed emotions being expressed at the same time. Ekman’s work begins with the a priori 
assumption of a single emotion being expressed, preventing any analysis of mixed emotion.  
Indeed, Greasley, Sherrard, & Waterman (2000) note that assumptions underlying basic emotion 
research using forced choice methodology are somewhat problematic in terms of mixed 
emotions:  
While this experiment has shown that free choice labels are largely consistent with “basic 
emotion” labels, we have also seen that for 46% of our “negative emotion” samples there 
was no clear similarity across judges’ responses to which “basic emotion” label was most 
appropriate to describe the emotional state of the speaker. These results indicate that a 
fixed choice mode of response giving subjects choice of just one label from a small range 
of “basic emotions,” may not allow the subjects of an adequate level of discrimination in 
identifying a speaker’s emotional state. (p. 364) 
 Pavlenko (2005) elaborates on these findings relating that more naturalistic approaches may 
enable participants to disentangle the emotions that occur in the course of normal conversation.  
Similarly, Smith and Ellsworth (1987) note an important finding that—in the stressful situation 
of taking a college examination—mixed emotions are usually experienced. Remember also that 
many of the other appraisal studies reliant on residing at on participants relied on the 
participants’ recollection of their previous experience of a specific emotion, much in the same 
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way that facial expression studies present only a single expression of a single emotion. Neither of 
these situations represents the lived experience that human beings have every day. We are 
always presenting emotions “on-the-fly,” in all probability in combination with other emotions, 
and almost certainly to varying degrees of intensity based on the situation. While in our 
intellectual discussion each emotion is presented quite distinctly, in practical reality emotions 
almost certainly fit into the category of cognitive events which Schumann (1997) describes as, 
“separate and independent at the psychological level [that] may be united or at least highly 
integrated” (p. 237). Clearly, the practical reality of mixed emotion represents emotions beyond 
the basic level: the sorts of emotions which Turner and Stets (2005) described as secondary 
emotions (in opposition to primary emotions – which are Ekman’s basic emotions), and which 
we will consider in more detail in the following subsection. For the purposes of this study, the 
gaps in consideration of mixed emotions and emotional intensity brought about by forced choice 
methodology prompt me to make use of two methodological tools: first, allow participants to 
describe emotion with free choice vocabulary and second to rate intensity of forced choice “basic 
emotion” options. 
 The other cognitive area of study that we are considering in this dissertation is 
neurobiological research.  Indeed, neuroscience research, in significant part due to those recent 
advances in technology, is the catalyst that drove the paradigm shift in emotional research. 
Specifically, we were able to see ways in which aphasia studies and psychological studies are 
quite limited in their ability to analyze the working of the human brain. Neuroscience has 
provided a broadly different view of emotion and language that research informs this study: a 
picture of the neurology of language and emotion processing—how linguistic and emotional 
processing work together to create emotional expressions and emotional understanding. Clearly, 
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language is continually being processed throughout the brain, and a whole brain is required to 
process even the most pedestrian conversations and their emotional import.   Consequently, if we 
do not incorporate these facts into our foreign language teaching curriculum and methodology, 
we will miss an opportunity to serve our students. At the same time, however, because of the 
restrictions of that technology (an fMRI machine is big) this sort of research is unable to delve 
into both the natural occurrence of emotional communication, as well as the social and cultural 
factors involved in emotional communication. I will explain the methodological procedures in 
more detail later, but while I take the findings of neuroscience research into emotion and 
language into consideration in developing the study the methodological tools I will use will be 
very different.  
Social and anthropological perspectives 
 All the world is a stage, and all men and women merely players 
Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II, Scene 7 
 
That I turn my attention to social perspectives next would seem to me particularly fitting 
in that anthropology, sociology and cognitive psychology have tried to establish very different 
research methodologies, agendas, and perspectives – some would argue polar opposite 
perspectives – which also explore the same topics.  I must point out however, that I use the term 
“social perspectives” here because of the significant crossover between anthropology, sociology, 
social psychology and a few other fields with like perspectives – I will do my best to distinguish 
between general social perspectives and sociological perspectives in particular. Moreover, while 
I have stated this before, I wish to emphasize once again that this study will explore emotion 
from within the construct of the display rules that govern the expression of emotion and the 
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comprehension of emotional meaning. Thus, this study seeks to present a contrast to the premise 
that emotional universals are the most critical element of our emotional lives, particularly when 
those lives interact across cultures and engage “the Other.”  While not denying the existence of 
emotional universals, the idea that emotional expression as governed by display rules implies 
that emotional communication represents an inherently social event. Moreover, the idea that, as 
social constructs, emotional communication events must therefore differ across cultures is the 
fundamental premise of this study. Perhaps more simply, the intercultural differences in 
emotional expression are where problems of intercultural miscommunication arise.  
“One of the key issues of current debate in the psychology of emotion concerns the 
universality versus cultural relativity of emotional expression” (K. R. Scherer, Banse, & 
Wallbott, 2001, p. 76). We have reviewed Ekman (1999a) and others arguments for universal 
and basic emotions.  Consequently, I suspect that few if any human beings have not felt each of 
those “basic” emotions.  Yet we have seen in a variety of ways that the research that suggests 
and supports the universality of these specific emotions is highly structured and suffers from 
gaps and weaknesses.  Ultimately, the vast majority of the research is both designed and 
structured through and American and English language lens– a fact in itself supporting the 
validity of Wierzbicka’s (1999) argument that language  inherently mediates and differentiates 
our understanding and use of emotion in significant ways. Planalp (1999) extends the argument 
against the ethnocentricity of the basic emotions position, “because it assumes an individual, 
internal state model of emotion that is hidden and is expressed rather than a model in which 
participants enact an emotional event or situation together in public” (p. 213). A simple thought 
experiment indicates that basic emotions are only part of the story.  For a moment, imagine you 
are a participant in one of those appraisal studies we discussed earlier.  Picture some powerful 
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emotion you have felt. Did that emotion involve other people? Perhaps you, like me, have 
difficulty in imagining an emotional experience that does not involve other people.  Let’s expand 
that experiment a bit more, imagine an emotional experience that you were having in solitude, 
but you were interrupted—perhaps you were reading a book, or watching a program on 
television or a DVD or video and someone else heard you laughing, or crying and came in to see 
what was going on.  Did your expression of that emotion change in manner or intensity in the 
presence of another person?  Did you try to stop crying, or not laugh as loud?  Did you use your 
emotions to draw the other person into your experience?  Unsurprisingly, this thought 
experiment has been carried out in a number of experimental studies (U. Hess, Banse, & Kappas, 
1995; Jakobs, Manstead, & Fischer, 1999a, 1999b, 2001; Yamamoto & Suzuki, 2006). In 
general, experimental participants in these studies were placed in either in isolation or in 
groups/pairs of either strangers or friends and then shown stimuli that elicited emotional 
responses of varying intensity.  All of the studies found a social element to emotional 
expressions and showed a complex interaction of social factors. One early experiment concluded 
and was supported by later studies regarding the interaction of three factors of sociality 
(participants in isolation or in groups), intensity of emotion displayed, and relationship 
(participants in the groups either friends or strangers): “The results indicate that the intensity of 
expressive displays cannot be satisfactorily predicted by either of these factors alone but is 
influenced by a complex interplay of all 3 factors” (U. Hess, et al., 1995, p. 280). Clearly, we are 
hardwired for some basic emotions that can to be traced far back down our evolutionary tree, but 
nearly as far back in that evolutionary tree, we see that emotions are intricately, inseparably 
intertwined with the social needs, skills and, talents that distinguish humans for “lesser” animals. 
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Thus, the social perspective on emotion must be included in the constellation of fields that 
inform our understanding of cross-cultural emotional communication.  
Philosophical foundations of social and anthropological research in emotion. 
While I have titled this subsection “philosophical foundations,” I will cover a bit more 
herein. We will look at the how and why of emotion from a sociological point of view, address 
the question of rationality versus emotion through the sociological lens, and consider some major 
themes of sociology as they relate to the study of emotion.  
You may recall that Turner and Stets (2005) in The Sociology of Emotions offered the 
broadest definition of emotion that I could find: “In emphasizing the term emotions in this book 
we are asserting that this concept subsumes the phenomena noted by other labels – sentiments, 
affect, feelings, and the like – which are often employed by theorists and researchers” (p. 2). 
Their rationale for this all-inclusive definition is as follows: “Surprisingly, there is no definitive 
answer to these questions (Van Brackel, 1994). Indeed, there are almost as many answers as 
there are theoretical approaches examining the dynamics of emotions” (p. 2).  Frankly, I had to 
ask: why would the authors offer such a broad definition – a definition, that I suggested earlier 
goes too far? At one level, the author’s intention is to write a text that surveys the existing 
literature, so they clearly hope to cover as much as possible. Another possible reason is that 
recent paradigm shift in the explosion of theory and research associated with it. In both cases the 
important implication for my research is that anthropology and sociology have not completely 
solidified their perspectives methodology and research targets in terms of emotion, in general, 
and the communication of emotion, in particular. 
Parkinson et al. (2005) point out that as a psychological and anthropological project – and 
therefore a sociological one – the task of leading differences in emotions and emotional 
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communication across cultures raises some important questions: 
Are people talking about the same things when they talk about “emotions” in different 
cultures or at different times? What exactly counts as an emotion in one culture compared 
to another? Is they are precisely the same variety and number of “emotions” in all 
cultures and languages? Is it self evident that there must be phenomenon corresponding 
to our own idea of what emotions are in all other cultures?  
The answer to each of these questions is no. (p. 29) 
The sociological perspective on the communication of emotions across culture must be one that 
is looking at the differences and hoping to better understand them. Recognizing that the 
differences in emotional communication are the fundamental research problem in sociological 
studies into emotion, Parkinson et al. (2005) offer a three level framework3 to both describe the 
types of current analysis and guide future analysis of the sociological questions associated with 
emotional communication:  
The first and most obvious level is the interpersonal level which focuses on direct 
relations and interactions with other people and on how their conduct influences and is 
influenced by our own … a second level permits consideration of how individuals’ 
conduct is shaped by the fact that they belong to groups. …  as groups get larger over the 
course of history they tend to subdivide and stratified to develop traditions and rules, no 
formal and informal. … Distinctions between interpersonal, group, and cultural factors 
often get fuzzy. 
Indeed this three-level distinction of how people communicate their emotions can be difficult to 
tease apart. In the practical reality of this proposed study, all three levels must come into play. 
                                                 
3 Rephrasing the perspective previously cited from (Parkinson, 1995). 
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Each participant will be having their own emotional experiences at the first level as well as 
trying to describe them. Also, as this will be a focus group study, the factors of the focus group at 
the second level will be critical. Finally, the fundamental purpose of the study is to determine if 
cross culturally distinct emotional communication factors can be uncovered, and therefore be 
germane foreign language education, is the ultimate goal of the study.  Clearly, these “hows and 
whys” associated with sociological studies into emotional communication will be critical for my 
research. 
    As I have discussed, Western science has drawn a stark contrast between rationality 
and emotion: “Historically, in Western thought, emotion and reason were considered opposing 
forces with emotions and irrationality at one pole and cognition and rationality at the other pole” 
(Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 21). This conceptualization within Western thought has been a major 
cause of both the lack of research into emotion as well as the “diminishment” of emotion 
research – attempting to turn what research is being done into a sort of “second tier” branch of 
study. Thus, the question of rationality versus emotion is pivotal to the sociological 
understanding of emotional communication. Indeed, one conception of the field of sociology is 
as a bridge between the “hard rationality” of science and the “soft relativity” of human 
experience: “For example, Max Weber  (1922/1968) conceptualized action as ‘rational’ and 
‘affectual’” (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 21). Collins (1993), in an argument reminiscent of Nash’s 
equilibrium theory (Nasar, 2001), contends that emotions are the “common denominator of 
rationality” because our rational actions inherently depend upon our ability to judge the affect 
bestowed in a particular situation. Moreover, the effect which the affect contributes to the 
individual’s assessment of the utility of one or another course of action leaves the idea of display 
rules a short step away from a Nash equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium definition of a 
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display rule would represent an emotionally charged situation where any individual’s best 
strategy for emotional expression would be to follow the display rule, and, additionally, any 
alternative strategy that might improve the individual’s situation would also result in an 
improvement of the situation for the entire cooperative group. Consequently, a sociological 
treatment of emotion must ultimately explore “cultural ideologies, beliefs, and norms as they 
impinge on social structures define what emotions are to be experienced and how these culturally 
defined emotions are to be expressed” (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 2).  
Methodological preferences within social and anthropological research in emotion. 
 Just as the cognitive and social perspectives have different philosophical approaches to 
question of emotional communication across cultures, the methodologies employed in research 
in anthropology and sociology are strikingly different than those used by cognitive researchers. 
The broad generalization that cognitive approaches are generally quantitative while sociological 
approaches are qualitative is broadly true with the study of emotion within each field as well. 
Specifically, we have seen how cognitive methodologies often involve experimental studies done 
in a laboratory setting that are analyzed through statistical and quantitative procedures. In 
contrast, sociological studies rely on questionnaires, interviews, participant observation and other 
ethnographic procedures; however, “anthropological investigations too often have tended to 
concentrate on semantic aspects of emotional meaning” (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 44). Though 
we find a range of methodologies in both cognitive science and anthropology/sociology, a fair 
characterization of the preferred methodologies of each would place them at opposing ends of 
the quantitative/qualitative spectrum.  
The methodology that overlaps with cognitive studies is survey research – and while I do 
not intend to conduct a large-scale survey, questionnaires are certainly part of my intention for 
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this study. Such surveys however suffer from several limitations. For one, the detailed analysis 
of forced choice, individual word meanings can provide information about the general 
interpretation of “category exemplars, but tell us very little about how words are actually used in 
less abstract contexts” (Parkinson, et al., 2005, pp. 43-44). Additionally, questionnaires rely on 
inherently imprecise translations of the key emotional vocabulary. Unfortunately, in a cross-
cultural study it becomes very difficult to tease out whether the differences in response are based 
on differences in cultural interpretation or differences in translation of the vocabulary: “in fact it 
may simply be that the different emotion words presented to members of the two cultures lead 
them to pick out a different phenomenon or different aspects of the same phenomena”(Parkinson, 
et al., 2005, p. 84). 
 While ethnography, as well as the interviews and participant observation that are part 
and parcel of an ethnography, are also subject to translation problems, the more intense and long 
term interaction of the researcher with subjects can quote get around these issues can “get around 
these issues to some extent by making more direct observations of the emotional phenomenon in 
question” (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 85). Also, qualitative methods in general, and 
anthropological ethnography specifically, are somewhat more subject to bias created by the 
researcher’s own frame of reference, as their “observations are bound to be conditioned by the 
anthropologist’s own cultural perspective” (Parkinson, et al., 2005, p. 85). In the end, my 
methodological conclusion in relation to the divide between cognitive and sociological 
methodologies is that some sort of mixed method may be appropriate in this case, as Parkinson et 
al. (2005) suggest: “in principle, these pragmatic functions of emotion language may be 
identified from ethnographic analysis, and intensive, qualitative studies of this kind may help 
supplement the more quantitative findings” (p. 44). 
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Critical findings within social and anthropological research in emotion. 
As any academic field has particular themes and topics of interest, the study of emotion 
within anthropology and sociology has been guided to some extent by themes within the fields of 
study. The major theme I will review is clearly the most prominent issue to be addressed in 
sociological study of emotional communication – the social construction of emotion and 
emotional expression within cultures. In addition, I will explore some less prominent issues 
surrounding emotional communication that are also central themes in anthropology and 
sociology including: gender, power, and cultural differences that frequently “get hogtied” into 
the marco-concept of individualism/collectivism. 
At the outset, we should recall that the notion of social construction is critical not only to 
anthropology and sociology but to education as well making this theme doubly important to this 
proposed study.  You will recall that Ekman began his research when the dominant notion in the 
field of psychology – championed by Margaret Mead and others – was that emotions were 
created culturally. In contemporary parlance – emotions represent a social construction. Even 
now in the 21st century, Turner & Stets (2005) explained that “for most sociologists, emotions 
are socially constructed in the sense that what people feel is conditioned by socialization into 
culture and by participation in social structures” (p. 2). Pavlenko (2005) points to two distinct 
paradigms in the study of emotion and communication as emotion research moves into the 21st 
century. One, the “communication of emotions,” sees “language and emotions as largely separate 
phenomena and posits a one to one correspondence between emotions as inner states and their 
perception, interpretation and expression”  (p.114).   The other, the “discursive construction of 
the emotions, … focuses attention on rhetorical alternatives available to speakers, … in the 
ongoing negotiation of meaning in the context of emotional, social, and power relations” (p. 114, 
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emphasis in original). The first paradigm has a great deal in common with the basic/universalist 
approach to emotion typified by Ekman, while the second paradigm is clearly a 
sociological/cultural one. At first glance, one might conclude that these two paradigms are 
simply opposite ends of the spectrum and, therefore, completely incompatible: however, that 
conclusion would drastically misrepresent the totality of this particular case. Pavlenko (2005) 
continues: 
Many scholars working on communication of emotions acknowledged that speakers use 
emotion categories to accomplish social goals (cf. Planalp & Knie, 2002). Similarly, the 
work on discursive construction of emotion recognizes the embodied nature of emotional 
experience (Abu-Lughold and Lutz, 1990) and the role of conventionality in effective 
displays (Arndt & Janney 1991; Irvine, 1990). (p. 114). 
Thus, the two paradigms are at least partially compatible in the minds of many researchers who 
predominantly adhere to one paradigm or the other. So too, sociologists Turner & Stets (2005) 
find some middle ground: “what the social constructionist perspective neglects is that the 
activation, experience, and expression of emotions are intimately connected to the body” (p. 3). 
Thus, finding a way to tread the line between these two perspectives is critical in developing a 
whole and complete notion of the practice of emotional communication. 
Moreover, a considerable volume of the sociological research into emotions focuses not 
only on basic emotions, but on more complex and mixed emotions. Plutchik’s (2001) argument 
is that emotions can be analogous to colors arranged in a wheel (see figure 1) with the third 
dimension of intensity, allowing for the blending of emotions reminiscent of secondary colors  
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 Figure 2. Two Plutchik’s three-dimensional circumplex model of emotions (from 
http://www.fractal.org/Bewustzijns-Besturings-Model/Nature-of-emotions.htm) 
 
in that we remember from studying the color wheel in elementary school art class.  What is 
important for this discussion is that the study of color terms already has a long history in 
language learning in general, and linguistic relativism in particular (Ember, 1978; Kay & 
Kempton, 1984; Regier & Kay, 2009; Roberson & Hanley, 2009; Roberson, Hanley, & Pak, 
2009). The basic argument of the supporters of linguistic relativism with reference to color terms 
is that different cultures have different systems for naming colors–referred to as a color lexicon. 
Some languages have two different basic color terms, some three, and at the high end some 
cultures have twelve in their color lexicon. Yet, patterns have been discovered in the way that 
those particular color lexicon are categorized by the different cultures [e.g. If there are only two 
colors they’re basically “dark” and “light”]; thus, embedded within the fact that color terms are 
quite different across cultures, there is also support for universalist patterns.  However, if we 
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attempt to extend this analogy to the realm of emotions we were in into one significant stumbling 
block: all colors have real, natural, physical representations associated with the properties of 
light that can be scientifically categorized.  For example, if one combines yellow and blue light, 
and the result will always be green. At this point in the scientific study of emotions, we cannot 
consistently point to real, natural, physical representations directly linked to each emotion.   
Thus, the analogy is bound to unravel, because, for example, were we to mix one person’s “joy” 
with of their “trust,” we cannot guarantee that the results would be “love.”  As Plutchik (2001) 
himself suggests, “But in the final analysis, this is a theoretical decision to be evaluated in terms 
of the inferences and insights to which it leads, the research it suggests and the extent to which 
empirical data are consistent with it” (p. 348). Finally, one study in particular adds an insight that 
may prove useful in this research.  Roberson, Hanley, and Pak (2009) explored whether English 
and Korean speakers who have different color term categorization systems would have any 
differences in their ability to distinguish subtle distinctions in color based on their respective 
categorizations of color and determined that “at least for the domain of color, categorical 
perception appears to be a categorical, but not a perceptual phenomenon.” (p. 482). One goal of 
this research will be to see if the analogy holds true for emotions as it does for colors.  In other 
words, regardless of the differing categorical systems in the two cultures, will we find that 
emotional distinctions are perceptible across cultures? Perhaps a practical example will help 
illustrate: German has a word for feeling pleasure at another person’s pain, schadenfreude, but 
American English does not. English speakers are perfectly able to distinguish this emotion, yet 
lacking a word for it may affect our ability and proclivity to discuss and consider it.  Certainly, 
the fact that many English language authors use the term schadenfreude when writing offers a 
clue. Will the perceptions of individuals from the different cultures of Korea and North America 
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“retain a smooth continuum of perceptual space that is not warped by stretching at category 
boundaries or by within-category compression” (p. 482) with emotional distinction ability as was 
found with their color distinction ability?  
By all accounts, the most obvious example of how social forces have a direct impact on 
emotional communication is through display rules – a central concept in this proposed study. For 
sociologists, two central questions are: “what kinds of symbol systems do humans develop and 
how do they use them to regulate their conduct?” (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 23) – questions when 
applied to emotional communication lead directly to a study of cultural scripts and display rules. 
While I will address both scripts and display rules from the point of view of linguistics and/or 
communication studies in the language perspectives section of this chapter, considering the 
social point of view in this section is also critical. In terms of sociology, an obvious place to start 
is with Goffman’s dramaturgical model that suggests the notion of scripts in cultural interaction. 
Without going into detail on the model, Goffman’s point is that, like Shakespeare’s actors on the 
stage, individuals perform in a group setting according to certain elements of the cultural script 
established for the particular situation or ritual. Goffman did not, however, see the individual as 
completely bound by the cultural script, but having some sort of flexibility in manipulating “the 
expression of gestures to present themselves in a certain way” (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 28). For 
Goffman, emotional communication was not the central theme of the cultural script, but was 
certainly an element of that script. Consequently, a description of the paralinguistic (facial 
expression, vocal cues, gestures, etc.) symbols used within the cultural script may, in fact, also 
be a description of the functioning of display rules: “Individuals are strategically motivated to 
manipulate gestures so that their presentation of ‘face’ and ‘lines’ are seen by others to conform 
to the cultural script, and in so doing, they reinforce the implicit morality of the cultural script” 
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(Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 30). 
Hochschild’s (1979) offers two alternative methodological approaches for dealing with 
the social aspects of emotion: one, to explore how social events induce emotions – “emotions 
passively undergone,” and another to explore the “secondary acts” through which we regulate the 
experience of emotion. In this vision, display rules are “secondary acts” and therefore fall under 
the umbrella of emotion work, emotional management, and feeling rules. Consequently, display 
rules can be viewed as a form of symbolic interactionism – mechanisms through which we 
engage in the cost-benefit analysis and trading of social symbols. Moreover, the exchange of 
these displays exist both on a superficial level of maintaining “normal” social relations, as well 
as on the level of emotion work: 
The exchange of gestures has, in turn, two aspects; it is an exchange of display acts 
(Goffman 1969, 1967) – that is, of surface acting – and also an exchange of emotion 
work – that is, of deep acting. In either case, rules (display rules or feeling rules), once 
agreed-upon, establish the worth of a gesture and are thus be used in social exchange as a 
medium of exchange. (Hochschild, 1979, p. 568, emphasis in original) 
 Thus, Hochschild’s work is the theoretical postulation of the various rules (emotion, feeling, 
display) that go along with the functioning of emotion in a social setting. Turner and Stets (2005) 
add the suggestion that emotion work “will be most evident when people confront emotion 
ideologies, emotion rules, and display rules that go against their actual feelings, and especially 
when they are required to use those rules to express and display emotions that they do not feel” 
(p. 40).  Here they describe precisely the sort of situation that I would hope to explore with this 
study – the cross-cultural interpretation of differentiated display rules and the effect of such 
interpretation on the practical application of the rules.  
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A few studies have provided examples of display rules as acts of emotional work. In her 
own monocultural work, Hochschild (1983) explores some professions that require very different 
performance of emotion: flight attendants and bill collectors. In a frequently cited example, two 
ticket agents are working at an airline counter. The more experienced agent has taken a break, 
and the novice/trainee gets tied up with a difficult ticket reissue. Ten minutes pass.  The line 
backs up. Everyone is getting anxious. When the experienced agent returns: 
The novice says, “I was looking for you. You are supposed to be my instructor.” The 
instructor answers ironically, “Gee, I’m really sorry, I feel so bad.” And both laughed 
together. 
The experienced agent is not sorry that he wasn’t available to help the novice. His 
apparent misfitting feeling does not put them in debt, however, because the more general 
feeling rule – “we should both take this seriously” – is poked fun at. (p. 79)  
This incident relates an interesting case where multiple rules for emotion come into play: the “we 
should be serious” rule in contrast to the “we should enjoy life” rule. In this instance, humor 
appears to win the day; however, in Hochschild’s exchange-based model, we cannot be certain 
about future events – e.g. hidden grudges brought about by such emotional events.  
At this point I should point out the importance of Hochschild’s clear distinction between 
feeling rules and display rules. For Hochschild, the feeling rule determines how we should feel in 
a particular situation, as opposed to the display rule that dictates how we should show our feeling 
in the same situation. While the distinction may seem subtle – and we may be hard-pressed to 
find instances where the two expressions would be different – her point that the two rules may 
not always be the same is well taken.  Recognizing the inherent philosophical problem raised by 
Wittgenstein’s beetle argument, I cannot determine a way to reliably distinguish between 
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physical expressions resulting from the two different rules in this proposed study, as I will not 
have the ability to access the individuals present in the video stimulus used for the study. 
Consequently, I will use the term display rules to indicate both feeling rules and display rules.  
 Cahill and Eggleston (1994) study of the emotional management of wheelchair users 
provides an example of Hochschild’s model.  Clearly, Cahill and Eggleston are investigating 
situations that are just those sort of conundrums where an individual is required by display rules 
to show the diametrically opposite emotion. Some of the section headings in their paper are 
simply, classically, wonderfully oxymoronic – “humoring embarrassment,” “embarrassing 
anger,” and “ingratiating sympathy” – going a long way to prove their point. In the study, I noted 
three prominent instances of display rules for wheelchair users including: when a wheelchair 
user pretends not to hear a child’s inappropriate question regarding their disability, when 
someone treats them as if they are a non-person – that is, talking to their non-wheelchair user 
associate or speaking about them in the third person – they mute their anger, or finally, in a 
situation when a person offers assistance that is unneeded, but the wheelchair user thanked the 
“assister” graciously. In each of these cases, the wheelchair user chooses a display rule function 
that is diametrically opposite to their actual emotional state – “they will publicly express what 
they did not privately feel” (Turner & Stets, 2005, p. 43). Pierce’s (1995) ethnographic study at 
two law firms also provides examples that support Hochschild’s model.   For example, Pierce 
relates to a particular incident during a job interview where some important aspects of 
Hochschild’s model are clearly present – the explicit statement of both the feeling and the 
display rules in situations when feelings cannot be expected to match the required expression: 
As the personnel director for a private law firm told me in a job interview, “It’s important 
to maintain a pleasant manner while attending to the not-so-pleasant-side of the job, don’t 
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you think?” Being pleasant not only involves inducing a feeling – being cheerful – but 
also calls for a specific facial display – a smile. (p. 98) 
Here, the personnel director explicitly states that while the normal feeling rule – in many 
situations at this workplace – would result in a negative emotion, the required display rule is a 
pleasant manner and a smile – a polar opposite. 
In sum, the distinction between the cognitive perspective on display rules and the social 
perspective on display rules has become clear. The cognitive perspective sees display rules as 
instances where society and culture intervene to modify biologically based “universal” emotional 
display. On the other hand, the focus in sociology has been to, first, emphasize the situational – 
and thus process-based – force that produces “what we ought to feel” which is defined as a 
feeling rule, and second, to clarify that display rules represent instances where what we ought to 
feel does not match what we ought to show. In addition, the sociological research that I have 
reviewed here has generally been mono-cultural; consequently, the question of display rules 
across cultures has not been addressed therein. As cultural differences in display rules is the 
primary target of this proposed study I will need to pay close attention to whether or not these 
examples from Western culture apply in Korean culture. 
 In addition to the notion of the social construction of emotional display rules, other 
fundamental themes in anthropology and sociology are apparent in sociological emotion 
research. Allow me to continue by exploring the questions of gender, power, and 
individualism/collectivism. Pierce (1995) relates the gender-based differences in the way that 
display rules are structured in the legal profession.  She observes that “many women paralegals 
(but not men)” are subject to sanctions as the result of the double standard in the display rules for 
a particular emotional communication marker—the smile—as they “grimly reported the 
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consequences of not smiling” (p. 99). She continues that those consequences are generally issued 
from the mouths of men to women: “Such remarks were typically made by male attorneys, 
clients, and witnesses to female legal assistants” (p. 99).   In summary, Pierce argues that women 
at law firms face a completely different set of rules – display rules – for emotional expression. 
Furthermore, the repercussions of their emotional expression are both double standards and 
double binds. Pierce concludes that for these women: 
producing a smile, a mood, or a feeling for the job is even more problematic because they 
confront a double bind that men do not. Women and legal assistants who are nice are 
subjected to never-ending emotional demands from lawyers for whom they work, while 
those who are not nice are considered problematic and are sanctioned. Female attorneys 
who are pleasant and nice are not considered a tough enough to be good litigators, but 
when they are tough and aggressive, they are criticized for being difficult, strident, or 
shrill. The constraints created by these double binds give women workers even less 
control over their emotional integrity than men have. 
Emotional double binds, sexual overtures, sexual innuendos, teasing, and exclusionary 
practices are not isolated incidents but rather systematic and patterned forms of 
harassment. (p. 183) 
For the purposes of this study, being cognizant of the potential for gender differences in 
emotional expression will be important in disentangling the question of whether any differences 
found in emotional expression in the study are artifacts of cross-cultural differences or simply 
“generic” gender differences.  
Adding to the level of complexity is, of course, the influence of power and status 
differential in emotional communication.  The effect of power on emotional communication is 
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not new to the scientific study of emotion: even Darwin (1998) recognized the “submissive” 
posture of dogs, in his early descriptions of emotional expressions.  In more recent history, 
“disempowered” groups have taken an active role in using emotion as a tool for increasing their 
group’s solidarity and power, as in the Black Pride and Gay Pride movements. Indeed, coming 
on the heels of our consideration of gender differences, we have to recognize that at least some 
element of gender differences in emotional expression can be tied to the power and status 
differential between men and women. Parkinson et al. (2005) points out this entanglement — the 
“intriguing links between perceptions of gender typicality, status, and emotion”  (p. 149). The 
authors conclude that in relation to the specific nonverbal expression of smiling that “it is not 
simply the presence of another person that makes a difference to smiling, but also that other 
person’s relative degree of influence [i.e. power differential] on what is happening, as well as 
their socialized gender role” (p. 162). 
Social research into emotion and power has more often than not dealt with power as a 
cause of emotion than display rules for the expression of emotion as an effect of power 
differential.  Certainly, this conclusion can be inferred from Turner and Stets (2005) review of a 
number of studies: “inequalities in power and prestige or status also have important effects on 
emotions… with high-ranking individuals more likely to experience positive emotional arousal 
than lower ranking persons” (p. 295). My contention is that these recognized differences in 
display rules for emotional communication are both part and parcel of the power differential that 
is often a critical and signifying element of intercultural/international communication. 
Unfortunately, teasing apart what are the causes and what are the effects in these instances is a 
“chicken or egg” conundrum for research into cross-cultural emotional communication. An 
example of this conundrum can be found in Hewstone and Greenland’s (2000)  analysis of the 
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conflict in Northern Ireland where positive emotions are held for in-group members and negative 
emotions are directed toward out-group members—and all of these assessments/emotions are 
supported by power differentials in the community. So which came first: the hatred, the power, 
the oppression, the violence? To assume that similar highly entangled emotional assessments 
would be found in in-group/out-group relationships in other conflict areas is only natural. Fiske, 
Cuddy, and Glick (2002) noted similar results in their mono-national, multi-group analysis of 
prejudice and the emotions associated with it. They describe two “systematic dimensions of 
stereotype content,” competence and warmth, from which they “find intergroup emotions: 
Prejudices follow from perceptions of relative status, threat, and intent” (p. 248). Using these two 
dimensions, they were able to strongly predict when a variety of emotions—pity, envy, 
contempt, and pride—would be directed toward other groups.     
Another suggestion is that emotional contagion (“catching” the emotion of others – which 
has also been called mimicry) may also be regularly influenced by power differential. Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, and Rapson (1994) hypothesized that those with less power would be more likely to 
“commit” emotional contagion than those with more power. However, the results of their 
research did not support that conclusion: “the results were somewhat surprising. As predicted, 
subjects in all conditions did tend to catch the emotions of others. There was, however, no 
evidence that powerful people were more resistant to emotional contagion than were their 
powerless counterparts!” (p. 176). Later in the same discussion, they argue that what the research 
had evaluated was not power, but responsibility. Some subsequent research supported this 
notion, but the authors conclude that more research “is needed to determine just how power and 
contagion are linked” (p. 176). Disentangling the various elements that have influence on 
emotional communication is a significant problem. However, the authors point out that 
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professionals in the field behave as if a definite relationship between power and emotion exists. 
Moreover, I am certain that our individual experiences will confirm that both academics and 
non-academics alike behave in ways that support power/emotion links – which in turn become 
examples of emotional communication. 
Anthropological view of unique Korean emotions 
Substantial anthropological work has looked at the question of classifying emotion within other 
cultures. Wierzbicka (2005) explores differences between Anglo, Russian, Korean, and Japanese 
conceptions of the body-mind duality including the critical element of emotion in that 
conceptualization – finding significant distinctions across these cultures. Schmidt-Atzert and 
Park’s (1999) fascinating study sought to explore the cross-cultural “interpretability” of two 
particular Korean emotions, dapdaphada and uulhada, precisely because they could find no 
adequate translation of the terms into German. Rough translation into English would be 
“frustration” and “gloom” respectively. Two conclusions critical to this study should be noted. 
First, “the words dapdaphada and uulhada seem to denote emotional feelings restricted to 
specific situations … [thus] the words dapdaphada and uulhada should be regarded as specific to 
the Korean language” (Schmidt-Atzert & Park, 1999, p. 652) which would make them the sorts 
of emotions we may find and compare through this study.  Other “negative” emotions have been 
categorized in the sphere of Korean emotional expression, prominently those associated with 
depression such as han, hwabyung, and shingyungshayak (Arnault & Kim, 2008; Pang, 1998, 
1999). Pang (1998) defines the three emotions: “Han can be described as a passive, chronic 
regret and resentment syndrome … Hwabyung … has been described as an anger syndrome that 
encompasses elements of depression, resentment, somatic illness, and neurotic symptoms … 
Shingyungshayak, an emotional, psychic, and bodily disorder” (p. 96).  However, certain 
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“positive” emotions can serve as coping mechanisms and are themselves arguably unique to 
Korean culture. Pang (1999) contends that several Korea specific emotions serve to aid those 
suffering from depression: “To attain harmony within the self and with others, they practice 
noonchi (measuring with the eyes), chenyom (right thinking), chemyun (face-saving), and 
confiding in others” (p.134). A goal of this study will be to search for these characteristically 
Korean emotions to present them for American interpretation in hopes of teasing out what makes 
them uniquely Korean. 
Impact of social and anthropological research in emotion on this study. 
While a great deal of research into emotions expressed across cultures has been 
conducted within the framework of cognitive studies, the fundamental philosophical approach of 
such research has been to seek universal/basic emotions that do not differ across cultures. This 
perspective is particularly unsatisfying when we recognize that virtually every person who has 
intercultural experiences finds some level of cross cultural misunderstanding. That social 
perspectives on the communication of emotion across cultures choose to focus on the differences 
rather than the similarities across cultures provides a window into the cross-cultural 
communication of emotion that will be essential for this study. One concern, however, is that 
social research into emotion has yet to solidify a perspective regarding preferred methodology 
and research targets, particularly in terms of the communication of emotion. 
Thus, the starkest difference between cognitive research and social research into 
emotions is in methodology. The quantitative tools associated with cognitive research – from 
forced choice experiments to brain scanning – stand in bold contrast to the ethnographic tools 
employed by social research – from interviews to full-scale ethnographies.  Moreover, while I 
have indicated that social perspectives hold greater sway in my philosophical approach, the use 
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of qualitative tools from cognitive research should help to verify whether my findings are in line 
with previous cognitive research. That said, ethnographic tools remain my overall preference. 
This literature review reveals some significant gaps in the methodologies used in social research 
into the communication of emotions across culture. Initially, much of the sociological research 
has been conducted in a mono-cultural environment with the tacit assumption that the results 
would apply across different cultures. Additionally, one particular social research tool, a focus 
group, does not appear to have been used in any significant way in research into the 
communication of emotions across cultures. As we shall see in the methodology section of this 
proposal, a significant case can be made that a focus group approach may be one of the best – if 
not the best – methodology for exploring many of the issues surrounding the communication of 
emotion across cultures. 
 The impact of the findings from social research into emotion reviewed here is the 
conclusion that some element, at the very least, of emotional communication is socially 
constructed. Certainly, the “nature versus nurture” debate regarding the communication of 
emotions that has waged between cognitive scientists and social scientists has yet to be 
resolved—and will continue to be argued in the future. However, nearly irrefutable evidence 
supports a mixed model in which emotional communication is some part biological and some 
part social construction. Moreover, much of the social (and cognitive) research into emotional 
communication points to display rules as a key area to explore for elements of the social 
influence on the communication of emotion.  Importantly, social research has explored some 
mechanisms by which display rules are performed – for example, Goffman’s dramaturgical 
model presenting the idea of cultural scripts. Goffman’s model provides the groundwork for 
emotional scripts championed by Planalp that we will discuss in the next section.  Critical for 
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this proposed study is the conclusion that the prime opportunity for finding examples of display 
rules in action is on those occasions where the specific cultural rules for the display of emotion 
are in conflict with rules for “natural” emotion – or “feeling rules” – rules that themselves are 
arguably social constructions. That the most crucial display rules within a culture are ones that 
represent a disconnect between what ought to be felt and what ought to be shown will prove 
central to the study, and most importantly when those required displays are in direct opposition 
to what is felt.  
When sociologists have considered the question of the display rules along with the 
feeling rules associated with emotion in a social setting, several important sociological themes 
have been front and center. Prominently, questions of gender, power, and status have been found 
to have significant effects in the expression of emotion in mono-cultural studies.  The mono-
cultural aspect is important, because we cannot be certain whether effects uncovered in these 
studies are universal across cultures, or are culturally specific to the countries/cultures in which 
the studies were conducted. A second question raised through social research exploring the 
interaction of gender, power, and status with emotion is the question of cause and effect. Are 
display rules an effect of these differences in gender power and status, or do the ways that we 
communicate induce changes in those power and status structures. Therefore, the important and 
generalized impact on this proposed study will be to remain cognizant of previous findings 
regarding gender, power, and status and watch for their occurrence in this study – keeping the 
question of cultural specificity in mind while attempting to find appropriate opportunities for 
practical applications.  
Language based perspectives 
The very essence of literature is the war between emotion and intellect. When  
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literature becomes too intellectual -- when it begins to ignore the passions,  
the emotions -- it becomes sterile, silly and actually without any substance. 
-- Isaac Bashevis Singer 
In the final section of this literature review, I will turn my attention to language-based 
perspectives on emotional communication.  The choice of the phrase “language based” as 
opposed to “linguistic” is an attempt to accomplish two goals. The first goal is to recognize that 
the philosophical divide represented by cognitive and social perspectives on emotion and 
emotional communication discussed is replicated within emotional communication is replicated 
within the field of linguistics. Many linguists take a decidedly cognitive approach to language 
and communication that is seen in linguistic studies of the communication of emotion. 
Alternatively, sociolinguists have a much more relativistic and social constructionist perspective.  
The second goal is to recognize that a significant amount of research on the fringes of linguistic 
study or, or even outside of linguistics has taken a decidedly “language and communication” 
perspective on important research into the communication of emotion across cultures – e.g. 
communication studies.  
 At the outset, a critical distinction between the cognitive, social, and language based 
approaches to the study of emotion and emotional communication becomes clear. Cognitive and 
social researchers are asking very different questions than are language-based researchers. In 
general, cognitive and social questions researchers are asking broader and more philosophical 
“why” questions of emotion, while language-based research focuses on more specific and 
applied “how” and “what.” In this section, as in the previous two, I will present a summary of the 
research within language based studies into the communication of emotions across cultures 
focusing on the three areas of philosophical foundations, methodological perspectives, and 
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critical findings to determine what sort of impact the literature has on this proposed study. 
Philosophical foundations of language-based research in emotion. 
Within the broad range of language-based studies into cross-cultural emotional 
communication, three thematic areas have important connections to this proposed study: 
semantic/lexical research, emotional scripts research, and paralinguistic research. The 
semantic/lexical research, championed by Wierzbicka (1999) and others (E.g. Goddard, 2002), 
looks at the differences in the meanings of emotion words across languages – including how they 
function morphologically, syntactically, and rhetorically. The contention, in direct opposition to 
the universalist/basic emotions approach led by Ekman, is that subtle differences in the manner 
of interpretation of emotion words represent significant differences in the emotions of people in 
different cultures. Wierzbicka illustrates this point by selecting one of Ekman’s universal 
emotions, the word anger, and conducting a detailed lexical semantic analysis of the word in 
English and Polish. She concludes, “that an apparently basic and innocent concept like anger is 
in fact linked with a certain cultural model and so cannot be taken for granted as a ‘ culture free’ 
analytical tool or as a universal standard for describing ‘human emotions’” (Wierzbicka, 1999, p. 
32). Moreover, these differences are critical, because, in terms of intercultural communication at 
least, the differences are often problematic while the similarities are not. The second notion of 
emotional scripts is often found in communication studies research, for example Planalp’s (1999) 
work. The idea of emotional scripts is akin to Goffman’s dramaturgical model from sociology. 
Finally, paralinguistic research represents perhaps the most studied area in this group. Individual 
research studies in the paralinguistic aspects of emotional communication, however, tend to 
focus on very specific and discrete elements of communication.  
 Some elaboration on the character of paralinguistics and paralinguistic research is in 
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order. Gestures, proxemics, kinesics, facial expression, and vocal cues are common examples of 
those discrete mechanisms of the paralinguistic communication. Therefore, these different 
categories are attempts to subdivide different types of paralinguistic clues.  Indeed, research into 
these subdivisions has a substantial history and tradition. Proxemics – the study of how we hold 
our bodies, standing, sitting, etc., in relation to those we are talking with – was initially studied 
by Birdwhistle (1952). Hall (1959) famously studied kinesics, which is generally what people 
tend to think of as “body language” in the vernacular.  Additionally, Gumperz (1982) and 
Scherer’s (1982) research into prosody, or the rhythm, tone, and music of oral language, has 
added great depth to our ability to understand how people communicate.  All of these elements 
are essential to this study and constitute the current constellation of paralinguistic cues in relation 
to emotional communication.  
In this long history of research into paralinguistics, the fundamental complexity of the 
types of information carried within the paralinguistic clues has presented a critical problem.  
These clues carry not only semantic and emotional intent, but all sorts of other information as 
Mozziconacci (2002) explains: “in addition to fulfilling a linguistic function such as to structure 
discourse and dialogue, and signal focus, prosodic clues provide information such as the 
speaker’s gender, age and physical condition, and the speakers view, a motion, and attitude 
towards the topic, the dialogue partner, or the situation”  (p. 1). While Mozziconacci refers 
specifically to prosody clues, similar complexity is found in other paralinguistic elements. 
Moreover, because many of these early studies – and much of the current research – are 
conducted from a semantic and/or pragmatic point of view, a substantial gap in both the 
philosophical approach and empirical results regarding the interpretation of paralinguistics cues 
when experienced in the realm of emotional communication remains: “Even though Mehrabian 
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and Wiener in 1967 expressed the need for studies on the nature of the interrelation between 
emotional prosody and semantics, few research studies have been conducted in this subject” 
(Wambacq & Jerger, 2004, p. 427). Pavlenko (2005) adds that “little systematic information is 
available on cross linguistic similarities and differences in conventionalized affective meanings 
of particular combinations of vocal cues. The scarcity is understandable: Attention to affective 
meanings of prosody is a relatively recent development in applied linguistics” (p. 76).  
The relative immaturity of this subfield is only part of the problem – the fact that prosody 
also the carries a lot of different information results in “theoretical and methodological 
difficulties inherent in deciding what meanings should be attributed to particular contours, in 
particular when research is conducted in a second language” (Pavlenko, 2005, p. 76). Another 
piece in the puzzling task of teasing out how paralinguistic cues serve to convey emotional 
communication are Scherer, Helfrich, & Scherer’s (1980) so-called “push and pull” effects. In 
brief, push effects are caused by internal activity that is biologically motivated – those 
uncontrollable expressions. On the other hand, pull effects are those that we generate to match 
our appraisal of the social situation. In some sense, these effects are virtually identical to the 
distinction between biologically caused or socially motivated emotional expressions that we have 
discussed previously. Ultimately, we are led to Pavlenko’s (2005) question:  
… cross-linguistic differences in mean values and social meanings of conventionalized 
vocal cues to emotion that are further complicated by individual and contextual variation. 
Considering the potential implications of these differences for intercultural 
communication, we can now ask: Are vocal cues sufficient to decode the intended 
affective meaning of the speaker’s utterance in a second or foreign language?  [emphasis 
in the original] (p. 55) 
  76 
 
Indeed, determining whether vocal cues are sufficient as well as the relative importance of 
various other paralinguistic cues is an essential element of this proposed study. The inherent 
complexity of emotional communication is reflected in the variety and complexity of the 
methods we have used to analyze emotional communication – and the challenges for future 
research. 
Methodological preferences within language-based research in emotion. 
Unsurprisingly, methodological preferences within language-based research into 
emotional communication follow a pattern similar to the distinctions noted between cognitive 
research and social research into emotional communication. Methodological preferences for 
emotional scripts research tends toward the qualitative side generally using ethnographic 
techniques, while paralinguistic research is generally quantitative and experimental using a wide 
variety of technologies to assist in procedures. The third category of semantic/lexical research 
methodology is significantly different than both the quantitatively influenced methodologies seen 
in cognitive and paralinguistic research and the qualitatively influenced methodologies seen in 
social science research. Finally, semantic/lexical research has much in common with literary and 
linguistic analysis relying on an in-depth textual and conversation analysis (and even contrastive 
analysis) using native informants for triangulation. As the methodological preferences of 
emotional script research and paralinguistic research share many of the methodological tools that 
we explored in discussing social and cognitive research, respectively, many of the strengths, 
weaknesses, and gaps of those research areas are also common to emotional script and 
paralinguistic research.  Consequently, I will not add any additional comments here, but refer 
you back to the previous sections for that analysis.  
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Critical findings within language based research in emotion. 
Because semantic/lexical studies begin with the assumption that different 
languages/cultures have both the similarities and differences in the way that they understand and 
interpret emotion, individual studies in this area, tend to look for the similarities and differences 
in the lexis and semantics of the individual languages. Both anecdotally and through research 
studies, we are aware that a variety of emotions seem to be culturally specific. For example, the 
German emotion/concepts of angst and schadenfreude4 are often cited, as are amae and oime5 in 
Japanese, and song6 in Ifaluk (Parkinson, et al., 2005; Pavlenko, 2005; Wierzbicka, 1999). 
Schmidt-Atzert and Park (1999), who conducted their study without the benefit of Wierzbicka’s 
NSM – but following similar procedures otherwise, looked at a pair of emotion words that are 
frequently characterized as peculiarly Korean in character: dapdaphada and uulhada.  In the 
study, the authors combined scenarios for several universal emotions from previous studies, and 
used some of Ekman’s own photographs of facial expression for some universal emotions, and 
finally added scenario descriptions for dapdaphada and uulhada.  The authors sought to 
determine if respondents of Korean and German backgrounds would have equal success in 
labeling the scenarios with words, and photographs. If the Germans and Koreans had equal 
success, that would point to the universality of these emotions – that is both Germans and 
Koreans felt emotions nearly identical to dapdaphada and uulhada, only the Germans did not 
have words for them. However, the Koreans did markedly better than the Germans in particular 
with dapdaphada and uulhada; therefore, we have to conclude that dapdaphada and uulhada are 
                                                 
4  Roughly, feeling pleasure at others’ misfortunes. 
5  “A fondness of dependence” and “the unpleasantness of being indebted” respectively. 
6  Morally justifiable anger 
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somehow distinctly Korean (at least relative to informants from a German cultural background). 
The information carried in lexis is also only part of the lexical semantic story. Wierzbicka 
(2002) reminds us that “while it is generally agreed that, metaphorically speaking, words are 
carriers of meaning, it is less widely recognized that grammatical categories of a language, too, 
encode meaning” (p.162). Pavlenko (2002b) set out to test Wierzbicka’s contention that Russian 
language encodes emotion differently in a syntactic sense than does English: specifically the 
contention that English relies more heavily on conveying emotion through adjectives, while 
Russian relies heavily on conveying emotion through verbs. The author elicited narratives on the 
same task using “the same visual stimuli” from Russian speakers and English speakers. After 
analyzing the narratives produced by her informants, Pavlenko concludes: 
The results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the narrative corpus support 
Wierzbicka’s claims, suggesting that ‘the reading of the body’ is not a culture- and 
language-free experience, but is shaped by cultural, social, and linguistic forces, as well 
as by individual differences. (p. 207) 
While the lexical semantic analysis we have been discussing relies in part on prototypes, 
which have much in common with scripts and appraisals, the study of emotion scripts as a “stand 
alone” research project has not come under such heavy criticism. For the most part, cultural and 
emotional script research looks at a single culture – although often a Western researcher is 
looking at a culture other than their native culture (Goddard, 1997; Larsen, Clore, & Wood, 
1999; Carolyn Saarni, 1989; Wierzbicka, 1996, 1998). Amongst the few that explore more than 
one culture, Pavlenko (2005) lists five studies that are truly cross-cultural using bilinguals 
(Heider, 1991; Panayiotou, 2004; Pavlenko, 2002a; Stepanova & Coley, 2002; Toya & Kodis, 
1996), and I found one other using cross-cultural scenarios (Schmidt-Atzert & Park, 1999).  
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What Pavlenko concluded also holds true for Schmidt-Atzert & Park’s (1999) study, “cross-
cultural linguistic differences in emotion scripts can be identified in verbal performance, and 
dissertation, and categorization tasks … and in bicultural bilinguals’ perspectives” (p. 105). 
Moreover, these studies allow us to note cross-cultural differences in all of the steps in a process 
approach to emotion, specifically: antecedents, appraisals, physical reactions, actions in 
response, and emotion regulation. Also important for this proposed study are the ways that these 
individual studies have demonstrated both translation issues and questions of emotional 
display/display rules. 
The next significant area of language-based research into emotional communication is 
paralinguistic research, and as I indicated earlier, this area is rather broad. Allow me to forgo 
consideration of paralinguistic research into facial expression as language based, because we 
have already the topic discussed that under cognitively influenced research, and focus 
specifically on vocal cue research in this section. In general, and much like facial expression 
research, those studies are primarily experimental in nature.  Moreover, along with facial 
expression research, vocal cue research has produced a great number of individual studies. That 
being said, however, few of these studies link emotions, cultural differences, and interpretation 
to the vocal cue differences that are uncovered. Consequently, plenty of work still needs to be 
done – as Pavlenko’s (2005) contends: “to date, little systematic research has been conducted on 
voice quality and affect (see however Scherer, 1986), and even less is known about cross 
linguistic differences in meanings of paralinguistic features”  (p. 50). Consequently, I will focus 
on a few studies here that emphasize key points for this proposed study’s research focus – first 
we will look at monocultural studies, then cross-cultural ones. 
 In an early monocultural study, Williams and Stevens (Williams & Stevens, 1972) did 
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not find clear vocal cue indicators of different emotions, “at present it is certainly not possible to 
specify any quantitative automatic procedures that reliably indicate the emotional state of a 
talker” (p. 1249). What they did find that is particularly useful for understanding emotional 
communication is that, “attributes for a given emotional situation were not always consistent 
from one speaker to another” (p. 1238). In other words, we need to understand the individual’s 
manner of speaking and then recognize differences in that manner of speaking to interpret 
whether the current vocal cues reveal a specific emotional state for that specific person.  
Russell, Bachorowski, and Fernández-Dols (2003) reviewed a number of the 
monocultural studies into vocal cues interaction with affect and drew a few important 
conclusions. First, regarding “linguistic vocalizations,” such as laughs, cries, and yawns, the 
conventional wisdom that emotional state causes the production of these vocalizations does not 
seem to hold true in the light of, “mounting evidence, [which] questions whether such 
vocalizations are each linked to a specific, discrete state” (p. 339). In other words, the folk 
wisdom that, for example, “we yawn because we are bored” is not well supported. A second 
conclusion that the goal of finding a specific “vocal signature for each hypothesized basic 
emotion [as in Paul Ekman’s basic emotions], however, remains elusive” (p. 340) again 
disproves the hopeful hypotheses of many researchers.  However, Russell et al. found substantial 
support for the folk theory that we can judge the level of excitement of the speaker through vocal 
cues: “studies again confirm the link of vocal expression with sender’s general arousal, and, 
importantly, sometimes show different patterns than those obtained with acted portrayals” (p. 
340). That actor’s portrayals do not consistently match naturalistic samples is important for 
methodological choices in future research. Russell et al. present a weak view of the utility of 
vocal cues in the interpretation and/or communication of emotion in a monocultural situation – 
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much the same conclusion to which Pavlenko (2005) arrives: “the most we can say is that 
emotional intensification tends to be accompanied by wider pitch contrasts” (p. 55). 
The final monocultural study is particularly interesting because it was the only one that I 
was able to find that attempted to assign emotion tags to various body postures – a kinesic 
analysis. Coulson’s (2004) study found a wide variance in subjects’ ability to recognize specific 
emotions from body postures from 0% accuracy to 90% accuracy – dependent upon the posture 
and the emotion. In addition, the author concludes, “Analysis of the confusion matrix suggested 
a circumplex solution with happiness and surprise sharing a similar position, and few confusions 
between the other four emotions”  (p. 117).  Clearly from this study kinesic clues are unreliable 
in many areas, but some kinesic clues are very clearly understood. 
 An excellent place to start analyzing cross linguistic studies of vocal cues and emotional 
communication is Gumperz’ (1982) seminal work comparing the intonation patterns of South 
Asians speaking English with British speakers of English chronicled in Discourse Strategies – 
which relates in part some of the content of the film/video Crosstalk (Twitchin, 1979) . While 
Gumperz’ overall purpose was not the investigation of emotional communication per se, the 
topic was nearly impossible to avoid as he concludes, “the prosody of Indian English described 
here… [in] encounters among speakers of Asian and Western English reveal communication 
difficulties that are far more pervasive and fundamental than those associated with the sentence-
level grammatical and lexical distinction” (p. 129). Clearly, from Gumperz’ use of emotionally 
charged words, his statement reveals the importance of these vocal cues in appraisal and 
emotional impact is critical. Indeed, in the Crosstalk video, speakers on both sides of an 
interview situation, English and South Asian, experienced frustration resulting in strong 
emotional response. Indeed, each appraised their cross-cultural interlocutors in negative ways 
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(e.g. the English interviewers felt the South Asian was rude, and vice versa). As Pavlenko (2005) 
relates from Gumperz study, the day-to-day workplace often sees difficulties in emotional 
communication, for example “between staff and customers in a British airport cafeteria. The 
supervisor and the customers continually complained that the newly hired Indian and Pakistani 
women were surly and uncooperative, while the women… did not know what they were doing 
wrong” (p.65).  Similar results were found by Holden and Hogan (1993) an experiment where 
the intonation patterns of English and Russian were transposed: English speakers judged in a 
negative way English utterances with Russian prosodic patterns. 
In a very thorough analysis of cross linguistic studies of the identification of emotional 
information from vocal cues, Pavlenko (Pavlenko, 2005) reviews fourteen studies of this type 
from 1964 through 2002.  In all of the studies reviewed, the researchers isolated the sample 
expressions to best match the desired emotions before delivering them to the participants. Some 
variety was represented across the studies regarding the source of the utterances, that is, whether 
the utterances were produced in a studio by professional actors or amateur native speakers, or 
gathered from other sources such as radio or television – these  “other sources” being as close to 
naturalistic recordings as were seen. In addition, many of the researchers made efforts to 
neutralize the linguistic elements of the utterances either by mechanically filtering them to the 
point where the words could not be recognized but the vocal cues could be, or in one case using 
scrambled syllables selected from the target languages. Allow me to explore a couple of the 
studies in some detail before relating Pavlenko’s conclusions from her informal meta-analysis of 
the studies. 
In an early study, Rintell (1984) used the unusual methodology – at least within this 
group of studies – of narrative recordings where speakers attempted to communicate the emotion 
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without naming the emotion. The recordings were then played to 127 non-native speakers of 
English as well as 19 native English speakers. Amongst the non-natives were 66 Spanish 
speakers 20 Arabic speakers and 17 Chinese speakers.  Compared to the other studies, one might 
expect that the longer narratives as well as the lexical content would assist the English learners 
judge which emotion was being expressed. However, the performance of non-native speakers 
was similar to the performance of foreign-language listeners in many of the other studies: native 
speakers performed significantly better, at 76% accuracy, while the non-native speakers 
performed worse, at 33%. Moreover, the Chinese speakers, who are arguably the furthest 
removed culturally and linguistically from native English speakers, performed least well. 
A similar pattern is found in the study by Scherer et al. (2001). The authors in this study 
selected participants who were speakers of six European languages and Indonesian. They then 
used meaningless combinations of syllables from the European languages formed into 
meaningless sentences delivered by professional German actors instructed to express the 
meaningless sentences with a specific and meaningful emotion. The results showed similar gaps 
in recognition accuracy as the native language and culture of the subjects was more removed 
from German. The group with the highest accuracy was not surprisingly native speakers of 
German at 74%. A second cluster, Swiss speakers of French, English speakers from Britain and 
America, Dutch speakers, Italian speakers, and French speakers were tightly packed in the in 69-
66% accuracy range. Spanish speakers were slightly removed from them at 62% accuracy. As I 
suggested earlier, the Indonesian speakers were the least accurate at 52%.  
I want to briefly present the results of a final study that has particular significance for my 
proposed research. Nakamichi, Jogan, Usami, & Erickson’s (2002) study was the only one that 
either Pavlenko or I was able to locate which used video recordings. The obvious advantage of 
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that is that the viewers would be able to read able to read the kinesic, facial, and gesture cues as 
well as the vocal cues in judging which emotion is being expressed. The researchers selected 
scenes from “Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone” in the original English as well as dubbed 
into Japanese. As in the other cases, the accuracy was much higher when viewed in the speaker’s 
native language, 91%, then when viewed in a foreign language, 72%. 
Pavlenko (2005) is able to draw several conclusions from her analysis of the studies. The 
first is that native speakers do better than non-native speakers in judging the emotion being 
presented, “even when utterance content is neutral or unintelligible,” (p. 63) while non-native 
speakers and non-speakers of the target language performed less well. However, they do better 
than would be predicted by mere chance, which, in turn, “points to some overlap among 
languages in the meanings of vocal cues, while the difference between native and non-native 
speakers points to linguistic and cultural specificity of some of the cues” (pp. 63-64). 
One of the authors that I quoted earlier states that little systematic research has been 
conducted in the area of language-based research into emotional communication.  Indeed, while I 
have been able to find a good deal of research, the collection of language-based research I 
reviewed here is, indeed, not particularly systematic. Before moving on to the impact this 
literature review of language-based research will have on my study, I would like to point out a 
few additional research conclusions. As with some of the experimental facial expression research 
and forced choice methodology, the overwhelming impression from language-based studies is 
that context IS important. Beier & Zautra (1972) provide some interesting results in this area. 
While I would argue against their leap from “agreement across cultures on the mood expressed is 
high” all the way up to the “results suggests the presence of a universal emotive language in the 
vocal channel” (p. 16), the results do suggest clear evidence of some sort of universal 
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mechanisms which may be mediated by other, perhaps social or cultural, mechanisms. In terms 
of context, and importantly for this study, Beier & Zautra determined that “accuracy in response 
increases with the length of the expression to be interpreted” (p. 16). A great number of possible 
interpretations leapt to mind as to why this would be true: increased understanding of the 
semantic and situational context, or, as Pavenko (2005) suggests, adjustment to the speakers 
norms of vocal patterns, “longer speech samples offer more information about the speakers 
baseline values and thus allow for judgments of relative rather than absolute values” (p. 74).   
Therefore, in summary of the results from language-based research in the communication 
of the emotions across cultures, Pavlenko (2005) offers this interpretation:   
without lexical or contextual cues we cannot reliably label a tone contour as conveying a 
particular aspect of meaning. Linguists agree that while in each speech community there 
exist conventionalized patterns of prosodic usages, a match between a particular contour 
and meaning is never absolute – either within or across languages – and the ultimate 
interpretation is always carried out in context. (p. 55) 
Ultimately, we have to conclude that this complex system is not wholly dependent upon 
any of the individual parts: whether biological or social or language based. The language based 
elements, however, are the actual channels that must be analyzed to understand broader 
biological/cognitive or social/cultural effects. Moreover, language effects analysis will allow us 
to determine how broader mechanisms cause or are caused by similarities and differences in 
emotional communication across cultures.  Between and amongst lexis and semantics, facial 
expressions, vocal cues, gestures and the like in the realm of language based emotional 
communication reside all the mechanisms of emotional communication that I propose to analyze 
and study.  Consequently, a good, precise, and detailed understanding of how these mechanisms 
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function in human interaction provides a foundation from which we can begin to draw 
conclusions about the broader cross-cultural issues associated with emotional communication.  
Impact of language-based research in emotion on this study. 
This final subsection of my literature review is designed to examine how language based 
research into emotional communication will influence the proposed study. Clearly, the complex 
interactions of cognitive/psychological, social/cultural, and language based perspectives and 
mechanisms for the communication of emotions and particularly the communication of emotions 
across culture are important in the expression and interpretation of emotions between human 
actors. As is the case with much academic emotion research, the individual researcher’s task has 
been to isolate an individual mechanism and analyze if and how that mechanism functions in the 
communication of emotion. Consequently, research in this area has rarely taken a holistic view. 
The first impact of language based research into emotional communication on this proposed 
study is to force a recognition of the impulses driving researchers to look narrowly at a specific 
topic and reject a holistic analysis. Because I propose a mixed and more holistic analysis, I have 
to understand the opposing, and dominant, perspective in the field. Along those same lines, we 
see the quantitative and experimental methods of cognitive/psychological research  [e.g. Ekman 
(1993, 1999a, 1999b, 2003), Izard (1977, 1991, 1994), and Scherer (1982, 1986, 1993, 2003)] 
contrasted to the qualitative and ethnographic methods of social/cultural research [e.g. Gumperz 
(1982), Lutz (1990), Markus & Kitayama (1994), Pavlenko (2002a), and Rintell (1984)]. 
Moreover, these quantitative to qualitative and experimental to naturalistic dichotomies are 
reflected in a variety of the language based research reviewed here – with the important addition 
of lexical semantic methodology. All of these methodological choices that have produced results 
at variance with each other that certainly points to a need for additional, or perhaps initial, mixed 
  87 
 
methodology study into emotional communication. 
In terms of the populations sampled, American and European participants and cultures 
are ubiquitous. “Japan, China, and India are well represented. Isolated/aboriginal cultures are 
fairly common. Koreans and Korean culture, however, are underrepresented in the collected 
studies. Therefore, the addition of a study of Korean emotional communication and cross-
cultural situations is certainly a worthy research choice. In a similar fashion, the critical 
importance of revealing process and context through understanding the emotional scripts that are 
indeed being performed and communicated is another worthy research addition. 
Finally, extensive criticism has been directed at the lack of naturally sampled emotional 
communication in these studies – particularly in the experimental research. Three important 
elements of this criticism will impact my proposed research: the use of multiple channels of 
emotional expression, providing a significantly long sample, and allowing free choice over 
forced choice. As stated earlier, language based studies in general attempt to isolate the channel 
of emotional communication as much as possible, for example facial expression, body posture, 
or vocal cues. However, much of the research indicates that a variety of mechanisms function in 
emotional communication. Yet to my knowledge only one study has been conducted using video 
recordings – a delivery method that would provide facial expression, body posture, and vocal 
cues simultaneously – and even that study relied on trained actors performing in a film, as 
opposed to natural interactions. Consequently, combining the channels of emotional 
communication through video is definitely indicated. Similarly, many of the studies presented 
extremely brief samples for interpretation, in spite of the fact that Beier & Zautra (1972) had 
indicated that longer samples improved identification accuracy. As the last impact, the use of 
forced choice in selecting emotion terms has been roundly criticized. Using free choice 
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elicitation procedures should not diminish the researcher’s ability to categorize the free choice 
emotions offered to compare them with “basic” emotions, while simultaneously allowing the 
exploration of variety and intensity differences in emotional interpretation.  
 Final Thoughts 
  This literature review covers a breath of research that I had initially intended not to 
reach for; however, I find that the reach has been necessary. A major goal for this proposed 
research is to conduct a holistic analysis.  My reason to strive for a holistic view is the core 
conflict between the biological/cognitive perspective and the sociological/cultural perspective on 
emotional communication.  I hope that an increased understanding of many perspectives on the 
questions of emotional communication will be better enable me to construct and analyze a mixed 
methodology study of the communication of emotion across Korean and American cultures. 
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CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY 
This methodology section presents a justification of the research methodology, describes 
the participants, data collection, data analysis, and the limitations of the researcher’s 
positionality.  
Why focus groups? 
 When I began my review of the literature, I was under the impression that only a limited 
amount of research into emotional communication across cultures had been conducted. However, 
I soon learned that emotions, communication, and culture had been studied in a range of 
disciplines, including sociology, neurology, linguistics and others using a wide variety of 
research methodologies.  Thus, I conclude here, as Pavlenko (2005) does, that “little systematic 
information is available on cross linguistic similarities and differences in conventionalized 
affective meanings . . .” (p. 76). The key word here is “systematic.” Given the variety of 
methodologies employed across these studies, a reasonable approach to reconciling the various 
and often contradictory conclusions reached in the studies is through a mixed methodology 
design with focus groups as the primary method.  
As we have seen the philosophical and methodological split in the research on emotional 
communication mirrors in many respects the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Two major research design clusters are found in the literature: one primarily 
ethnographic, and another substantially experimental. Each design cluster reflects the preferences 
of its field, and offers both strengths and weaknesses for the study of emotional communication. 
On the experimental side, three particular limitations exist: the use of static samples to represent 
the communication of emotions, reliance on forced choice methodology, and the reliance on a 
ethnocentric interpretation of the emotion words from the outset. On the ethnographic research 
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side, the limited generalizability for teaching emotional communication in foreign-language 
classrooms reduces the usefulness of ethnographic research in the study of emotional 
communication. Finally, neither research methodology has effectively explored the cross-cultural 
elements of emotional communication.  
The use of methodologies from these two design clusters in the studies reviewed here 
leads me to conclude that, at this stage, the proper research approach is a mixed methodology 
strategy with focus groups being the primary data collection method relative to other 
methodological choices is that the results presented to the readers are transparent:  
The results of a focus group are extremely user-friendly and easy to understand. 
Researchers and decision-makers can readily understand the verbal responses of most 
respondents. This is not always the case with more sophisticated survey research that 
employs complex statistical analyses” (Stewart, Shamdasani, & Rook, 2007, p. 16). 
Participants 
A total of 18 participants took part in this study. All of the participants were: 
• women 
• between the ages of 22 and 32 
• university graduates with at least bachelors’ degrees 
All of the South Korean participants had lived in South Korea for their whole lives, while the 
North Americans had been working as language teachers in South Korea for less than one year.  
The participants were recruited through open calls for participation at the researcher’s university 
and snowball recruitment. Specifically, NL focus group 1 was composed of Master’s Students in 
counseling from a highly ranked women’s university in the nation’s capital. NL focus group 2 
was composed of Korean public school teachers recruited through an MA TESOL program at a 
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private university located outside of Seoul. The FL focus groups were composed of English 
language instructors from the same private university and in the local community. Tables 1 and 2 
summarize the collected personal information on the focus group participants. 
 
Participant Age Highest degree Profession English level  
(self assessed) 
US culture knowledge 
level (self assessed) 
NL Focus group 1 (Korean) 
“U” 24 BA (MA Student) Counselor Intermediate High beginner 
“V” 24 BA (MA Student) Counselor Low intermediate High beginner 
“W” 25 BA (MA Student) Counselor High intermediate Intermediate 
“X” 23 BA (MA Student) Counselor Intermediate Low intermediate 
“Y” 31 BA (MA Student) Counselor Intermediate Intermediate 
“Z” 24 BA (MA Student) Counselor Intermediate Low intermediate 
NL Focus group 2 (Korean) 
“Q” 32 BA (MA student) Teacher High Intermediate High beginner 
“R” 25 BA  Teacher Intermediate High beginner 
“S” 27 BA (MA student) Teacher High intermediate Low intermediate 
“T” 27 BA (MA student) Teacher  High intermediate High intermediate 
Table 1 – NL focus group participant data (Koreans) 
 
Participant Age Highest 
degree 
Profession Korean level  
(self assessed) 
Korean culture 
knowledge level 
Nationality 
FL Focus group 3 (North American) 
“A” 27 BA  Teacher  High beginner High Intermediate USA 
“B” 26 MA Teacher Beginner  Intermediate  USA 
“C” 27 MA Teacher Beginner  Intermediate Canada 
“D” 24 BA  Teacher Beginner  High intermediate USA 
FL Focus group 4 (North American) 
“G” 28 BA  Teacher  High beginner High intermediate Canada 
“H” 30 BA  Teacher Low beginner Low intermediate Canada 
“I” 26 BA  Teacher High beginner Intermediate USA 
“J” 24 BA  Teacher Beginner  High beginner USA 
Table 2 – FL focus group participant data (Koreans) 
Data collection procedures  
Data collection consisted of the three separate and consecutive phases.  Phase one was 
the initial selection of the video clips by the primary researcher and research assistant.  Phase 
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two was the presentation of those clips to native speakers including the selection of the final two 
video clips.  The third and final phase was the presentation of selected video clips to non-native 
speakers.  
As described above, the primary data elicitation tool was a Korean commercial film 선생 김봉
두 (Kim & Jang, 2003), which was distributed under the English title of “My Teacher, Mr Kim.” 
A plot summary can be found in appendix D. For data collection all of the focus groups watched 
two scenes from the film. Each scene was about one minute long. In the first scene, a parent 
interrupts a faculty meeting screaming, “Which one of you is Kim, Bong-du?” He wants to find 
Mr. Kim, because Kim has been hassling his son for bribes.  In the second scene, Mr. Kim 
attends a business meeting over dinner at a barbeque restaurant. He meets with two men who 
discuss their plans to close down the country school in order to open a survival game site. 
English translations of these segments are provided in appendix E. They were asked to describe 
and discuss the emotions that they saw each character display and what clues indicated those 
emotions. A moderator facilitated each focus group. The primary researcher moderated the North 
American groups, and the Korean research assistant moderated the native Korean groups. Each 
focus group discussed the clip for 60 minutes. These discussions were audio recorded. The 
moderators then transcribed each discussion, and the Korean research assistant translated the 
Korean transcripts into English.  
Data analysis procedures 
As mentioned above, this study attempts to compare some of the different data analysis 
methodologies from previous studies in emotional communication.  Therefore, three separate 
data analyses were conducted on the transcripts.  These data analyses are paired with the three 
major sections of the discussion chapter on the accuracy of non-native interpretation, the 
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different channels for emotional cues, and when emotional cues fail across cultures. For that first 
section on the accuracy of interpretation, the quantitative data from the notetaking worksheets 
was analyzed using descriptive statistics (see for example, Aron & Aron, 2002). Likewise, 
descriptive statistics were used for the frequency counts of the emotion words for the non-native 
group. However, in order to determine which “non-Ekman” emotion terms would be included in 
the frequency counts, the primary researcher reviewed all of the words in the text from the two 
alphabetical indices created by the Word and TAMS analyzer software programs. The specific 
details of why these programs were selected, as well as how they serve to provide deeper 
analysis of the collected data, are covered with greater precision in the discussion chapter of this 
dissertation (see pages 128 through 145).  
In the case of the other two sections on communication channels and failures to interpret, 
that qualitative data was analyzed following the four steps Creswell (2006) outlines: first, all of 
the transcripts were reviewed; second, the researcher’s initial reactions were “memoed” in the 
margins; third, those memos were described classified and interpreted; and fourth, the resulting 
codes were represented and visualized. In addition, a fifth step, member checks, was included for 
the purpose of data analysis verification. Four member checks were conducted before creating 
the final version of the discussion chapter, and the revisions recommended from those member 
checks are included therein.  
Coding 
 Each focus group transcript was then coded according to Creswell’s (2006) coding 
system. A priori codes, ones that are “preexisting” (p. 152) in the literature, were used for 
Ekman's seven basic emotions—sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, anger, contempt, and enjoyment.  
A priori codes were also used for the emotional communication channels: 
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• Appraisal – used when participants described understanding the emotion based on the 
appropriate emotion for a specific situation. E.g. “He was mad, because the teacher had 
come in late.” 
• Lexical Semantic – used when the participants either directly referenced words from the 
movie script, or the meaning of a phrase or sentence used by a character. E.g. “The 
character said, ‘I'm unhappy.’” 
• Behavioral – used when the participant described cues for emotion, in the literature these 
are further broken down into the following codes: 
o Face – used when the participant described a particular facial expression. E.g. 
“He was smiling.” 
o Gestures – used when the participant described a gesture made by the character. 
E.g. “He shrugged his shoulders.” 
o Kinesic – used when the participant described a physical action that the character 
did; however, this needed to be a larger physical action than a gesture. E.g. “He 
threw the books across the room.” 
o Prosodic – used when the participant described changes in the pitch or volume of 
the characters voice. E.g. “He was screaming.” 
o Proxemic – used when the participant described differences in physical 
positioning of the characters. E.g. “He was frightened, because he was backing 
away from the man.” 
The seven codes were selected from the literature on non-verbal communication (see for 
example, Birdwhistell, 1952; Ekman, 1993; Fast, 1970; Mehrabian, 2007; K. R. Scherer, 1982, 
1999; Wierzbicka, 1999). In addition, an eighth code, Circular, was used in those cases where 
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the participant used circular descriptions to describe the emotion that they interpreted: E.g. “I 
thought he was angry because he looked mad.”  An extensive example of the coded transcript 
can be found in the discussion chapter on pages 152-153.  
An extensive list of in vivo codes, or “names that are the exact words used by the 
participants” (Creswell, 2006, p. 153), were generated for linguistic items. These codes were 
then grouped into the following categories: “non-basic” emotions, and emotionally laden terms, 
as well as slang, metaphor and archetypal phrases.  The second and most extensive area of in 
vivo coding was the emergent themes that arose in the participants’ discussions: the social 
construction of emotional acts, “reverse” situational appraisal, participants’ recognition of 
display rules, contradictory/masked, or diminished/exaggerated display rules, and dissonance 
caused by “breaking” display rules.  
Limitations  
This study brings with it some inherent imitations. While focus groups provide some 
benefits, they also only function with small numbers of participants.  Thus, the mere handful of 
participants limits the generalizability of the study.  Additionally, the film and genre, as well as 
the video clips themselves limit the range of expressions that were considered and, therefore, the 
breadth of the study.  Moreover, the fluidity and trans-nationality of communication practices 
leaves some of specifics of this study bound in the brief time window of the research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - DISCUSSION 
The primary purpose of this study is to shed light on the debate over whether emotions 
are universally basic or culturally relative in character.  In other words, how and when do out-
group participants’ interpretations of emotions displayed in a particular movie scene match and 
mismatch those of in-group members? Moreover, how do those basic and relative interpretations 
interact in the process of cross-cultural communication? The participants met for homogeneous 
focus group discussions and were asked to describe the emotional expressions they saw and how 
they understood those emotional expressions.  This discussion reviews and integrates the 
evidence that supports each perspective and explores the interactions. The literature review 
indicates that the vast majority of researchers on both sides of the issue accept some level of 
value and validity in the other perspective (Besnier, 1990; Coggins & Fox, 2009; Ekman, 2003; 
Matsumoto, 1991; Planalp, 1999; Turner & Stets, 2005; Wierzbicka, 1999). Moreover, this study 
utilizes the methodological approaches of both the nature and nurture perspectives on the same 
data set to determine if one perspective or the other provides a better description of emotional 
communication across cultures.  The simple answer to that primary research question is that the 
“nature” argument for basic and universal emotions is well supported by the data, but substantial 
and often contradictory interpretations are also present in the data which are better understood 
via a social mediation perspective.  Moreover, the character of the emotional expression 
mechanisms used by out-group members to negotiate those differences provides important new 
insights into cross-cultural emotional communication. This discussion will explore the evidence 
regarding which of the various channels for reading emotional communication—appraisal, 
nonverbal communication, or direct communication—Koreans and North Americans use to 
interpret emotional cues. Finally, this chapter reviews the character of incidents where marked 
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differences were noted in interpretation, with a specific focus on aspects that offer opportunities 
to improve cross-cultural communication and foreign language instruction. 
Accuracy of Non-native Interpretation of Cross-cultural Emotional Communication 
 The consideration of accuracy of nonnative interpretation of the emotional cues that 
native speakers use is essential to determine if cross-cultural differences exist between these two 
national groups in emotional cue interpretation. The literature offers two suggestions for how 
accurate the nonnative speakers' interpretations will be.  Ekman (1993, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 
2003; 1972) and others (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Kohler, et al., 2004; Matsumoto, 
1991; Matsumoto, Yoo, Hirayama, & Petrova, 2005; Panksepp, 2011; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & 
Scott, 2010) suggest that emotions and emotional cues are essentially universal, so there should 
be little difference in interpretations, while Mead (1967) and others (Dewaele, 2008; Jack, Blais, 
Scheepers, Schyns, & Caldara, 2009; Pavlenko, 2005, 2008; Planalp, 1999; C. Saarni, 1989; K. 
R. Scherer, 1999; Wierzbicka, 1999) imagine that we will find striking differences. The data 
from this study suggest two windows into the question of accuracy. Transcripts of the focus 
groups’ discussions offer one window into the accuracy of nonnative interpretations, while the 
note taking worksheets add another method of measuring the accuracy of nonnative 
interpretations of any cross-cultural interpretive act. 
 As the use of focus groups is an underutilized methodology in foreign language 
learning, data analysis requires a different conceptualization from that used more commonly in 
FL research.  The examination of the audio recordings and transcripts in terms of accuracy raised 
four issues: a holistic view of nonnative accuracy, translation effects, word choice differences, 
and intensity variation. While the note taking worksheet data allow us to look at four separate, 
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but interrelated issues: the range of responses, the worksheet as a frame, a statistical analysis of 
relative accuracy and a separate statistical analysis of intensity differences.  
Researchers’ gut reactions.  
While objective research rejects subjective opinions in general, this section begins with 
the subjective responses of two individuals heavily involved in the project. Clearly, one of the 
fundamental realities of intercultural communication is that, in purely practical ways, a statistical 
analysis of interpretation accuracy of members of another cultural group is not sufficient to judge 
intercultural acuity.  Even intra-culturally, a wide range of subjective terms and phrases is used 
to describe one’s sensitivity to another’s intentions, or lack of sensitivity. In America, our 
subjective judgments of other people’s sensitivity lead us to suggest that someone “is savvy,” 
that someone “gets it,” or, alternatively, that someone “is clueless.” Arguably, a more holistic 
approach may prove useful.  Indeed, a gut reaction is exactly what we would rely on in our 
normal lives. Importantly, that phrase “gut reaction” refers directly to the physical, autonomic, 
emotional response we have in these situations: we feel emotions in our bodies; in our gut.  Of 
course, such a holistic analysis is by definition subjective, and the potential for bias is duly 
noted, yet this holistic response is precisely the opposition of expectations to the reality that 
underlies many cross-cultural communication conflicts. 
The primary researcher is the person most “embedded” within this data set.  What was 
my initial gut reaction in analyzing the accuracy of the nonnative interpretations?  In the 
moment, I generally thought that the nonnative participants did a respectable job in interpreting 
the Korean emotional cues in the same way the Korean focus groups had. You will recall that 
one of the steps was to “reveal” to the North Americans how the Koreans had interpreted and 
identified the emotional cues. In one of these “comparison phases,” I stated “many of the things 
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that you guys said, and even some of the direct references to how they saw the emotions, and 
where they saw them [were the same].” In another instance, I stated, “I think that you guys pretty 
much sussed it out.” Clearly, my analysis and interpretation of the data during the focus group 
process was similar to the results of the analysis of the “presence or absence ratings” in the 
previous sub-section: Neither perfectly off target, nor perfectly on target, and substantially more 
accurate than inaccurate, as Elfenbein & Ambady (2002) argue, “Emotions do not lose all 
meaning across cultural boundaries—but they may lose some meaning” (p. 231). 
However, while I felt that the nonnatives were clearly “in the ballpark” I raised questions 
in the moment about the absolute precision of their interpretations “although they didn’t say that 
they were two peas in a pod, the businessman and the middleman, they saw almost the same 
expressions on both the businessmen and this man in the middle.” In addition, even during the 
focus groups, there was some serious questioning of the intensity of the emotions displayed.  In a 
few instances, the nonnative ratings of intensity differed substantially from the natives as we will 
see more clearly in another analysis.  Alternatively, during the focus groups, I pointed to a few 
clear examples of the nonnative missing a cue completely.  In one case, I stated, “Mr. Kim was a 
little bit contemptuous of the other two people. I don’t know if you guys saw that at all.” 
While my responses are the responses of a “first-culture American,” I wanted to measure 
my own assessments against other holistic data.  Consequently, I asked the Korean focus group 
facilitator, Yoonjin (pseudonym), who translated the Korean transcripts into English, to review 
all of the transcripts and provide a “first-culture Korean” interpretation.  During this interview, 
she related, “I wouldn’t say they did as well as Koreans did.” But she later added, “I thought they 
did quite well.” Importantly, she wished to specify the differences between what the non-natives 
understood well, “very, very big gestures and obvious feelings like anger” (emphasis added), and 
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what they had more difficulty with, “when it gets to be more subtle, there were more 
interpretations.” Yoonjin’s analysis of the specific emotions which are generally more clear is in 
line with the results of Elfenbein & Ambady’s (2002) meta-analysis of the cross-cultural 
emotional communication research that concluded in terms of Ekman’s basic emotions that anger 
was most likely to be accurately interpreted by non-natives, “anger showed a relatively small in-
group advantage in both face and voice” (p. 222). 
 Clearly, the nonnative participants were less than perfect in their interpretations--even 
though the primary researcher’s initial reaction was that they had done quite well in interpreting 
the emotions displayed in the same manner as the native culture participants. Again, we are 
forced to consider the threshold question. How much misunderstanding is enough to cause 
difficulties in communication? Moreover, is it possible to train and educate individuals involved 
in cross-cultural situations in the required flexibility to overcome a moderate level of 
misunderstanding that would seem natural in most intercultural situations. 
Participant worksheets -- presence or absence ratings.  
The most obvious way to compare the accuracy of the non-native’s ability to perceive 
emotions in the same way "native culture" members do is to ask if they see the same emotions. 
In this study, appendix B is the note taking worksheet that the participants used in recording each 
participant’s judgment regarding the presence or absence of Ekman's basic emotions.  At the 
bottom of that page, each primary character in each scene was to be rated on Ekman’s seven 
basic emotions.  The reason participants were limited to the seven basic emotions was to allow 
an apples to apples comparison (Erkut, Alarcón, García Coll, Tropp, & Vázquez García, 1999) of 
their intensity responses.  Consequently, these results provide a method to quantify the relative 
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difference between the native culture participants’ judgments of the emotional intensity and the 
non-native participants’ judgments of the same emotions. 
The participants indicated which emotions each character in each scene displayed.  They 
then rated the intensity of each of the seven emotions—sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, anger, 
contempt, and enjoyment—on a five-point scale. Thus, with seven emotions and three characters 
in each of the two clips, a total of forty-two emotions were evaluated. In evaluating the ratings, 
the results were examined using two separate lenses, representing lower and higher standards of 
agreement. In the lower standard lens, a simple majority of responses in each national group was 
considered to be agreement as to the presence or absence of the emotion. If the responses were 
equal in number, the results were considered ambiguous. Under the higher standard of 
measurement, if 75% or more of the nationality group stated that the emotion was present or 
absent, then that result was considered a clear indication of the presence or absence of the 
emotion. If the response was between 25 and 75%, then the result was considered unclear. This 
analysis regarding the presence or absence of emotions could support a variety of results: the two 
groups could differ in a contradictory fashion—i.e. one group clearly seeing the emotion, while 
the other clearly did not see the emotion—or one group could have a clear response while the 
other group’s response was unclear, or the two groups could agree. 
When applying the simple majority standard to the forty-two cases to be evaluated, the 
Korean and North American groups agreed 86% of the time. In just less than 10% of cases, the 
two groups had contradictory results–one group stating that they saw the emotion, while the 
other group did not. While the other 4% of cases represented instances where one group was 
uncertain, while the other group perceived the emotion.  Eighty-six percent agreement would 
seem a relatively high level. Indeed, 86% exceeds the level which Ekman set for his cross-
  102 
 
cultural studies, in which a majority of people from the culture selecting the same emotion was 
considered the gold standard (Ekman, 1999b). When we use the more stringent 75% standard of 
agreement in the monocultural groups, which requires 75% or more of the individuals in the 
cultural group to agree on the presence or absence of the emotion, the results reveal a large 
increase in the number of ambiguous responses.  Indeed, in about 35% of the cases one group’s 
response was unclear well the other group clearly saw an emotion or did not see that emotion.  
However, the Korean and North American groups still agreed almost 65% of the time, including 
a few cases where both groups were unsure.  Perhaps more importantly, in no cases under this 
higher standard, were contradictory results returned, where one group perceived an emotion, 
while the other one did not. This lack of strongly contradictory results seems particularly salient 
in terms of cross-cultural miscommunication, because if one culture clearly and strongly 
perceived an emotion that the other culture clearly and strongly did not perceive, then the results 
would indicate a strong case of linguistic relativism indicating serious difficulties in the 
intercultural communication of emotional cues between these two groups. 
 A strong case can be made that the nonnative participants in this study have a fairly 
broad capability and in the large majority of cases to accurately perceive the same basic 
emotions that the native Koreans perceived. While this result was in line with Ekman’s research, 
and, therefore, not entirely surprising, the fact that substantial disagreement was found in this 
study raises a pertinent question: Is there a threshold level where the misinterpretation of 
displayed emotional cues results in problems for intercultural communication?  Is eighty percent 
accuracy enough for effective and courteous interaction, or would a “one in a million” 
misinterpretation be sufficient to cause communication problems between individuals? In 
addition to determining the presence or absence of the emotions and when the Korean and North 
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American groups are in agreement, the rating scales can be used to examine differences in 
intensity ratings for observed emotions across the cultural groups.  This question of ability to 
interpret the intensity of emotions will be addressed later in this section of the chapter. 
Translation questions.  
Before proceeding further, one fundamental consideration in a number of cross- and 
inter- cultural research studies—the issue of translation—needs to be addressed. The translation 
problem is exacerbated when dealing with issues of emotion, which have a tendency to be more 
subjective (Pavlenko, 2005; Wierzbicka, 1999). Consequently, that issues of translation arose in 
determining the accuracy of the cross-cultural interpretations is unsurprising. At the most basic 
level is the cluster of words and phrases that “just do not translate” to the target language. In 
addition, participants used a number of notions that have multiple correlates in the other 
language, and ultimately, the words do matter. Jjeol-jjeol-mae-da (쩔쩔매다 - being at a loss), 
dang-hok (당혹; embarrassment), hwang-dang-ha-da (황당하다; absurd), dang-hwang (당황; 
confusion), nun-chi (눈치; read/study/sense other’s faces), ho-gam (호감: a favorable 
impression), ppeon-ppeon-ha-da (뻔뻔하다; brazenfaced), jeong (정; affection) are examples of 
emotion concepts appearing in this study from the Korean participants for which the bi-cultural 
translator, a Korean native who lived in the United States for more than 15 years, had trouble 
finding adequate direct translations. 
My intention here is not to suggest a strong version of linguistic relativism (Niemeier & 
Dirven, 2000).  I do not suggest that Westerners cannot perceive or understand the notions of 
emotions presented in the Korean language.  My position here is something more akin to what 
Kay and Kempton (1984) call “limited linguistic relativity and determinism” (p. 78). Indeed, that 
the Koreans have a single word or “catch phrase” to represent an emotional state, while the 
  104 
 
North Americans do not have one, does not imply at all that the nonnative participants could not 
and did not describe something close to the emotional state the Koreans did.  For example, the 
Koreans considered their concept of nun-chi (an attention to the feelings of others) to be clearly 
represented in the first video clip, and they also considered nun-chi to be uniquely Korean. 
Participant S explained, “I thought what the principal did was very Korean. He showed Korean 
workplace culture where nun-chi happens a lot where there is a manager.”  Yet at least one North 
American participant recognized something similar to nun-chi.  Participant H says of Teacher 
Kim, “He’s kind of trying to minimize the damage” and then, “He was analyzing the situation.” 
However, such analogues were not always seen in this study. Indeed, in the case of the 
nine Korean terms listed above that “just don’t translate,” the nonnative participants clearly 
attempted to convey something akin to the Korean term. Thus, this study provides support for the 
weak version of the linguistic relativity of emotional terms (Perlovsky, 2009) (i.e. when a 
culture/language does have a succinct word or phrase for a particular emotion, it does raise an 
individual's cognizance of that notion).  Simply put, having a word for something makes it easier 
to talk about that thing, which in turn increases the likelihood that people will talk about the 
notion, and ultimately to raise the level of that notion in the consciousness of the society.  This 
finding matches the in-group advantages in cross-cultural interpretation of emotion cues that 
Elfenbein & Ambady (2002) found in their meta-analysis.  
Word choice/intensity.  
Hand in hand with concepts that “just do not translate” is the concern expressed by 
Yoonjin, the Korean focus group facilitator, that subtle differences can and do matter.  For 
example, in American English we might normally accept that the emotion terms “mad” and 
“angry” are interchangeable in most situations, yet it is easy to imagine situations where 
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someone would choose one over the other.  Such subtleties are quite difficult to tease out of 
intercultural communication.  One way that this study sought to explore those subtleties was to 
determine if the participants from each country offered similar or different intensity ratings for 
the emotions that they observed. 
In general, Koreans rated the emotions expressed as more intense on the five-point scale.  
On thirty-three of the forty-two possible items, the Korean’s aggregate rating was higher than 
North American’s.  That is to say that they thought the emotions expressed were stronger than 
how the North American’s did—that the characters were more angry, more happy, more sad, etc.  
On average, their ratings were half a point higher on the five-point scale, or about 10%. 
Moreover, the presence/absence split in responses was roughly equal on both sides. In the lower 
standard, simple majority, “forced choice” evaluation, the Koreans found the emotion present 16 
times, absent 25 times and in only one case were they tied. The North American’s responses 
were almost identical with the participants finding the emotion present on 15 occasions, absent 
on 26, and in only one case tied. Consequently, the Koreans simply seeing emotions more often 
and thereby having higher overall numbers did not cause the difference in response level, rather 
in each individual instance they rated the intensity of the emotion more highly.  Of course, a 
larger, randomly selected sample and appropriate analysis using inferential statistics would be a 
great deal more revealing than this analysis using only descriptive statistics.7 However, the 
consistent pattern of responses is intriguing and indicates the potential for future research, which 
should include appropriate confirmatory inferential data analysis of any hypotheses suggested. 
Arguably, considering only those cases where both groups judged the emotion present is 
more appropriate. In the lower standard, simple majority, “forced choice” evaluation, a total of 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, this small nonrandom sample prevents the use of inferential statistics. 
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13 cases existed where both the Korean and the North American participants interpreted the 
presence of one of the basic emotions.  Again, the Koreans rated these emotions higher on the 
scale than did the North Americans–in nine of the 13 cases they rated the emotional level as 
higher than did the North Americans. Likewise, on average the Koreans rated the intensity of the 
emotion higher than the North Americans did, but the difference was less than the overall 
average. In the overall average, the difference per item was 0.56; while in these cases of 
agreement the difference was 0.35. Within those 13 cases, eight cases met the higher “75% or 
better” standard indicating strong concurrence by the members of the both national groups.  The 
results here are similar to those in the other cases. In five of the eight cases the Koreans rated the 
intensity of emotion higher than did the North Americans. However, the range difference in these 
cases was much smaller. In these cases matching the higher standard of agreement within the 
groups, the average intensity difference between the Koreans and North Americans was only 
0.04 points on the five-point scale.   Essentially, the intensity ratings were the same for the two 
groups in these readily apparent emotions.  
 Understanding why the ratings for emotions where both groups indicated a strong 
consensus that the particular emotion was expressed by the character in the scene were nearly 
identical, in spite of the fact that more pronounced differences were seen for all of the other 
emotions is not entirely straightforward. In part, more intense emotions are likely to be skewed 
toward one end of the five-point scale, and therefore show less difference. Moreover, this may be 
some indication of basic, “hardwired” emotions of the sort that Ekman studied, and therefore are 
universal across cultures, even in the level of intensity that is judged to them. Again the 
questions arising from this intriguing finding cannot be answered with the methodological tools 
designed for this study; however, the findings do raise tantalizing questions for future study. 
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Language Used to Discuss Emotional Communication 
This section reviews the language used in emotional communication, specifically in 
regards to lexical usage, while the semantic aspects of the language used in emotional 
communication will be saved for the discussion of the emergent themes, the fourth section of this 
chapter. Both experience and research have indicated a substantial question regarding accurate 
translation from one language to another–which is only exacerbated when considering the 
communication of emotion (cf. Besnier, 1990; Pavlenko, 2005; Schumann, 1997; Wierzbicka, 
1999). Simultaneously, from the perspective of data analysis, a discussion of the language used 
in a conversation on emotional interpretation in these focus groups is a type of content analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2004; Wolcott, 2001).   As a result of that theoretical background, data collection 
and data analysis, three important themes have emerged: word frequency analyses, lexical 
differences in cultural terms, and the interrelationship of those items to the relativism versus 
universalism of emotions debate.  
Word frequency analysis—basic emotions. 
Because universal emotions as framed by Paul Ekman really focus on single words to 
represent a small number of “basic” emotions, the analysis of this study starts from those basic 
emotion words. However, computer analysis of the total word counts of the transcripts, allowed 
us to look at every single word spoken in each transcript and get an idea of the rough frequency 
of each word. Consequently, a secondary analysis of additional secondary emotion terms and 
emotionally laden words (Pavlenko, 2008) that could not be readily categorized as one of 
Ekman’s basic emotions was also possible, and, in fact, more revealing. 
Initially, I will present frequency information for the basic emotion words.  Two different 
frequency counts were provided through two different software tools. One “total” frequency 
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count was the raw frequency of the words conducted with the TAMS analyzer providing counts 
of every single occurrence of each word. A second “page” frequency count used the indexing 
feature in Word, which provides the frequency occurrence of each word on a different page. In 
other words, in a small intense discussion of a particular scene a word could occur very 
frequently in the total word count, but if the term has many page counts, the word occurred quite 
often across the full breadth of the interviews. 
The total frequency count using the TAMS analyzer revealed some interesting 
information. As discussed in the methodology section, the TAMS analyzer simply presents the 
total number of occurrences of every single word in the text it analyzes.  Subsequently, the 
researcher had to go back and select out those words that described basic emotions, secondary 
emotions, and emotionally laden words, which would have a significant impact on the study. In 
addition, the transcripts of the individual focus groups were analyzed separately and then placed 
into the same spreadsheet to compare word frequency across focus groups. Finally, the 
researcher needed to look at the frequency of the words to determine if they had an important 
role in the individual discussion. Because the question of universal versus culturally bound 
emotions is central to the general discussion of emotional communication, considering Paul 
Ekman’s six basic emotions cannot be avoided. As one might expect given that the video clips 
were not selected to represent each of the six basic emotions, not all of these emotions were 
discussed in the same level of detail by all of the groups. Disgust was only mentioned twice and 
in only one group, and sadness only six times in just two groups. The logical conclusion is that 
disgust and sadness were not central to the scenes presented to the focus groups, and even a 
cursory review of the video clips supports that conclusion. Fear, surprise, and anger were 
discussed in some detail by all four groups, as was happiness; however, both of the Korean 
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groups used the word happiness much more frequently than did either of the North American 
groups. See Table 3 for a summary of these results. Similarly, the indexing feature in Word 
shows that disgust and sadness were only discussed by some groups and only infrequently. 
Consequently, analysis and discussion of the four of Ekman’s universal emotions -- fear, 
surprise, anger, and happiness – that were considered thoroughly by the focus groups is 
justifiable. 
Table 3 – Summary of basic emotion term word frequency data from TAMS. 
 
 Of course, the main purpose of this section is to compare the Korean perspectives to the 
North American perspectives. To accomplish that task, we need to separate the word counts for 
the Korean groups from the word counts of the North American groups. Table 4 provides a 
Emotion   Different roots  
(occurrences) 
 Synonyms  
(occurrences) 
 Discussed by 
which groups? 
Reasonably balanced 
or imbalanced? 
 fear Afraid (19), 
fear (18), 
fearful (1) 
Scared (9)  All groups Reasonably balanced 
 disgust  Disgusted (2)  Group #3 (North 
American) 
Imbalanced 
 
 sadness  Sad (4), 
sadness (2) 
 Group #2 
(Korean) and 
group #4 (North 
American) 
Imbalanced 
 
 surprise Surprise (27), 
surprised (23), 
surprising (1) 
  All groups Reasonably balanced 
 anger Anger (35), 
angrily (1), 
angry (46) 
Enraged (6), 
outrage (2), 
outraged (2), rage 
(11) 
 All groups Reasonably balanced 
 happiness Happier (1), 
happily (2), 
happiness (17), 
happy (28) 
Enjoying (2), 
pleasant (2), 
pleasantly (2), 
please (7), pleased 
(2) 
 All groups Imbalanced. 
Both Korean groups 
discussed happiness 
much more than either 
North American 
group 
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summary of those counts for the clusters of words very closely associated with the four basic 
emotions that were covered in enough detail in the focus groups to allow us to consider them in 
the study – fear, surprise, anger, and happiness.  As mentioned above, we find relative parity in 
the intensity of discussion and in the frequency of use of the clusters of words associated with 
three of the basic emotions–fear, surprise, and anger–for both the Korean and the North 
American groups. That is to say, the total number of occurrences of the words in the fear, 
surprise, and anger clusters for each focus group, and each nationality were not substantially 
greater or less than those of the other groups–never rising above a two to one ratio. However, the 
discussion of happiness was significantly imbalanced with the Korean groups mentioning 
happiness about nine times as often as did the North American groups. 
 
Fear cluster  Group #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 AFRAID 4 8 4 3 19 
 FEAR 5 8 4 1 18 
 FEARFUL 0 0 0 1 1 
 SCARED 3 1 1 4 9 
Totals  12 17 9 9 47 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 29  N. Am. 18  
 percentage per nationality 61.7%  38.3%  
      
Surprise cluster Group #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 SURPRISE 2 10 7 8 27 
 SURPRISED 5 5 6 7 23 
 SURPRISING 0 0 0 1 1 
Totals  7 15 13 16 51 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 22  N. Am. 29  
 percentage per nationality 43.1%  56.9%  
      
Angry cluster  Group #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 ANGER 7 18 9 1 35 
 ANGRILY 0 1 0 0 1 
 ANGRY 8 22 11 5 46 
 ENRAGED 5 1 0 0 6 
 OUTRAGE 0 0 1 1 2 
 OUTRAGED 0 0 0 2 2 
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 RAGE 4 4 3 0 11 
Totals  24 46 24 9 103 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 70  N. Am. 33  
 percentage per nationality 68.0%  32.0%  
      
Happy cluster Group #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 ENJOYING 1 0 1 0 2 
 HAPPIER 0 0 1 0 1 
 HAPPILY 2 0 0 0 2 
 HAPPINESS 7 10 0 0 17 
 HAPPY 21 4 2 1 28 
 JOY 6 5 0 0 11 
 PLEASANT 2 0 0 0 2 
 PLEASANTLY 1 1 0 0 2 
 PLEASE 4 1 2 0 7 
 PLEASED 1 0 0 1 2 
Totals  45 21 6 2 74 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 66  N. Am. 8  
 percentage per nationality 89.2%  10.8%  
  
Table 4 – Frequency of four emotions words across groups from TAMS 
Ultimately, while word frequency is a gross tool for analyzing meaning, it remains a 
useful tool for highlighting factors that may get overlooked by other analytic methods. The main 
conclusion that we can draw from this frequency analysis of the basic emotion words is that the 
two cultural groups discussed three of the four basic emotions—fear, anger, and surprise—with 
somewhat similar intensity and frequency. That is to say that all of the four groups discussed 
these three emotions in substantial volume and the ratio differences were less than two to one. 
They were “relatively balanced” and “in the ballpark.” The discussion of the happiness depicted 
in these scenes, however, was discussed with a substantially different frequency and intensity.  
Interestingly, the fact that the Korean focus groups used terms directly related to happiness nine 
times as often as did the North American groups allowed a focus on exactly how the different 
focus groups were talking about this relatively imbalanced discussion on happiness. This result is 
intriguing, because happiness is shown to be relatively easily recognizable across cultures 
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(Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), yet the intensity of focus in these “free discussions” is graphically, 
substantially different. To provide a sense of the content from the video that they were 
discussing, happiness is only depicted in the video clip showing the meal and discussion between 
two businessmen and the teacher Mr. Kim. In the scene, the two businessmen are hoping to shut 
down the country school in order to open a “survival game” on the property.  However, since Mr. 
Kim has come to the school, the community has become more enthusiastic about education as 
well as keeping their small country school.  They are becoming resistant to closing down the 
school. The businessmen are hoping to persuade Mr. Kim to their cause so that the school can be 
closed down, and they can move ahead with their business plans. 
 Interestingly, in both North American focus groups, every reference to happiness was in 
a discussion of how the expressions of happiness that they saw in the businessmen in this scene 
were actually the feigned happiness typified by the non-Duchene smile (Ursula Hess & 
Bourgeois, 2010; Ursula Hess & Kleck, 2005; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009), the one where 
the corners of the eyes do not wrinkle. The Korean focus groups, on the other hand, while 
recognizing the false expression of happiness used for business purposes by both businessmen in 
this particular scene, also state that they see a genuine happiness expressed by the businessman 
when they complete their business deal. For example, Participant V described the two 
businessmen by stating that the mediator showed “happiness and relief, because he heard the 
teacher saying that the school would be closed soon. [While] the businessman … had a happy 
expression when he heard the school would close.”  Similarly, Participant T describes the 
mediator’s emotional communication: 
I felt that his happiness in the beginning as fake. His mouth is open and laughing, but I 
felt he was tense/nervous inside. But he felt happiness that came from relief when he 
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heard from the teacher that the school was going to close. Fake happiness in the 
beginning and then later feeling joy without the tension and worries.   
The North American focus groups did not mention this expression of happiness as genuine 
happiness at the completion of a business deal, only discussing that emotional communication in 
terms of the businessmen’s “relief”—but not happiness—that Mr. Kim had already taken steps to 
facilitate the completion of their business deal.  Participant G’s response typifies this 
interpretation of the emotional expressions of the younger businessman, “First, he kind of looked 
concerned and then relieved … after we heard the talk about the game and then something about 
the students he said “oh great!” and you could really see his relief.” Participant C in the other 
North American group made a nearly identical comment about both businessmen, “as soon as 
[Mr. Kim] said, ‘Well, don’t worry, they are all transferring.’ This relief just washed over them.”  
Certainly, this difference in interpretation of happiness and particularly distinguishing 
between happiness and relief is a cultural difference between these focus groups.  Moreover, the 
differences in focus raise questions about the depth and breadth of the universality of 
happiness—at least in this situation and between these two cultures. For the Koreans in these 
focus groups relief is a form of genuine happiness; however, for the North Americans relief 
remains somehow short of genuine happiness. These fundamental differences draw attention to 
and provide a foundation for a second area of analysis on word frequency: other emotion words 
and word clusters. 
Word frequency analysis—the other emotions. 
Because the concept of universal emotions and the number of basic emotions limits the 
sorts of emotions that can be discussed considering emotional communication, discussing “non-
basic” emotions is essential as we wish to have a holistic analysis of the topic.  Indeed, one of the 
  114 
 
most striking impressions one receives when examining the list of words from both the TAMS 
analysis and the analysis using the index feature in Word, is that both lists contain many, many 
more emotion words than Ekman’s six or seven.  These words tend to be of two types.  Some of 
the emotion terms are unique emotions themselves, which do not fit readily into Ekman’s 
categories, for example, guilt, relief, worry. Of course, many of these terms for “non-basic” 
emotions can be found in more complex emotional coding systems such as Plutchik’s or Parrot’s 
(Plutchik, 1980, 1994, 2001; Turner & Stets, 2005). Other emotion terms used by the participants 
in the focus groups are, alternatively, are emotionally laden words or concepts that the layman 
may associate closely with emotions, for example, anxiety, arrogance, shyness.  To provide a 
rough sense of the occurrence of these non-basic emotion terms, I eliminated all of the words 
from the TAMS word count data that were neither basic or non-basic emotions or emotionally-
laden terms, and then hand coded into the three groups: basic, non-basic, or emotionally-laden 
terms or phrases.  Table 5 provides a summary of the rough word count.  In a  
 
 
Number of 
terms 
% of total 
terms 
 number of 
occurrences 
% of total 
occurrences 
Basic emotion clusters 29 10.36% 297 28.50% 
Non-basic emotion 104 37.14% 332 31.86% 
Emotionally laden 147 52.50% 413 39.64% 
 280 100.00% 1042 100.00% 
 
Table 5 – Rough word count of the types of emotion words 
cursory examination of the list, one immediately notices that only about10% of the words 
selected as either emotions or emotionally laden words can be categorized clearly as part of those 
basic emotion clusters. Moreover, about half of the words that were categorized from the 
transcripts of this study fell into the “non-emotion, but emotionally laden” category. However, in 
terms of frequency of use of these words in these discussions about emotional communication, 
basic emotion words were used more frequently, than either non-basic terms or emotionally 
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laden terms.  In fact, in examining the word counts, we discover that many of the non-basic 
emotion words as well as many of the emotionally laden terms and phrases are used only one 
time. Thus, the greater count of basic emotion words does temper the striking 1 to 9 ratio of basic 
emotion words to non-emotion/emotionally-laden terms. In the end, however, these “other” 
emotion terms were at least twice as important to the focus group participants in the discussion 
of the emotions expressed than were basic emotion terms. This result is made more striking by 
the methodological focus on basic emotion terms as seen in the note-taking worksheets and in 
the preparatory remarks to each focus group. Ultimately and unsurprisingly, these data force us 
to conclude that in the communication of emotion between “real, live” human beings, basic 
emotion terms are woefully insufficient to cover the breadth of human emotional experience and 
communication. 
Moreover, and more importantly, expanding our perspective on emotions to include other 
emotions allows us to see other important terms in the conversation that may lead to the sorts of 
cross-cultural emotional miscommunication that this study in part hopes to identify. Thus, using 
the same criteria for inclusion in the analysis used for the basic emotion terms, that is more than 
one group needed to discuss the concept, and the concept needed to be discussed substantially, 
using ten occurrences of a single term in the cluster as a minimum number, we can look 
specifically at a few more emotion terms. Table 6 lists the “non-basic” emotion terms that met 
the criteria for inclusion in the analysis. 
Embarrassment cluster #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 EMBARRASSED 5 7 5 4 21 
 EMBARRASSMENT 1 4 3 0 8 
Totals  6 11 8 4 29 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 17  N. Am. 12  
 percentage per nationality 58.62%  41.38%  
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Guilt cluster #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 GUILT 0 0 0 11 11 
 GUILTY 0 3 12 12 27 
Totals  0 3 12 23 38 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 3  N. Am. 35  
 percentage per nationality 7.89%  92.11%  
       
Loss cluster #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 LOSS 14 5 0 1 20 
 LOST 5 4 0 1 10 
Totals  19 9 0 2 30 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 28  N. Am. 2  
 percentage per nationality 93.33%  6.67%  
       
Relief cluster #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 RELIEF 3 1 1 2 7 
 RELIEVED 2 1 1 6 10 
Totals  5 2 2 8 17 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 7  N. Am. 10  
 percentage per nationality 41.18%  58.82%  
       
Worry cluster #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 WORRIED 6 3 3 4 16 
 WORRIES 1 1 0 0 2 
 WORRY 1 0 2 0 3 
Totals  8 4 5 4 21 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 12  N. Am. 9  
 percentage per nationality 57.14%  42.86%  
 
Table 6 – “Non-basic” emotion terms meeting minimum criteria 
What is seen when we look at these frequency counts of “non-basic” emotions?  First, the 
emotions on the list include—embarrassment, guilt, loss relief, and worry—and while they do 
not make Ekman’s list, they are fairly ‘basic’ emotions in a layman’s sense. As was the case with 
the basic emotions above, some of these non-basic emotion terms were discussed in relative 
balance amongst the groups: worry, relief, and embarrassment.  That balance would indicate 
some cross-cultural similarity between the Korean and North American groups might be found.  
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On the other hand, two of the emotions, guilt and loss, while they would seem inextricably 
intertwined in a psychological sense, were discussed in rather imbalanced ways.  Importantly, the 
Koreans discussed loss extensively, but the North Americans did not. Simultaneously, the North 
Americans focused extensively on guilt, but the Koreans did not.  Given the intertwined nature 
of the two emotions in the Western psychological sense, the next task was to explore just exactly 
how the various focus groups were discussing guilt and loss. Were they describing the same 
events in the clips? Were they referencing the same emotional cues? Were they talking about the 
same things, but using different terms? 
The easy answer to those three questions is, “no.” However, to clarify the issue, we need 
to note that both of these emotions, “guilt” and “at a loss,” represent a ‘secondary’ emotion (cf. 
Plutchik, 2001)--one that requires higher cognitive processing in order to exist. In other words, 
people have to “think about it” to feel this emotion. In general, Ekman’s basic emotions are 
emotions that we can see in animals–particularly mammals. However, emotions termed here as 
secondary emotions, require some sort of conscious awareness of some other factors that enable 
us to feel these emotions—less autonomic processing and more conscious processing. We cannot 
feel guilty if we are not aware of the “right and wrong” of the situation, and we cannot feel ‘at a 
loss’ if we are not struggling amongst a variety of options and consequences available to us.  
As the data show, the Korean focus group participants did not discuss guilt much. The 
one individual who discussed guilt talked about it in terms of the school principal in the initial 
scene, but no other participant from any of the four groups also described that emotion in that 
character. The Koreans, however, did talk about sensing that both the principal and Mr. Kim 
were “feeling at a loss,” in the faculty meeting scene.   To clarify the situation depicted, the 
scene occurs early in the film and is set chronologically before Mr. Kim is “sent down” to the 
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country school for soliciting protection money. In the scene, Mr. Kim arrives late to a faculty 
meeting. As the principal begins to approach Mr. Kim, an angry, screaming parent enters the 
room and instigates a melee over the “shakedown” of his son.  Six of the eight Korean 
participants described the principal is being at a loss during the melee, and five of the Korean 
participants say the same thing about Mr. Kim. Interestingly, the Korean participants use two 
different words to describe the sensation of being at a loss with specific cultural implications, 
which I will discuss in a later section. The North American focus groups, on the other hand and 
as stated above, did not arrive at an overall conclusion that any character was “at a loss.” 
Interestingly, North American Participant I does see essentially what the Korean participants 
saw, stating that the principal: 
starts off being stern and professional and all and kind of above everyone … but then the 
situation [created by the angry parent causes the principal] obviously to be surprised and 
everything. He wants to take control, but he’s kind of at a loss. 
However, Participant I is the only member of the North American focus groups to discuss that 
emotion. The conclusion we can draw is that the sensation of being “at a loss,” which was so 
plainly obvious to the Korean participants is not “unperceivable” to the North American 
participants; however, that “at the loss” emotion was also not plainly obvious and worthy of 
discussion to the North Americans. Which supports Frank, Harvey, & Verdun’s (2000) 
conclusion that non-natives are able to understand culturally specific varieties of emotion “even 
though the distinctions may not arise in everyday life nor be reflected in ordinary English usage” 
(p. 887). 
Switching the focus to guilt, which the North Americans discussed in detail, but the 
Koreans hardly mentioned, we also find that they are not talking about emotional cues that were 
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perceived differently by the Koreans. Rather they are talking about a separate set of emotional 
cues that the Koreans did not discuss. Guilt, however, as a secondary emotion, is not a simple 
construct.  Certainly, embarrassment is embedded in many expressions of guilt—but not every 
expression of embarrassment is caused by guilty feelings.  The word frequency data from these 
focus groups indicates that both North Americans and Koreans discussed embarrassment in 
significant detail regarding similar events depicted in the video clips. The North Americans 
discussed guilt in terms of three separate situations in the two video clips.  The first instance 
described as guilty was Mr. Kim’s behavior upon entering the meeting late. This particular 
description is important in the subsequent discussion of channels for emotional cues, because the 
discussion implicates multiple channels through which they assessed this emotion. However, for 
the current discussion of how the North Americans and Koreans perceived the scene differently, 
the key factor is the fact that the Koreans did not mention that Mr. Kim was exhibiting cues for 
guilt upon his arrival at the meeting, nor did they describe them as being at a loss. Participant G 
describes Mr. Kim as feeling guilty: “I could feel … he feels a little bit guilty, too.” Similarly, in 
the other focus group, Participant D describes Mr. Kim’s emotional cues in the same way, “I 
thought he looked guilty. The way he came in and sat down, looked down and just kept his head 
and eyes down.” 
The second instance of guilt occurs later in the faculty meeting scene after the angry 
parent has entered. However, in their discussion some of the North Americans focus not on any 
emotional cues that reveal his guilt, rather they state that they did not see the emotional cues for 
guilt, in spite of the fact that Mr. Kim is indeed guilty of extorting “protection money” from the 
students. For example, Participant I described it this way, “I thought he just … wanted to stay out 
of it. He didn’t want to get involved in what was going on, but I didn’t see him feeling guilty.” 
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Moreover, in the other focus group, Mr. Kim was not thought to be expressing guilt during the 
melee, rather participants described him as, “a bit of a coward when the whole kerfuffle was 
going on” (Participant C). 
A third instance where the North Americans described guilt as an emotion occurs in the 
scene with the businessman when the younger businessman offers Mr. Kim a bribe. However, 
the participants again offer mixed interpretations. In one North American group the discussion 
centers on not seeing the emotion of guilt that they seem to expect from the younger 
businessman. Participant A suggests that the businessman offers the bribe “not in a guilty way … 
just to make sure that [the business deal] was sealed.”  While the other North American group 
describes seeing Mr. Kim express guilty feelings, as Participant J states, “I think he looked guilty 
and sad, because he is taking bribe money again, and this time he feels bad about it.” 
In addition, one “emotionally laden” term deserves attention based on the frequency data: 
respect. Table 7 shows the frequency data regarding the cluster of words around the notion of 
respect. Looking at those numbers, I am still taken aback.  The Koreans did not mention respect 
at all in their focus groups, while the North Americans focused a reasonable amount of their 
analytical time and effort discussing the respect and disrespect depicted—and, in fact, focus 
group number four was quite fixated on the notion of respect and its role in the public school  
 
Respect cluster Group #1 (Korean) #2 (Korean) #3 (N. Am.) #4 (N. Am.)  totals 
 DISRESPECT 0 0 0 1 1 
 DISRESPECTFUL 0 0 0 1 1 
 RESPECT 0 0 1 7 8 
 RESPECTED 0 0 0 2 2 
 RESPECTFUL 0 0 2 2 4 
Totals  0 0 3 13 16 
       
 number per nationality  Korean 0  N. Am. 16  
 percentage per nationality 0.00%  100.00%  
 
Table 7 -- Frequency of respect cluster words 
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situation. Given the fact that, one, the movie is set in public schools, and, two, the characters 
represent strong gradients of class and power, from students to parents to teachers to 
administrators, and, three, the focus group participants are teachers, this discussion of respect is 
particularly important. A great deal of writing, training and effort has been put into explaining 
the importance of Confucian ideals regarding respect for teachers to people from Western 
cultures. The data from this focus group shows that the North American focus groups were 
hyper-aware of this cultural norm, discussing it in great detail. Yet, the Korean participants did 
not even discuss the concept of respect. Why?  This question, and several others, where not 
sufficiently supported by the evidence in the focus groups to come to a definitive answer. 
Therefore, follow-up questions were developed and key informants were interviewed regarding 
these issues. Two different interpretations were offered. Yoonjin, the bicultural facilitator and 
translator, offered that the North Americans were likely over-interpreting the interaction.  In the 
faculty meeting, she suggests, “Koreans might have seen that [Mr. Kim] was respectful enough 
… it was within the limits of cultural appropriateness.” She continues, “He was not particularly 
rude … he was not overly polite, but he was not over the line … [the Koreans] didn’t seem him 
as respectful, but they didn’t see him as disrespectful, either.” 
Before moving on to the next topic, however, I want to look a little more deeply into the 
word frequency counts regarding the different categorizations of emotion words as revealed in 
these focus groups which a previously presented in summary regarding the occurrence of “basic 
emotions” versus “non-basic emotions” and/or “emotionally laden” terms. Clearly, people and 
animals do have some basic emotions that mammals in particular both express and recognize 
(Darwin, 1998; Panksepp, 2011). Indeed, scientists have written about the existence of basic 
emotions for over a century, and humans have undoubtedly known about that universality for 
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immeasurably longer.  In communication between and amongst cultures, those basic emotions 
unfortunately only cover an extremely limited scope of our emotional lives and, consequently, 
our emotional communication strategies and habits. Wierzbicka’s (1999) argument to that end is 
well supported by the frequency count data in this study. Simply put, those non-universal 
emotions regulated by cultural specific display rules are at least as important as basic and 
universal ones.  
While not directly linked to the question of non-natives’ accuracy in assessing another 
countries emotional communication cues, a few interesting themes emerge out of that analysis to 
be addressed in this lexical analysis section. Ultimately, the focus group data reinforce the notion 
that emotional communication is both subtle and intricate. That data also reinforce the 
methodological notion that teasing out the threads of meaning is an equally complex and intricate 
process. I have argued that humans create a category of emotion that I have labeled “secondary,” 
and that this category is inherently different from a basic, genetically universal emotion. 
Secondary emotions are different, because they require conscious processing to experience, for 
example, guilt and embarrassment.  Moreover, Plutchik (1980, 1994, 2001) has argued for 
hierarchical categorizations of emotions.  These categories suggest that many emotions can occur 
in combination, which in turn results in different and distinct emotional expressions. Critically, 
blending emotions can become quite complex quite rapidly, and offers enormous potential for 
culturally specific combinations. Certainly the focus groups discussed some elements of both 
complexity and cultural specificity.  A final issue revealed through the lexical/semantic analysis 
was the fact that when the focus groups discussed emotions, they did not always rely on the 
academic terms for emotion that a scientist might use. Instead, they frequently resorted to slang, 
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metaphor and archetype to express their assessments of the emotions that the characters were 
attempting to communicate.  
Before going into detail on these three emergent themes, I wish to clarify that much of 
the data for these conclusions comes from indexing data using Word.  Because the TAMS 
software can only return counts of individual words, the ability to index phrases in Word allowed 
for a different characterization of the lexical data.  Table 8 provides a summary of the frequency 
count data after those indexed words had been selected and then grouped into clusters. 
summary   
# diff 
words G#1 G#2 G#3 G#4 
Ks v. 
NoAms 
 page 
hits 
% 
Korean 
% 
NoAm 
  emotion                   
basic fear 13 19 13 20 21 -9 73 43.84% 56.16% 
  
disgust/ 
contempt 8 9 8 4 3 10 24 70.83% 29.17% 
  sadness 3 0 1 0 3 -2 4 25.00% 75.00% 
  surprise 3 6 7 9 10 -6 32 40.63% 59.38% 
  anger 12 22 25 21 12 14 80 58.75% 41.25% 
  happiness 16 28 18 16 4 26 66 69.70% 30.30% 
  totals 55 84 72 70 53 33 279 55.91% 44.09% 
                      
other                     
  
gen. arousal 
(anticipation) 4 3 2 1 2 2 8 62.50% 37.50% 
  
gen. agony 
(pain) 8 0 3 2 8 -7 13 23.08% 76.92% 
  shyness 5 0 2 3 3 -4 8 25.00% 75.00% 
  
"weighing 
options" (nun-
chi) 5 11 12 5 1 17 29 79.31% 20.69% 
  
gen. "nice" 
character 10 4 1 5 11 -11 21 23.81% 76.19% 
  
gen. "bad" 
character - 
arrogance 23 7 3 8 19 -17 37 27.03% 72.97% 
  flattery 6 4 3 3 1 3 11 63.64% 36.36% 
  archetypes 2 0 0 2 0 -2 2 0.00% 100.00% 
  interest 4 4 6 4 1 5 15 66.67% 33.33% 
  
guilt (+shame, 
embarrassment) 10 8 15 14 26 -17 63 36.51% 63.49% 
  anxiety 17 15 6 5 17 -1 43 48.84% 51.16% 
  
relief (post-
anxiety) 3 4 2 2 4 0 12 50.00% 50.00% 
  
showing no 
emotion (calm) 18 20 12 12 8 12 52 61.54% 38.46% 
  
conflicted 
(mixed/ 7 15 8 5 6 12 34 67.65% 32.35% 
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confused) 
  totals 122 95 75 71 107 -8 348 48.85% 51.15% 
 
Table 8 -- Frequency data from Word indexing 
Because I have already offered a few examples of secondary emotions and discussed the 
secondary emotion issue in some detail, at this point I would only like to provide one example of 
a participant verbally processing from a basic emotion description to a secondary emotion 
conclusion. Indeed, we can trace the ‘secondary’ character of guilt in participant G’s interpretive 
process regarding Mr. Kim in the faculty meeting. She begins describing him as fearful, when 
she agrees with Participant H’s assessment of Mr. Kim as “sheepish, scared, [and] nervous.” 
When the facilitator asks her to go into detail as to why she thought Mr. Kim was fearful, she 
points to his “the lack of eye contact” with the principal. As the discussion continues she makes a 
situational connection to Mr. Kim’s late arrival, and concludes that he may have committed some 
prior indiscretions at work, “I noticed that, okay, he kind of … he did something.” Finally, she 
appears to be linking the emotion of fear to the situation in the movie and ultimately describes 
him as feeling guilty: “it’s a little bit questionable, like I could feel… he feels a little bit guilty, 
too.” All of this negotiation and a conclusion process occur over about two minutes of the focus 
group conversation. 
Clearly, many of the “other” clusters section of Table 8 are clearly blended emotions that 
fit squarely into Plutchik’s (1980, 1994, 2001) hierarchy: anxiety, relief, anticipation, shame, 
curiosity, etc.  Consequently, these data provide the opportunity to explore the question, “Would 
a secondary, blended emotion be any more or less likely to result in cross-cultural 
misunderstanding than a primary, basic one?” Yoonjin, the bicultural facilitator and translator, 
suggests that non-natives had more difficulties in the second scene “where the emotions were 
more interpretation based … A lot of cognition goes together with the emotions.” An obvious 
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way to answer that question is to count the accurate and inaccurate interpretations of secondary 
emotions. However, this study was not designed to conduct that sort of analysis. The data we do 
have allow us to compare the relative intensity of focus on the particular emotions by the various 
focus groups. As already discussed, four of Ekman’s basic emotions were considered in 
sufficient detail by the focus groups to allow for analysis, and three of the four were discussed in 
relatively equal intensity by both focus groups. Table 9 summarizes the data for the ten 
“substantial” secondary emotions coded in this study.   As before, the overall average indicates a 
reasonable balance in focus. That is to say, about half of the overall other emotion words were in 
the Korean groups (49%) and half were in the North American groups (51%). However, as we  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 -- Frequency data on substantial “other” emotions from Word indexing 
go down the list of the individual emotion clusters, we find cases of imbalance in some word 
clusters. Of the ten clusters, only two have ratios near one to one, four have ratios of about two to 
summary   
# diff 
words G#1 G#2 G#3 G#4 
Ks v. 
NoAms 
page 
hits 
% 
Korean 
% 
NoAm 
  emotion                   
 other 
gen. agony 
(pain) 8 0 3 2 8 -7 13 23.08% 76.92% 
  
"weighing 
options" (nun-
chi) 5 11 12 5 1 17 29 79.31% 20.69% 
  
gen. "nice" 
character 10 4 1 5 11 -11 21 23.81% 76.19% 
  
gen. "bad" 
character - 
arrogance 23 7 3 8 19 -17 37 27.03% 72.97% 
  flattery 6 4 3 3 1 3 11 63.64% 36.36% 
  interest 4 4 6 4 1 5 15 66.67% 33.33% 
  
guilt (+shame, 
embarrassment) 10 8 15 14 26 -17 63 36.51% 63.49% 
  anxiety 17 15 6 5 17 -1 43 48.84% 51.16% 
  
relief (post-
anxiety) 3 4 2 2 4 0 12 50.00% 50.00% 
  
showing no 
emotion (calm) 18 20 12 12 8 12 52 61.54% 38.46% 
  
conflicted 
(mixed/ 
confused) 7 15 8 5 6 12 34 67.65% 32.35% 
  totals 122 95 75 71 107 -8 348 48.85% 51.15% 
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one, and the ratios of the remaining four are about three to one. Relatively speaking, the 
imbalance between the Koreans and North Americans is greater in reference to the intensity of 
their focus on various secondary emotions than in the intensity of their focus on basic emotions. 
Since the overall use of secondary emotion terms is about equal, that means that over those ten 
secondary emotions, Koreans focused more intensely on some and North Americans focused 
more intensely on others.  Interestingly, the two secondary emotions that are exceptions to the 
imbalance pattern were the discussion of “anxiety,” and “relief,” which seem to be interrelated, 
because we can interpret relief as the resolution of anxiety. In regards to discussions that were 
relatively imbalanced, the Koreans focused about twice as much as the North Americans on 
flattery, interest, conflict, and lack of emotional expression. They also focused almost four times 
as much on nun-chi/“weighing options”—which we discuss in on more detail later.  The North 
Americans, on the other hand, focused about twice as heavily on the guilt/shame/embarrassment 
cluster, as previously discussed. In addition, they focused about three times the attention on 
general comments about expressions of pain, and interestingly about three times the amount of 
attention on emotionally laden character traits—both “good” and “bad” traits.  Ultimately, I do 
not believe that the data warrant specific conclusions about specific emotions and emotions 
terms, rather the results suggest that as we move beyond “basic” emotions to secondary and 
blended ones, universality becomes extremely tenuous.  Simultaneously, however, secondary 
emotions are important elements of our lives. Indeed, in these conversations secondary emotions 
warranted greater attention from every focus group than did basic emotions. Perhaps more 
importantly, the fact that the Korean and North American discussions focused on secondary 
emotions and emotion laden terms in roughly equal measure indicates that refining of emotional 
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definitions is equally important in both cultures—even though they tended to focus on different 
emotions. 
 Delving into those specific secondary emotions and emotion-laden terms is clearly 
warranted by the data. As stated in the previous paragraph, the Koreans focused more on flattery, 
interest, conflict, the lack of emotional expression, and particularly on nun-chi/“weighing 
options.”  The North Americans focused more on guilt, pain, and “good” or “bad” character 
traits. As each of these traits seems salient, and, at least in part, matches anecdotal conclusions 
about differences in these two cultures, a different methodology regarding each of these 
differences may prove the distinctions important and clear enough to warrant inclusion in a 
cultural assimilator or other training text or tool, but for the purposes of this study I want to look 
specifically at the question of non-natives ability to recognize different conceptualizations of 
emotion. You will recall Roberson et al.’s (2009) conclusion that the different color 
categorization systems in Korean and English in no way affected the ability of speakers of those 
languages to recognize “just noticeable differences” in colors.  Do we see that North Americans 
are able to recognize Korean emotional categories? Two different instances in the video clips and 
in the focus group discussion with the representative Korean emotional categories can provide 
insight into this question.  The emotion described in the first instance, when Mr. Kim arrived late 
for the faculty meeting, was nun-chi. The emotions described in the second one, when the entire 
meeting turns into a wild confusing melee, were dang-hwang and jjeol-jjeol-mae-da. Each of 
these emotions was discussed heavily by both of the Korean focus groups. However, as we might 
imagine, the North Americans knew none of these three terms. Consequently, the researcher 
needed to go back into the transcript and look for longer phrases and descriptions, that is to say, 
strings of words or phrases that represent essentially the same concept for which Korean has a 
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single word. Indeed, in each of these instances, something was found. In place of the concept of 
nun-chi, the North Americans used phrases like: “weighing his options,” or being “thoughtful.” 
Similarly, in lieu of dang-hwang at least one participant referred to Mr. Kim as appearing to be 
“at a loss.”  This recognition shows is that in spite of the lack of specific words to name the 
emotion, the non-natives were quite able to: 1) recognize these emotions, 2) understand their 
salience in the situation and 3) describe them with their own words. This finding matches the 
conclusion of Frank, et al. (2000). Raising again the question of cultural relativism: Can the lack 
of a single word to describe the emotions change the role of those emotions in the psyche of the 
individuals?  Clearly from the indexed frequency counts, the Koreans talked more about nun-chi 
with 23 total pages referenced, while the North Americans only discussed equivalent concepts on 
six pages. Importantly, two of the nun-chi “page hits” for the North Americans occurred after the 
researcher described the Korean focus group results and introduced the nun-chi concept.  
Regardless of the infrequency prior to the facilitator describing the Korean concept of nun-chi, 
the North Americans responded with recognition and understanding when the notion was 
presented. For example in focus group 3, Participant A immediately recognized the emotion: 
“when he didn’t speak I think that (nun-chi) is exactly what he was doing.”  Even more 
compelling is a North American discussion regarding what nun-chi is, and how it functions 
cross-culturally: 
Participant J: Oh yeah, now that [nun-chi] is mentioned. I kind of see that, but I wouldn't 
have really kind of picked up on it. 
Participant H: I think that it is a lack of words, because when we were saying that, like at 
the part when we were all kind of discussing how he was trying to control, before he 
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jumped from one emotion to taking control of the situation. Like when the parent came 
in, he [Mr. Kim] was analyzing the situation. 
Participant G: Yeah, another thing there were just so many emotions. He was just going 
with what was going on, but it is so hard to kind of put all those in [one emotion word]. 
Participant J: You can’t really verbalize in regular English.” 
We can see in this interaction how non-natives can see the emotion and associated behaviors of 
nun-chi when asked to focus directly at those behaviors. However, socio-linguistically at least, 
they have not been trained to focus on that unnamed notion. Therefore, they would be less likely 
to recognize nun-chi and certainly less likely to discuss it in any specific terms. 
 Similarly, later in the same scene, after the parent has already entered, kicked the 
furniture around, and confronts the principal, the Koreans discuss a couple of emotions with 
specific Korean terms: dang-hwang and jjeol-jjeol-mae-da. In this instance, the North Americans 
did not arrive at a specific word or phrase to describe the emotion – at least not as clearly as they 
had in describing nun-chi as “weighing his options.” They did use words like “helpless,” “timid,” 
and the phrase “acting like a child,” or, as Participant I put it: “when the parent came in, he [Mr. 
Kim] just wanted to stay out of it.” The North Americans clearly understood the importance of 
those emotional expressions to the story, and the important of accurate interpretation of that 
expression to following the story. Participant I wonders what Mr. Kim is trying to express: 
“When he started jumping… did you see when he was jumping? Why? What is that?” and 
participant G concurs: “that was a little strange.” In spite of their professed inability to 
understand the emotion being expressed, they actually arrive at many elements of the gloss of 
jjeol-jjeol-mae-da provided by Yoonjin, the translator:  
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Jjeol-jjeol-mae-da feels like both action and feelings. It is when a person acts like he/she 
is at a loss of what to do, sometimes trying random things, because he or she feels 
embarrassed and/or apologetic—it usually happens when the party this person deals with 
is very angry. 
For example, Participant C latches on to the random and ineffective actions of Mr. Kim, stating 
that his actions were “not very productive.” In the other focus group, they latch on to Mr. Kim’s 
distress—being at a loss—when Participants J and G discuss Mr. Kim’s emotions: 
Participant J:  I think he’s jumping out of distress. 
Participant G:  You think he’s jumping out of distress? ... I can agree with that. I can 
agree with that. 
Again, the non-natives are well able to perceive the emotional cues, but a lack of the 
proper vocabulary prevents them from discussing and identifying those emotions in the same 
way that native speakers can. Moreover, the problem is simply that some of these emotion terms 
just do not translate readily, and these two terms serve as prime examples.  None of the 
dictionaries I checked had any matching words.  The most used Korean - English dictionary, 
Essence, defines dang-hwang as “be confused (flustered, bewildered, embarrassed); be 
perplexed.” Dictionary.com provides “embarrassed.” Yahoo’s Babelfish offers “bewilderment.” 
Babylon returns “upset.” Moreover, none of these match the gloss provided by Yoonjin: “at a 
loss with surprise and confusion.”  Definitions for jjeol-jjeol-mae-da are equally divergent. 
Again, Essence defines jjeol-jjeol-mae-da as, “Fluster oneself; be all in a hurry; be flurried 
(confused, flustered); lose one's head; be solely perplexed; be at a loss what to do.”  Babelfish 
returns: “Is nonplused.” Babylon suggests, “slaphappy, dazed, stunned, bewildered, be at a loss, 
be at one's wit's end.” While Dictionary.com does not even have an entry—returning only the 
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Romanization of 쩔쩔매, “Jjeol-jjeol-mae.”  Ultimately, a single word or phrase seems 
completely insufficient to translate these secondary emotion terms.  Please note that several of 
the offered definitions for both terms are the same: “bewildered,” “flustered,” “perplexed,” or “at 
a loss.”  Thus, while the terms are certainly closely related, a Korean speaker is unlikely to 
confuse dang-hwang for jjeol-jjeol-mae-da or vice versa, any more than an English speaker 
would confuse “fluster oneself” for “at one's wit's end”—two of the definitions provided above. 
The issue of inconsistent, difficult, or simply absent translations may prove to be the most telling 
result from the study: Understanding emotions across cultures, particularly secondary and 
blended emotions, is simply “off the radar,” including the radar of people that produce bilingual 
dictionaries. 
A final area of interest in understanding the perception of cross-cultural emotional 
communication, particularly in reference to the emotional lexis, is the status of slang, metaphor 
and archetype in describing emotional communication.  The importance of such metaphorical 
language is emphasized in a number of studies (Koven, 2004; Pavlenko, 2008; Wierzbicka, 
1999) regarding the emotional communication of multilingual individuals. Indeed, these focus 
group discussions contain several instances of metaphorical language. Because of the 
directionality of the study—North Americans interpreting Korean emotional expressions—the 
results in this area tend to be North American expressions.  Slang expressions like “power 
tripping” and “freaking out” appeared. Participants used metaphors like “buttering him up,” 
“finger pointing,” “cool as a cucumber,” and “crawl under the table” to describe the emotions 
they saw. Some of these metaphors rose to an even higher level, one that I called “archetypes” in 
my notes.  For example, Mr. Kim behaving like “Robin Hood,” and the two businessmen 
behaving like the “Dynamic Duo”—alluding to Batman and Robin. The Koreans also used such 
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archetypes, describing Koreans as being like “cocks in a cockfight.” While the total number of 
slang, metaphor and archetype usages was not huge, the numbers justify a discussion of 
figurative language here.  Moreover, we have to wonder how much the academic research 
situation of the study might have limited the participant’s use of such figurative terms.  How 
much does the frequency of these expressions increase in conversations about the emotional 
behavior of “the other” which occur in private and casual settings between friends, at the pub or 
elsewhere, for example?  Ultimately, as indicated in the introductory scenario with South Korean 
bantamweight boxer Byun Jong-Il, these informal settings, rather than academic ones, are more 
often the locales where stereotypes are built and reinforced. The deconstruction and disruption of 
such stereotypes are, however, likely to find their genesis in academic settings. 
As stated, this study does not have the sample size, the methodology, or the data analysis 
tools to provide statistically significant evidence on the particular emotions viewed differently 
across these two cultures.  Rather, the data here reveals that substantial differences in how the 
groups of the same gender, similar ages, and similar educational backgrounds reacted to the same 
scenes in free response focus group format.  Moreover, when we examine the secondary 
emotions and emotion-laden words in particular, we can see more similarities amongst the 
national groups and more differences across national distinctions.  
Thus, in partial summary of the focus groups descriptive language, the discussions that 
occurred in the various focus groups show both strong similarities and striking differences.  With 
regards to Paul Ekman’s six original “basic” emotions (and disregarding those emotions not 
depicted in the video clips shown to the participants), both the North Americans and the Koreans 
recognized the cues for those basic emotions based on the word frequency counts. The single 
exception to this conclusion was the discussion of happiness, where the Koreans concluded that 
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some expressions on the characters in the Korean film represented genuine happiness, as well as 
some that represented feigned happiness for social purposes, while the North Americans 
concluded that all of the expressions they saw were merely false expressions of happiness as a 
part of a display rule for the particular social situation.  Simultaneously, strong support was 
indicated for the “diversity” of human emotions perspective suggested by Dewaele (2008), 
Pavlenko (2005), Schumann (1997), and Wierzbicka (1999).  I do not believe that the two 
perspectives are incompatible.  As suggested earlier, evolutionary brain development models 
(Cziko, 1997; Panksepp, 2011) suggest that emotions themselves may have evolved over time. 
Consequently, basic emotions may exist universally within portions of the brain that are 
evolutionarily older, while secondary emotions could be mediated by portions of the brain that 
are evolutionarily more recent (e.g., the neocortex) and could, therefore, be more adaptable to 
social mechanisms. Indeed, this duality with one involuntary element regulated on occasion by 
another voluntary and conscious element would seem to be the essential character of display 
rules. Thus, in resolving the primary question of this study in the most general and gross fashion, 
the data indicates that both nature and nuture are important in the communication of emotion, but 
that answer is not all al lunexpected and frankly not that intersting.  What is interesting is the 
how universal nature and relative nurture effect the communication of emotion, and to get to that 
question we need a different set of tools for data collection and analysis.  A first step in searching 
for that answer is to look at the various channels for reading emotional communication—
appraisal, nonverbal communication, or direct communication—used by the groups in this study. 
Different Channels for Emotional Cues 
While analyzing the language used to describe emotions is an oft used and well-respected 
tool for understanding emotional communication, research comparing the different channels for 
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perceiving emotional communication messages is less common—to the point of being nearly 
non-existent (c.f. Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). In chapter 2, I reviewed the literature regarding 
three potential channels for the reception of emotional cues: Situational appraisal and cultural 
script based interpretations8 (Planalp, 1999; C. Saarni, 1989; K. R. Scherer, 1999), non-verbal 
communication cues (Darwin, 1998; Ekman, 1999b, 2003; Ekman, et al., 1972; Ursula Hess & 
Kleck, 2005; Nakamichi, et al., 2002), and lexical-semantic indicators (Koven, 2004; Lutz, 1990; 
Pavlenko, 2008; G. M. White, 1990; Wierzbicka, 1999). The transcript data from the focus 
groups was the main data source for this analysis. To that end, the participants’ stated reasons 
given for perceiving a particular emotion were coded into four broad categories: 
Situational/script based, non-verbal behavior based, lexical-semantic based, and a fourth 
category of “circular.”  
Raw results from channel coding 
Allow me to provide an example of each of these code types to give a better idea of how 
they are distinct. Participant G provides an example of situational appraisal when she describes 
the young businessman. She saw, “concern and relief and after we heard the talk about the 
[survival] game [plan succeeding].” In this instance, the participant sees “concern” and “relief” 
expressed by the young businessman, because of how she expects someone to feel in a situation 
where a plan goes well. The lexical syntactic category code was used individual directly named 
their emotional state. As an illustration of this code, Participant G describes the young 
businessman’s relief that their plan was going to move forward, when she states, “and he said, 
‘oh great!’” As discussed in more detail later in this section, the nonverbal communication cue 
category is actually subdivided into several subsections. However, one clear example occurs as 
                                                 
8 Please note that I use the term “situational appraisal” as an umbrella term for both cognitive appraisal and cultural 
scripts. In part this is because while a person’s appraisal of a situation is readily apparent, without secondary 
analysis, an individual’s idiosyncratic appraisal of a situation is difficult to distinguish from a cultural script. 
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Participant T describes the principal in the faculty meeting scene, “He was looking flat in the 
beginning during the meeting and then saw the teacher coming in and quietly stared at him – I 
was feeling the scorn and annoyance in his eyes.”   The final category, circular, describes those 
instances where the participant is unable to give an external reason for the character expressed 
that emotion.  Participant V describes the older businessman/mediator in a way typical of this 
category.  She explains that he shows “worry and anxiety because he looked worried.” 
First, let me provide a summary of the results for the three channels that were not circular 
definitions.  Chart 1 summarizes the results combining the two Korean groups and the two North 
American groups.  Chart 2 shows the results for all four groups. Clearly, the relative reliance on 
each of the three channels is very nearly equal for both the Koreans and the North Americans. 
 
 
Chart 1: Frequency counts for emotional cue channels for “national” focus groups 
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Chart 2: Frequency counts for emotional cue channels for each separate focus group 
Moreover, each one of the individual focus groups shows the same pattern. In relative rankings, 
non-verbal channels were discussed most in all of the groups, appraisal and script justifications 
channels were second most frequent, and lexical semantic channels were least used—with wide 
margins between each rank. More specifically, all the groups discussed the non-verbal cues on 
the order of twice as often as appraisal/script interpretations and discussed lexical-semantic cues 
only a fraction as frequently as the other channels--between 0.7% and 8.5% of the total codes, 
with a total average under 5%.  Table 10 provides the specific frequency counts, and Table 11 
provides the percentages. Since this pattern was consistent across the groups, and since that 
result concurs with previous studies that find lexical-semantic cues less common/important in 
understanding emotional content (Hsee, Hatfield, & Chemtob, 1992; Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967), 
 
Code FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 Korean tot No. Amer. tot 
Appraisal/Script 52 56 48 29 108 77 
Nonverbal behaviors 99 119 70 53 218 123 
Lexical-Syntactic 1 8 11 5 9 16 
Table 10 – Raw frequency counts of the emotional cues by channel 
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Code FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 Korean tot No. Amer. tot total 
Appraisal/Script 34.2% 30.6% 37.2% 33.3% 32.2% 35.6% 33.6% 
Nonverbal behaviors 65.1% 65.0% 54.3% 60.9% 65.1% 56.9% 61.9% 
Lexical/Syntactic 0.7% 4.4% 8.5% 5.7% 2.7% 7.4% 4.5% 
Table 11 – Percentage reference for each emotional cue channel 
we are led to conclude that such a rough pattern is indeed universal.  The caveats remaining are 
the fact that the data source was a single film from a single country.  Clearly, additional research 
following the same methodology using different films from different cultural perspectives would 
add weight to this conclusion. 
 When considering the different channels with the broad notion of non-verbal 
communication—for example, Mehrabian and Ferris’ (1967) two channels were non-verbal 
physical cues and vocal cues—a similar, but slightly less consistent pattern emerges. Table 12 
provides the expanded frequency counts, and Table 13 provides the percentages. To help 
simplify, I have provided two charts.  Chart 3 compares the Korean totals to the North American 
totals. Chart 4 shows each of the focus groups separately. The final way I will present the raw 
numbers is to reduce them to the ranks within the channel of non-verbal cues. Table 14 shows 
these ranks, and table 12 show plus or minus variance from the average ranking for the separate 
groups. 
Code FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 Korean tot No. Amer. tot 
Appraisal/Script 52 56 48 29 108 77 
Nonverbal Summary 99 119 70 53 218 123 
NVB>Face 40 41 24 31 81 55 
NVB>Gestures 4 18 17 2 22 19 
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NVB>Kinesic 33 37 12 15 70 27 
NVB>Prosodic 16 14 13 3 30 16 
NVB>Proxemic 6 9 4 2 15 6 
Lexical-Syntactic 1 8 11 5 9 16 
Total codes in group 152 183 129 87 335 216 
% of total codes 27.6% 33.2% 23.4% 15.8% 60.8% 39.2% 
Table 12 – Raw frequency counts of the emotional cues by channel 
Code FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 Korean tot No. Amer. tot total 
Appraisal/Script 34.2% 30.6% 37.2% 33.3% 32.2% 35.6% 33.6% 
Nonverbal summary 65.1% 65.0% 54.3% 60.9% 65.1% 56.9% 61.9% 
NVB>Face 26.3% 22.4% 18.6% 35.6% 24.2% 25.5% 24.7% 
NVB>Gestures 2.6% 9.8% 13.2% 2.3% 6.6% 8.8% 7.4% 
NVB>Kinesic 21.7% 20.2% 9.3% 17.2% 20.9% 12.5% 17.6% 
NVB>Prosodic 10.5% 7.7% 10.1% 3.4% 9.0% 7.4% 8.3% 
NVB>Proxemic 3.9% 4.9% 3.1% 2.3% 4.5% 2.8% 3.8% 
Lexical/Syntactic 0.7% 4.4% 8.5% 5.7% 2.7% 7.4% 4.5% 
Table 13 – Percentage reference for each emotional cue channel 
Code FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 Korean tot No. Amer. tot total 
NVB>Face 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NVB>Gestures 5 3 2 4 4 3 4 
NVB>Kinesic 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 
NVB>Prosodic 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 
NVB>Proxemic 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 
Table 14 – Rank of each non-verbal channel type within nonverbal channel codes 
Code FG1 FG2 FG3 FG4 Korean tot No. Amer. tot 
NVB>Face 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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NVB>Gestures -1 1 2 0 0 1 
NVB>Kinesic 0 0 -2 0 0 0 
NVB>Prosodic 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 
NVB>Proxemic 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Table 15 – Rank variance to overall total rankings 
 
Chart 3: Frequency counts for emotional cue channels for “national” focus groups 
 
Chart 4: Frequency counts for emotional cue channels for each separate focus group 
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Frankly, these data are a lot to sort through.  What I would draw your attention to first is 
the shape of the lines in chart 3.  While admittedly these are categories and the order I placed 
them in the chart is simply alphabetical, the two lines always have the same sign of their slope—
that is to say when one is rising, or falling, the other is also rising or falling with the single 
exception of the final data point of lexical-semantic cues.  I will address the lexical-semantic 
exception in the next paragraph, but first I wish to examine the overall pattern in more detail. 
The rank order figures and the variance from the average data in Tables 13 and 14 make the 
adherence to the pattern across all of the groups clearer.  Quite literally, the only substantial shift 
in ranks occurs in the third focus group with a shift between a somewhat greater number of codes 
for gestures and a lower number of codes for kinesics. Clearly, this data offers strong support for 
the idea that Koreans and North Americans tend to analyze emotion cues through similar 
channels when looking at the same communication events.  However, I would caution against 
any attempt to generalize the relative importance of these various channels.  No attempt was 
made to represent a cross section of human emotional experience in the selection of these video 
samples. Rather, the samples were selected because, one, they arose from situations that might be 
met in education, two, they represented authentic “Korean” communicative events, and finally, 
that they represented “clear” emotional expressions.  Thus, the video samples cannot be 
considered representative of Korean emotional communication overall.  The conclusion we can 
safely draw from this data is more narrow: When looking at the same emotionally evocative 
event portrayed from a Korean perspective, both Koreans and North Americans used remarkably 
similar communicative channels while exercising remarkably similar discursive weight in 
discussing their reasons for drawing their emotional communication interpretations. 
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Two thoughts come to mind when dealing with lexical semantic cues. First, the frequency 
is quite low; thus, the aberration may just be a result of the small number of codes made.  In 
other words, in a study designed to statistically measure such differences, the distinction may 
prove insignificant. If, however, the difference is indeed a “real” distinction between how natives 
and non-natives decode the emotions in a communicative event, why would it be that non-native 
speakers would be more reliant, or at a minimum more interested in discussing, lexical-semantic 
markers of emotional communication than native speakers?  At first glance, this result would 
seem counter-intuitive, because none of the North American participants were at all fluent in 
Korean. Thus, the potential for any of the North American participants to follow the spoken 
dialogue in Korean would seem limited. However, on more careful consideration, the North 
American participants might be more likely to comment on the lexical and semantic information 
from the subtitles. They may have been more cognitively involved via reading subtitles in 
English, than they might otherwise be when passively listening to dialogue.  
Finally, as I mentioned at the start of this section, an additional set of codes were labeled 
“circular.”  That is to say, the participant was unable to provide an explanation of why they 
perceived the emotion without making circular connection to the emotion itself. While it would 
be possible to disregard these codes, they do reveal something about the process of interpreting 
emotions, particularly across cultures, but also within cultures.  Moreover, the interpretations that 
were given circular codes amount to somewhat more than five percent of the total codes 
assigned.  While this amount is relatively small, it is not insubstantial.  In fact, the total number 
of “circular” codes was roughly equal to the total number of “lexical-syntactic” codes.  Thus, the 
participants’ descriptions of these scenes were just as likely not contain a clear explanation of 
why they thought the emotion was being expressed as they were to point to an overt lexical or 
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syntactic indicator of the emotion.  This result lends support to one of the central premises of this 
study: Emotional communication is not something that we are actively taught, or that we overtly 
analyze.  Moreover, the circular descriptions of emotions also suggest a deeper definitional 
understanding of emotion: the emotional expression is often seen as the emotion to the point of 
being viewed as one and the same in the vernacular definition. For example, just such an 
“expression=emotion” identity description was coded when Participant A describes the principal 
from the faculty meeting scene: “He [the principal] also looked pretty stoic, like he didn’t give 
him [Mr. Kim] much emotion.” These two realities—one, that emotional interpretation is often a 
less than fully conscious process appear and, two, that expression and emotion can become 
intertwined to the extent that they are one and the same thing—appear to run in parallel. 
At the broadest end of the spectrum, this data supports the notion found in previous 
research into the relative importance of “literal” (in my study “lexical-syntactic”) versus 
nonverbal emotional communication cues (Hsee, et al., 1992; Mehrabian, 2007; Mehrabian & 
Wiener, 1967).  This particular study, however, did not address one of the major concerns in the 
field–the precise relative importance in statistically quantifiable terms (Mehrabian & Ferris, 
1967)–due to sample size, selection procedures, and other issues. On the positive side, this study 
does provide several methodological advantages over some previous studies. The data source 
observed by the focus groups was video; therefore, the participants were able to analyze the 
communication in advance with as many different channels–situation, tone of voice, gesture, 
kinesthetic, etc.–readily viewable as possible, yet simultaneously allowing that data to be 
“replayable” in an identical fashion to each different focus group. Additionally, the “free choice” 
character of the focus group discussions allows participants to provide their own interpretations, 
rather than constraining them to one particular framework. Consequently, a more naturalistic 
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interpretation is possible. Finally, the focus group format provides additional insight into an 
individual’s interpretation processes, as well as the social processes that go into the ultimate 
cultural norm/stereotype.  
Using multiple channels for interpretation.  
 Certainly, exploring the raw results regarding the different channels used for interpreting 
emotional communications--situations/scripts, nonverbal cues, and lexical cues—provides 
important insights, particularly the striking similarity in the relative reliance each group had on 
each the various channels. However, these methods fail to give a full picture of the channels used 
to interpret emotional cues in normal social interaction.  Moreover, two important weaknesses 
affect the interpretation of this channel data. First, many more varieties of nonverbal cues were 
coded, meaning that we would expect participants to identify nonverbal cues more often than 
situational or lexical syntactic ones. Second, the linguistic character of how we name nonverbal 
cues is substantially different from how we name situational appraisal cues or lexical syntactic 
ones. A phrase names nonverbal cues, for example, “pursed lips.”  On the other hand, 
situational/appraisal cues or lexical syntactic ones require a full clause: “The teacher had been 
guilty of accepting bribes in the past, so…” or “ that younger businessman said, ‘ oh great!’ The 
net effect of how the different channels can be named in conversation increases the probability 
that behavioral cues will be coded, while simultaneously decreasing the chance of the other 
types.  However, given the vast difference between the number of codes for lexical-syntactic 
codes versus nonverbal cues and situational/appraisal cues, clear and meaningful differences 
exist between the different channels; however, the breath of the gap may be smaller than 
suggested by the raw numbers. 
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This conclusion leads us to a more fundamental distinction in discussing how the 
participants used different channels to interpret emotional communication cues. Simply put, 
when examining the individual interpretive acts, the participants more often than not used 
multiple, simultaneous cues via multiple channels to interpret the particular emotions being 
communicated at the particular point in time.  All four groups and all participants followed this 
pattern. Allow me to provide some examples to illustrate how this interpretation of multiple cues 
actually functions in the participants’ conversations.  To focus more specifically, let me present 
comments from a participant from each of the groups looking at the same character, Mr. Kim, as 
his emotions and emotional cues shift from one to another. A fine example occurred when 
Participant X described the teacher’s and the principal’s emotional cues in the faculty meeting 
scene. For this first example, the coding marks are left in the text to illustrate what portions were 
coded:  
I thought his [Behavior>Kinesic] body language [/Behavior>Kinesic] showed that he was 
feeling apologetic and being aware of others and nun-chiboda [Appraisal] because he was 
late [/Appraisal].   Later, the teacher showed [Behavior>Kinesic] body language of 
anxiety and worry [/Behavior>Kinesic] because [Appraisal] he was afraid people might 
find out something he did wrong [/Appraisal]. He [Behavior>Kinesic] did not stand up 
straight; [/Behavior>Kinesic] instead his nun-chi and [Behavior>Kinesic] bending 
forward [/Behavior>Kinesic] and [Behavior>Face] studying others’ faces 
[/Behavior>Face] – so I thought he was feeling nervous.  Principal – He paused when the 
teacher came in late then [Behavior>Proxemic] slowly walked toward him 
[/Behavior>Proxemic], which shows he is about to express his anger toward the teacher. I 
believe his [Behavior>Face] face suddenly became expressionless [/Behavior>Face] I 
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believe. Also I remember he was [Behavior>Prosodic] yelling [/Behavior>Prosodic] at 
the teacher [at the start of the next scene]. The principal’s [Behavior>Face] pupils were 
dilated [/Behavior>Face] and he heodoongdaeda , and this shows he was feeling at a loss 
and confused (dang-hwang). Parent – [Behavior>Kinesic] Running into the meeting 
room [/Behavior>Kinesic] [Behavior>Prosodic] screaming [/Behavior>Prosodic] his 
aggressive [Behavior>Kinesic] body language [/Behavior>Kinesic] , and his 
[Behavior>Face] facial expression [/Behavior>Face], which led me to think he was 
agitated/aroused and enraged. 
The individual codes are with in brackets, and the start of the coded section has no forward slash 
mark—[Appraisal]—while the end of the coded section is indicated by a forward slash mark—
[/Appraisal]. In looking closer at Participant X’s description, we see that she uses six different 
cues to inform essentially two different clustered and related emotions: nun-chi and anxiety 
(worry, fear, etc).  By way of comparison, Participant Q is in the other Korean focus group, and, 
therefore, unaware of Participant X’s analysis, described the teacher’s emotional cues in the 
identical faculty meeting scene in much the same way as Participant X did:  
[Mr. Kim] was doing nun-chi as he was opening the door. He was walking in the room 
feeling afraid and apologetic. He was hiding when the parent first came in and then 
pretended he was trying to stop the situation and then he went outside [to the calmer edge 
of the fight] and was jumping up and down with intense emotion. That [jumping up and 
down] was quite impressive because he was worried that he could be caught if he had 
continued to calm the situation down. So he was feeling conflicted and lost. 
Participant Q describes the same initial emotions, “apologetic/embarrassed” and “nun-chi” as 
does Participant X. Moreover, they both rely on similar kinesic and situation/appraisal cues. 
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Participant X describes, vaguely, “body language,” while Participant Q describes how Mr. Kim 
was “opening the door” and “walking in the room.”  The situational appraisal descriptions were 
also strikingly similar. Participant X said, Mr. Kim “was afraid people might find out something 
he did wrong,” while Participant Q said Mr. Kim “was worried that he could be caught if he had 
continued to calm the situation down” showing exactly the same situational appraisal and 
resultant emotional interpretation.  When the parent arrives throwing things around, everyone’s 
emotions shift, including Mr. Kim, and both note that shift. Participant X marks the shift saying, 
“Later, the teacher showed...” and Participant Q, with “when the parent came in and then . . .” 
While Participant X names the emotions expressed after the shift as varieties of anxiety, 
Participant Q arrives at the slightly different, but related, interpretation of “feeling conflicted and 
lost.”  Specifically, Participant Q focuses on the kinesic cue of Mr. Kim’s jumping up and down.   
Clearly, both participants used a variety of cues from situation/appraisal as well as nonverbal 
communication channels to arrive at their conclusion; therefore, the synthetic analysis of a 
variety of emotional communication cues appears to be the strongest and most logical 
description of these participants’ interpretation processes. To make cross-cultural connections we 
need to look at the North American’s interpretation processes. 
 In the North American focus groups, a similar pattern of synthesizing a variety of cues 
from a variety of channels emerges. Again looking at the emotional cues used to interpret Mr. 
Kim’s emotional communication in the faculty meeting scene, that pattern is seen in the first 
sentences of the first North American focus group’s discussion: 
Participant C:  Well, the teacher seemed to be quite shy and helpless, and I found him to 
kind of [trying to] hide behind his identity and not own up to whom he is—and let his 
coworkers get beat up on by this very angry parent. 
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Participant D: I thought he looked guilty. The way he came in and sat down, looked down 
and just kept his head and eyes down. 
Participant B: He also had that “respectful thing”—that guy walked over, and he did kind 
of bow. 
Participant B: I just saw him as timid. I didn’t even connect that he was probably feeling 
guilty too.  
Participant A: yeah, I have fear, embarrassment and shame.  
The different conversational “group dynamic” of the different focus groups immediately strikes 
us as we compare the text from the two different groups.  Allow me to address this difference 
latter in this chapter, but first we will examine how they use multiple and varied cues and 
channels.  We see Participant C using situational appraisal—Mr. Kim is “shy and helpless,” 
because “let his coworkers get beat up on.” Other members of the group point out kinesic cues 
(“the way he came in”), facial expressions (“his head and eyes down”), and gestures (bowing).  
They added more cues: 
PD: I added scared after we got the subtitles … and the parent came in and kind of looked 
around shiftily 
PA: as far as the body language that his shoulders were slumped that he … you can see 
even in the picture right now where he was trying to come in and as quietly as possible 
because he doesn’t want anyone to see. 
PC: I also saw him as a bit of a coward when the whole kerfuffle was going on and he 
was… he didn’t really get in and try to break up the fight. And you see him flailing his 
arms up and down and turning around. 
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They add more kinesic cues (“flailing his arms up and down and turning around”), more facial 
expressions (“looked around shiftily”), and more gestures (“shoulders were slumped”) to the list.  
In addition, they provide lexical syntactic (“I added scared after we got the subtitles”) and 
appraisal (“he doesn’t want anyone to see” and “he didn’t really get in and try to break up the 
fight”) indicators to the list.  As with the first two groups, these participants used multiple cues 
and multiple channels to interpret the emotions being expressed.    Additionally, the eventual 
emotional interpretation (shy, embarrassed, and “hiding from something” which changes to 
fearful) is strikingly similar to what the Korean groups interpreted, with the previously discussed 
exceptions with notions of nun-chi and guilt. Finally, however, we need to explore the 
interpretation process of the final focus group. 
Conspicuously, the final focus group’s discussion style relies even more on short 
sentences or phrases and mutual negotiation than was the other non-native focus group. The first 
few lines of their analysis of their discussion of Mr. Kim’s emotional communication cues in the 
faculty meeting are: 
Participant H: Sheepish, scared, nervous 
Participant G: By the lack of eye contact. 
Facilitator:  Okay, so you knew that by the lack of eye contact 
Participant H: That his shoulders came down 
Participant J:  Well, when the principal walks over to him he does make eye contact … he 
sort of looks … 
Participant H: Sort of scared, right? 
Participant J: I thought he looked just like, like he didn’t like the principal, that’s what I 
saw. 
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Facilitator: disrespectful, or…? 
Participant J: Just the sort look on his face, … he was kind of “half lidded” when he looked 
at  him. 
Participant G: Yeah, you’re right … I noticed that he kind of … he did something … 
Participant H: I thought the looking at him was like, more because of respect. He was kind 
of obligated to look this way … that he couldn’t keep the gaze. 
Immediately striking is the intense character of the negotiation amongst these participants, and 
we will discuss that in more detail later in this chapter. However, the answer to the immediate 
question of whether they were using multiple cues and multiple channels to arrive at a single 
interpretation is readily apparent. Facial cues (“lack of eye contact,”  “half –idded,” “the gaze”), 
proxemic cues (“principal walks over to him”), and situational appraisal (“He was kind of 
obligated to look this way”) were all described by the participants. Also, the specific emotions 
that they interpret (“sheepish, scared, nervous”) are similar to those of the other three groups. 
Finally, they later arrive at a reverse situational interpretation that matches that of the Korean 
groups’ interpretation, as Participant G states directly, “Something happened somewhere, and 
there was that moment of: ‘I could have gotten away with it.’ ” 
In summary, one of the principal emergent themes arising from the focus group 
discussions is the participants’ use multiple cues to enable interpretation of the emotions being 
expressed. Notably, this use of multiple channels and multiple cues was seen in each of the 
scenes, in each of the video clips, by all of the focus groups, and by all of the members of the 
focus groups. Within this study multiple channel interpretation was universal. Consequently, we 
are left to conclude that the normal process for interpreting cues of emotional communication 
relies on multiple channels and multiple cues regardless of ethnicity or nationality. Moreover, 
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while the research methodology was not designed to test this question, no clear pattern was seen 
in the combination of cues. Frequently, combinations of nonverbal communication channels and 
situational appraisal channels were seen, as well as combinations of multiple types of nonverbal 
cues, as well as, combining a variety of situational appraisal cues. Because lexical syntactic 
channels were used less frequently, we could not expect them to be present in each of the 
different interpretations; however, when they were found, they were often found in combination 
with nonverbal behavior cues and situational appraisal cues.  
Ultimately, the two key findings in terms of emotional communication channels are 
difficult to ignore. First, all of the groups’ relative reliance on the various channels was identical: 
Non-verbal cues were most often cited, situational appraisal cues were moderately important, 
while lexical-semantic cues were hardly mentioned at all. Second, and much more importantly, 
emotional communication channels were almost never used in isolation.  Participants always 
relied on a combination of cues, and almost always relied on cues from a combination of 
channels as well. 
When Emotional Interpretation Fails across Cultures  
 The discussion of non-native accuracy in interpreting emotional clues of another 
culture—via their ratings and language—and the channels that were used in the participants’ 
focus group discussions in the two previous sections of this chapter provide dramatic insights 
into the cross-cultural process of emotional communication.  The following section looks 
specifically at three critical cases where non-natives struggle desperately to understand the 
emotions being communicated and then struggle to match their non-native interpretations to the 
interpretations provided by cultural natives.  The first topic explores the sorts of emotional 
communicative acts that required the non-natives to use tools of social construction. Next, an 
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emergent notion, that I am calling “reverse” situational appraisal, will be considered. Finally, the 
importance of cultural script/display rules—the most obvious unifying element in these examples 
of confusion—will be examined.   
Emotionally communicative acts that require social construction.   
Emotional communication will on occasion fail—and will fail more often across as 
opposed to within cultures.  In such cases we would expect the out-group members to work 
together to better understand the miscommunication.  Thus, the items that required social 
construction are equally important.  For example, the participants’ interpretation of the parent’s 
outburst in the faculty meeting was universally understood and transparently interpreted by all of 
the participants regardless of nationality. Everyone understood that the parent was enraged and 
outraged. But what sorts of emotions, scripts, or situations were not universally understood—
which were not transparent?  As Participant C observes, the emotional expressions in the 
business meeting scene were less obvious than in the faculty meeting fight scene, because those 
business expressions “were more subtle, it was harder to read, … I mean you can’t really mistake 
the angry man for [someone] talking about rainbows.” 
Amongst the North American focus groups, the emotional expressions in just three 
specific incidents in the scenes required extensive social construction and negotiation in both of 
the separate focus groups: the interaction between the teacher, Mr. Kim, and his principal on his 
late entrance to the faculty meeting, the greeting and conversational rituals amongst the three 
people having the business meeting at the restaurant, and the final scene depicting the 
businessman’s delivery of bribes to Mr. Kim. Assessing the commonalities of these incidents 
helps us understand how people work together to understand another culture. Consequently, we 
examine here the aspects of communication being negotiated and the knowledge being socially 
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constructed. What similarities can be seen across these incidents? All three incidents involved 
display rules and prescriptive scripts: cases where the appropriate expressions were strictly 
prescribed.  Moreover, each case involved the display of emotions that were markedly different 
or even contradictory to the basic emotions that one would anticipate feeling in the situation. In 
addition, an aspect that all the incidents have in common is that the participants were careful to 
point to the specificity of setting and situation for each set of display rules that they were 
constructing together.   
 Regarding the prevalence of display rules/scripts in these particular incidents, 
Participants C and A point out discrepancies between the rules for a school principal at a faculty 
meeting in Canada and the Korean practice in the film: 
Participant C: I could imagine a meeting like this in my country and if a parent would 
come in raging like that and whoever was administering the meeting would be like …  
Participant A: You would look to him… 
Participant C: … would set things right. Yeah, exactly. You would look to him to get 
everything back under control and not to just go to the corner and [allow the other 
teachers to] be your front line for you … that’s just foreign to me … what happens here. 
Clearly both participants expect a different response from the principal including the kinesic 
elements of his emotional communication.  Metaphorically speaking, he should not “just go to 
the corner.” By inference they expect he should act like a man, and stand his ground. Indeed, 
these “metaphors we live by” (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003) in North American culture stand in stark 
contrast to the principal’s behavior in the meeting. Moreover, the participants, in spite of their 
short time in Korea, inferred them to be typical of Korean culture, or “what happens here.” As 
stated earlier, Sharifian (2009) argues that such metaphors are “cultural conceptions” and are 
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heterogeneously distributed. This study supports Sharifian’s conclusion, because the social 
constructions and representations varied not only across the national groups, but within the 
national groups, as well.   Thus, we must consider the situated character of display rules in both 
setting and interpersonal situation. Clearly, the North American participants’ define the 
appropriate emotional expressions in the faculty meeting in ways specific to both the setting 
(faculty meeting) and to the situation (the principal’s imminent discipline of Mr. Kim).   
Similarly, the North American participants struggled to interpret and define interaction in 
the restaurant business meeting. Ultimately, they conclude that Mr. Kim, the middleman, and the 
young businessman follow a set of rules specific to the setting and situation of the slightly shady 
business meeting. Even smoking, a direct and simple act, is governed by rules with emotional 
elements. The participants discuss which setting and situation permits smoking, and even how 
one smokes: 
Participant A: He is smoking which… if he really thought they were superior I don’t think 
he would have … 
Participant C: Really? 
Participant A: Yeah that’s just my impression. That he looked really comfortable anyway. 
Participant D: I didn’t notice that he was smoking. 
Participant C: Is that, like a Korean thing? Because I’ve umm… 
Participant A: Well the men always smoke together – like it’s not a big issue. 
Participant C: and also, during a meal it felt kind of take like a “breather,” bad choice of 
words, but have the smoke in the middle and like keep on eating, so  . . . 
Fascinatingly, they even discuss how the ‘phase’ of the meal when smoking is permitted as being 
culturally/emotionally regulated! Similarly, the Koreans had discussed the direction in which 
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smoke is expelled as part of the Korean script/display rule: “[Mr. Kim] blows the smoke right in 
front of another person, and this is Korean, too. It is very rude/selfish”  (Participant T). The 
Korean groups previously established the appropriate rules/script for smoking in this situation, 
yet anticipate that the Korean practices will be different from the North American’s rules as 
Participant T further outlines, “In terms about what is Korean [in the clip], like it was said 
before, smoking in the middle of the meal is Korean. America has a smoking area [in 
restaurants]. But here he didn’t even ask if it was okay to smoke and was not particularly 
conversational with others while “barbequing away” meat – this seems Korean.” Even the 
facilitator—who had been living outside of Korea for more than a decade—questions this 
interpretation, “Is it okay to smoke in a restaurant in Korea these days?” She asked. Participant 
T’s response was, “It is not allowed, but at samggyupsaljip [restaurants that specialize in 
inexpensive pork barbeque] it is okay.”  At that point, Participant Q chimes in, “When they care, 
they have smoking and non-smoking sections.”  
This example emphasizes some of the issues surrounding the cross-cultural interpretation 
of cultural/emotional display rules.  While display rules for emotions are by definition related to 
a specific situation (Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1993; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006), the subtleties 
of the application of those rules—as indicated by Matsumoto, et al’s (2005) discussion of the 
masking, amplification, controlling, and qualifying of those expressions–are further seen in this 
example. However, the sorts of expressions governed by display rules, which in turn require 
negotiation and social construction amongst members of another cultural group are not 
inherently embedded in the notion of display rules. Looking back amongst the examples that we 
have considered so far, a few patterns begin to emerge. The first, and perhaps most important, 
key is that a display rule contradictory to the display rule in an individual’s culture needs to be 
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figured out. In those cases, an individual is more likely to question the expression, and, given the 
opportunity, more likely to attempt to construct the display rules of the other culture. The 
preceding example regarding smoking in a restaurant during a business meeting is a clear case of 
a contradictory cultural expression.  Moreover, the manner in which Mr. Kim was smoking in the 
meeting was judged to have emotional content, which emphasizes the intertwining of cultural 
scripts and emotional cues and the relevance of the incident to this study. Indeed, emotional 
content was noted in both North American and Korean focus groups.  For example, Korean 
Participant Y saw, “contempt when he was smoking,” while North American participant C was 
uncertain about the emotion being expressed (perhaps because the contradiction with her 
anticipated display rule expression), and suggested through reverse appraisal, “sometimes people 
smoke when they’re nervous” [Emphasis added].  
A second “type” of emotional expression governed by display rules that required social 
construction was seen in the case of complex and/or mixed emotions.  We have already seen how 
the North American groups had some difficulty interpreting Mr. Kim’s emotions while he was 
receiving the bribe from the young businessman, and they clearly indicate their belief that mixed 
emotions are involved. Participant C describes Mr. Kim’s emotions: “I think he knows that he 
shouldn’t do it, but for some reason he just wants, he just takes the money anyway” and later 
continues, “it would be interesting to see if he really is a bastard (spoken in hushed tone) or not.” 
Participant G in the other North American focus group also points out the mixed and conflicting 
emotions she sees as Mr. Kim takes the bribe, “I put guilt, it … wasn’t enough, since he’s taking 
that money …  [he is behaving like] I’m going to continue doing what I’m doing right now, 
because the payoff is can it be greater than anything guilt that I am feeling at the moment.” 
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The focus groups’ discussions strongly point to the social construction of these display 
rules.  Importantly, the striking differences in the level of social construction in the non-native 
focus groups lends substantial support to the predicted need for greater social construction in 
non-native groups. Moreover, the particular items that were intuitively selected and isolated by 
the focus groups for reflection and social construction allow greater insight into the sorts of 
cultural/emotional expressions that require group interaction to develop principles for the 
interpretation and understanding of an emotionally communicative act. Specifically, we can 
isolate at least two broad types of emotional displays governed by emotional/cultural scripts that 
the participants struggled with in the process of socially constructing their understanding of these 
rules. One type involves cases where the display rule required contradictory expressions to the 
“natural and basic” emotion felt, or cases where the display rule modification was contradictory 
to the one required in their own culture.  The second type involves cases where the individual 
displays complex or mixed emotions. 
“Reverse” situational appraisal.  
Before moving on to discussing the mechanisms that governed those specific examples of 
misconstrued emotional communication, allow me to address an interesting and emergent point 
that I call “reverse” situational interpretations. In these instances, after a participant viewed a 
particular emotion, they would infer a “backstory” from their own understanding of what sort of 
situation might cause that emotion to be felt and expressed.  In fact, North American Participant 
J states this idea of reverse appraisal outright when describing a facial expression of the younger 
businessman in the business dinner/meeting, “in that look, I can just automatically see everything 
before the dinner.” Both Koreans and North Americans used this reverse situational 
interpretation. For example, Participant R describes Mr. Kim as he arrives late to the faculty 
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meeting, “When his eyes met the principal’s, he was nun-chiboda and looked as if he was 
thinking, ‘oops, I was caught again’ . . .” Clearly, Participant R is inferring that Mr. Kim has 
been in trouble with the principal in the past. On the North American side, the participants in 
focus group number three offer several reverse situational interpretations in attempting to 
understand the rage of the parent at Mr. Kim: 
Participant B: When it was silent [note: scenes were first played without sounds to focus on 
nonverbal communication], I was thinking only anger. But when it came on again (with 
sound) for the first few seconds I was thinking… “drunk anger”? (Laughter) I’m not sure ... 
Participant A: The only thing I can think of is that the teacher did something to his 
daughter.  
Participant B: (talking on top of one another) Yeah… that was on my . . .  
Participant A: You see I was thinking that there is no other [reason for such extreme anger] 
… which might be a woman thing. 
In this short vignette, we see at least three different reverse situational interpretations. First 
Participant B infers that the parent must be drunk and angry to interrupt the faculty meeting in 
such a raucous manner. Participant A agrees that some additional explanation is needed for the 
extent of the parent’s rage, offering her own interpretation that perhaps Mr. Kim had molested 
the man’s daughter. Finally, Participant A adds another layer of interpretation. She suggests that 
gender differences are important, although she does not clarify whether she is referring to her 
own interpretation of gender differences, or the importance of gendered differences in this 
particular scene–or both. 
  The “discovery” of reverse situational appraisal opens the door to a variety of 
possibilities in the interpretation of emotional communication. First, reverse appraisal illustrates 
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how deeply embedded situational appraisal is in our understanding of emotional experience, 
expression, and communication. Second, reverse appraisal illustrates the reciprocal fashion in 
which appraisal can function.  For the most part, appraisal research has focused on the fact that 
we appraise the situation first and then interpret the emotion (Bryce & Olney, 1991; Dipboye, 
1985; K. R. Scherer, 1999). In these instances, however, the participants conducted an appraisal 
of a situation that they were not privy to, one which occurred in a portion of the film they had not 
watched and had no knowledge of. Later in this section we will see how errors in such reverse 
appraisal can result in cognitive dissonance for the perceiver—particularly across cultures.  
How did cultural scripts and display rules play a role?  
While this paper focuses on emotional communication across cultures, in exploring how 
non-members of one culture interpret the emotional communication cues of another culture, 
cultural scripts are bound to play a role.  Moreover, emotional cues and display rules are 
inherently embedded in virtually every cultural script (Planalp, 1999). Consequently, many 
researchers refer to emotional scripts as well as cultural scripts (Balconi & Carrera, 2007; 
Goddard, 2009). While a number of research projects have well identified a variety of cultural 
scripts and done much to establish the importance of cultural scripts in social interaction, 
research to date has not explored how individuals of different cultures interpret the cultural 
scripts displayed by members of a foreign culture.  In this section, we will see how this process 
takes place. Specifically, the participants themselves relate how they see cultural scripts as being 
important. We will explore some of the mechanisms of cultural scripts that the participants point 
out.  Additionally, the focus groups identified contradictory, masked, or diminished emotional 
expressions as potential causes of cross-cultural miscommunication.  Finally, we will explore 
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how the “non-performance” or “mis-performance” of the appropriate cultural script creates 
cognitive dissonance.  
Participants themselves recognize the importance of scripts.    
A first step to understand how cultural scripts perform in emotional communication 
across cultures is to determine if the participants are aware of the importance and functionality of 
cultural scripts. All four groups directly identified the importance of cultural scripts in emotional 
communication.   For example, when discussing bribery, Korean Participant Q recognizes that 
the proper script for giving a bribe will differ across cultures, “I think that bribery exists 
everywhere, but how it is done is different from one culture to another.  In Korea, money 
envelopes sometimes get inserted in a book like a bookmark and often are handed in an 
envelope.”  Similarly, Korean Participant W describes the ritual of introductions as being an 
important Korean script:  
The mediator introduced the other two to each other, and this felt that the mediator was 
doing it on the basis of some kind of old boy social network and pleading for chung. 
Like, ‘I know this person well, so please be good to him.’  Appealing for chung is a 
Korean thing, I think. 
The North American groups, without the background in Korean culture, still recognized the 
importance of the scripts that were performed. For example, Participant A describes the behavior 
of the two businessmen in their meeting with Mr. Kim as following a preordained script, “so they 
were playing a game … At least the businessman and the middleman.” Similarly, Participant J 
recognizes the social structure of the dinner conversation with the businessmen—an age-based 
cultural script, “They have to explain to [Mr. Kim] what they want, but it’s him, the one on the 
left, the older man’s position to do that.  He’s the older one in their relationship, and it is his 
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responsibility to lay it out there.” Briefly, then, all of the focus groups attend to cultural scripts 
and recognize that scripts are indispensable in communication.  In the less structured and more 
emotional case of the parent’s “kicking and screaming” entry into the faculty meeting, 
Participant I relates the cultural differences, the display differences and the emotional reactions 
those cultural differences would induce:  
If someone in my hometown were to be engaged in destroying the room and making a 
ruckus, it would be much more … intimidating. There was something kind of … non-
calculated, and innocent about the way that he [behaved], but … I felt that it didn’t come 
from like an extreme … obviously he was really upset, but I wasn’t scared of him, … I 
wasn’t intimidated by him, but it was like if a Canadian friend of mine came in here and 
started throwing desks around. 
Ultimately, Participant I is talking about a situation where the emotional communication is clear.  
In situations where out-group participants struggled with the in-group interpretation, however, a 
different subtly different scenario emerges.  
Indeed, even in the previously cited example of accurate interpretation of the 
cultural/emotional script associated with bribery, not all of the elements of the script where 
abundantly apparent to all of the non-native focus groups. One North American focus group 
clearly “picked up on” the bribery script. Even after they were apprised of the Koreans 
interpretation of the appropriate cultural emotional script involving the existence of the second 
envelope, the other North American group clearly stated that they did not understand the purpose 
of Mr. Kim’s emotional expressions. Essentially, the Koreans clearly stated that a neutral, 
hesitant expression from the person receiving the bribe indicated that Mr. Kim, “the bribee,” was 
looking for more money, as the group facilitator explains: 
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Facilitator:  [The Koreans] had a pretty straight response that his lack of excitement at the 
first envelope meant, “give me more money” and 
Participant C: Really! 
Facilitator: Yeah. [My translator] says, “It seems like they thought it was a social script.” 
Participant A:  Did any of us say that? 
Participant C: I definitely didn’t. 
Participant D: I didn’t think, I thought he just hesitated and that the businessman thought 
he was thinking (extensive crosstalk -- unintelligible) 
Participant A: I don’t think any of us thought that but him. 
Facilitator: So you didn’t know that he knew. 
Participant A: Yeah 
 Clearly this definition of the appropriate cultural emotional script in the Korean context did not 
match what this group was anticipating. Indeed, three of the four members of the group explicitly 
state that they did not understand that particular expression to have the pragmatic purpose of 
asking for more money. Participant A summarizes the complete agreement of the entire group, “I 
don’t think any of us thought that.”  An additional insight we can garner from their discussion 
that is particularly noteworthy for the social construction of cross-cultural understanding that was 
going on amongst the members of the group was the intensity of the crosstalk that became so 
boisterous as to be unintelligible on the tape as indicated by the phrase “extensive cross talk–
unintelligible.” Participant A continues to elaborate on the novelty and surprise associated with 
the Koreans interpretation of the cultural emotional script: 
Participant A: I thought he was a little, yeah I didn’t play him for such a … I did when he 
was sitting down, how come I didn’t when he was outside? 
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Facilitator: You didn’t catch it?  
Participant A: It was like “surprise!” 
This sort of “surprise” points directly to the cultural script/display rules that were the primary 
stumbling block in accurate out-group interpretations of emotional communication: Cultural 
rules that require contradictory, or masked expressions. 
Scripts require can contradictory/masked, or diminished/exaggerated expressions.     
 While the notions of cultural/emotional scripts and display rules are quite similar, they 
arise out of different research traditions; therefore, we may need to consider than separately. The 
critical point of Ekman and Friesen’s (1969) notion of display rules is the idea that culturally 
appropriate emotional expressions are contradictory/masked, or diminished (hidden)/exaggerated 
emotional expressions. In this section we explore the masks of display rules.  First, let me 
provide a few examples of each of these two types of display rules: Contradictory/masked and 
diminished/exaggerated. Obviously, the most graphic example of a display rule is one that 
requires a contradictory expression–e.g. the beauty pageant runner-up smiling through the tears. 
A famous example cross culturally is the “enigmatic” Japanese smile which is frequently 
misinterpreted (Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1993).   Indeed, the Korean Participant T noted precisely 
this sort of smiling when unhappy, “Koreans tend to smile when they are sorry.” 
In several instances, Korean participants noted acts of masking one emotion with a contradictory 
emotional expression. In discussing the mediator’s expressions of happiness in the business 
meeting, Participant Y stated that he was actually “a little anxious and worried, but he was hiding 
it with laughter.” Participant Z said much the same thing, “I thought it was fake 
smiling/laughing: A business smile,” and in that statement she emphasizes the situated character 
of the display rule.  After the facilitator requests clarification, Participant Y provides substantial 
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detail regarding the contradictory emotional displays: “The mediator is laughing comfortably, 
but his posture reflects that he is worried, so his laugh was obviously fake, and I think he was 
feeling worried and anxious.”   Of course, these minute distinctions in emotional cues are 
precisely the sorts of subtleties that Duchene noticed (Darwin, 1998), and Ekman (1999b, 2003) 
elaborately codified in the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Members of the other Korean 
focus group noticed similar use of contradictory expressions.  Participant T notes, “In terms of 
the mediator, ... I felt that his happiness in the beginning as fake. His mouth is open and 
laughing, but I felt he was tense/nervous inside.”  Similarly, Participant Q concludes even more 
strongly referring to both businessmen, “They were smiling and laughing all throughout the 
scene. So, if you don’t know what’s going on, you may say that they are happy. But there is no 
happiness from the beginning to the end. It is all about business, and smiling/laughing is 
strategic.” 
 Interestingly, while the participants in both North American groups recognized the 
incongruity of the mediator’s emotional expressions, they struggled to interpret them. Participant 
G even had trouble finding any words to describe the incongruity, much less the right words: 
“It’s very un-genuine in certain situations, because there is so many… there’s so many… if 
there’s no…umm… voice or words. Like there’s so many things going on there, that you just 
keep thinking, ‘What’s going on with this guy?  Where is his genuine emotion?’”  The difficulty 
was not restricted to Participant G, in the other North American focus group Participant D was 
similarly perplexed: 
What I wrote down for the middleman. He looked like a politician, because he kind of had 
this slight smile on the entire time. When there was no sound, I couldn’t read him. I was 
just like, “Is he serious? Is he enjoying himself?” I couldn’t really tell. Then when the 
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sound came on and then I realized … the more we watched it, just like, he’s just… he just 
looks like a politician. 
What can we infer from these difficulties?  Clearly the non-Koreans understand that something is 
going on with the mixed messages.  Moreover, Participant D understands that the expressions the 
mediator is using have to do with the role he is playing, because she arrives at the “politician” 
interpretation—a role that would require him to follow certain scripted behaviors. 
Such contradictory expressions are, by definition, contrary to those essentially autonomic 
basic emotions; consequently, they are strikingly apparent.  However, cultural/emotional scripts 
also frequently require diminished or exaggerated expressions of emotion in a particular 
situation. A classic example of diminished expressions can be found in the injunction to male 
children that “big boys don’t cry”—in other words, if boys are sad, they are not permitted to 
express the sadness through outward crying.  As Korean participant Q relates the cross-cultural 
difficulties:  
I was talking with a foreigner [Anglo-phone non-Korean] who mentioned the facial 
expression thing. The foreigner said that it is difficult to read Korean’s faces. For this 
person, foreigners’ facial expression and body language fluctuates along with their 
emotions, but Koreans seldom change their face, which makes them difficult to read it. 
At least one example of exaggerated expression went unnoticed by the North Americans.  
Participant T points out that the mediator and businessman engage in “frequent head nodding. 
Koreans tend nod their head a lot to express their agreement. I could see the businessman and the 
mediator do that. Usually it is very repetitive.”  No mention of this by any of the North American 
participants. I note this exception, because exceptions are critical to the accuracy question. 
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One exaggerated expression that received generous attention from all of the focus groups 
was the parent’s behavior in the faculty meeting.  As previously discussed, the North Americans 
found the parent’s display to be completely “over the top.”  In one group, Participant B thinks 
that the parent had to be intoxicated to display such “drunk anger” in public at a school. Then in 
the next conversational turn, Participant A offers that the only explanation she could think for the 
exaggeration of his expression was that Mr. Kim had done something to the man’s daughter—
with sexual abuse implications.  Of course, each of these interpretations reflect these 
participants’ own cultural/emotional scripts, but Participant A further states her dissatisfaction 
with the eventual explanation revealed through the subtitles, when “he talked about money and I 
was like ‘okay… I guess not’” (sarcastic emphasis in original).  In the other group, Participant J 
had a similar response to the parent’s rage, “In a Korean movie, yeah. In real life, no. But I 
understand it’s dramatized.  It’s made more exciting for a movie, but that sort of issues, about 
money . . .” She trails off struggling with the interpretation. Even after the facilitator explains the 
details specific to Korean public education, Participant A still has difficulties accepting the 
intensity of the parent’s expressions: “when I realized it’s just money, now I am not judging how 
angry he is anymore, now I’m saying ‘come on, he can’t really be that angry’ ” (emphasis in 
original).   
Obviously, Participant A judges the situation through her own cultural/emotional lens and 
has difficulty ‘putting on’ the lenses of the Korean participants’ explanations.  Simultaneously, 
the Koreans appeared to recognize that the intensity of the parent’s expressions might prove 
difficult for non-Koreans to accept. Participant V summarizes the thoughts of the members of her 
group regarding both the real world character of Korean parent’s habit for expressing extreme 
levels of anger in defense of their children, and her own discomfort with this habit: 
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I think similarly [responding to the comment of other members of her group]. The way 
the parent was yelling, “Who is Kim Bongdoo? Where is he!”  I saw this behavior many 
times in real life. I think negatively toward this culture where parents can do whatever 
they want just because their children are involved, but this is Korean culture. 
Ultimately, in drawing a distinction between cultural scripts and display rules that require either 
contradictory/masked expressions or exaggerated/diminished expressions, these two situational 
examples allow a comparison of non-members of a culture’s varying ability to recognize, 
interpret, and accept those expressions. In these instances, the North Americans had much less 
difficulty recognizing the incongruity of the contradictory masking of emotions required by the 
Koreans cultural scripts, but found them perplexing.  In the case of exaggerated expressions, they 
sometimes failed to recognize subtle exaggeration, for example agreeing cues offered by the 
businessman and mediator as part of the business negotiation script.  However, they were 
strongly struck by the intense exaggeration of the parent’s anger display in the faculty meeting 
scene. Moreover, some participants had difficulty in fully coming to grips with the Koreans’ 
interpretation, even after they heard an explanation.  These examples support the idea that 
differences in cultural/emotional scripts and their interpretation by non-members of a culture can 
contribute to negative stereotypes. Moreover, while cultural assimilation exercises can help, they 
may not always have the desired, immediate impact. 
Dissonance created by “mis-performance” of scripts.    
While the previous section emphasized fundamental differences in the character of 
cultural/emotional scripts, this section examines specific examples of how contradictory scripts 
can create cognitive dissonance. That dissonance can, in turn, result in misinterpretations of 
emotional expressions.  However, what would such a “mis-performance” look like in this 
  167 
 
setting?  Initially, examples where a participant described a character behaving inappropriately 
were coded.  They tend to include cases where a participant would remark “this was strange” or 
that a character “didn’t do” something that was expected in the situation. Later they were 
reviewed and recoded to attempt to define any distinguishing features of each mis-performance.  
In this second layer of coding, two broad distinguishing types appeared: cases where the 
participant thought the performance was unusual in a universal sense, and cases where they 
thought that the situation was unusual in a culturally specific sense.  
A fairly clear example of this second culturally specific case is found when Mr. Kim is 
judged to be insufficiently apologetic for being late to the meeting. North American group 
Participant G states “[Mr. Kim] wasn’t more apologetic in a more fearful way. That is very much 
the Korean way. … You become used to that culture, and he was not like that. So he just puts out 
like there is something more to what you are seeing.” From the same group, Participant I was 
similarly taken aback by the teacher’s reaction to “getting caught” arriving late to the faculty 
meeting: 
You know what’s really, really strange? The principal [understood] the teacher was late, 
and the principal was angry, and he felt very offended, because the teacher was late. But 
then, what I thought was really strange is when the camera is showing the principal 
walking toward [Mr. Kim], he has this really stern look on his face. He’s really … it’s 
kind of clear that he is unhappy with the situation. But the teacher, I mean, maybe it’s 
Korean movies, I don’t know if it’s Korean or Hollywood movies, but in that situation I 
would normally see the person look sheepish: “Oh my god! I’m so embarrassed that I’m 
late,” but he didn’t.  It was just like a calm, “I’m sorry I’m late.” 
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Clearly, Participant I recognizes a difference in script, describing in detail the scripted steps: Mr. 
Kim is late, the principal sees it, walks over, is appropriately angry and offended.  Then she 
emphasizes the mis-performance, “I would normally see the person look sheepish: ‘Oh my god! 
I’m so embarrassed that I’m late,’ but he didn’t.  It was just like a calm, ‘I’m sorry I’m late.’”  
Importantly for this study, her explanation contains several emotion words, including two 
emotions, ‘embarrassed’ and ‘calm,’ an emotionally laden behavior, ‘sheepish,’ the adverb ‘so’ 
to intensify the embarrassment, as well as the exclamation ‘oh my god!’—all of which point to 
the intertwining of scripts and emotions.  Moreover, she recognizes that the problem may lie in a 
difference in the appropriate script for each nationality: “maybe it’s Korean movies … I don’t 
know if it’s Korean or Hollywood movies.”  Clearly, she has no doubt about the particular script 
that she was anticipating—and the dissonance she feels at not seeing that script performed: “You 
know what’s really, really strange?” 
Another example of a North American suffering dissonance from a mis-performance of 
the script they anticipate—yet they believe to be the appropriate script for Koreans—and, 
moreover, one where the participant’s interpretation is strikingly more blunt, occurs in the 
appraisal of the principal’s actions when the melee erupts in the faculty meeting.  Participants C 
and A explain: 
Participant  C: I could imagine a meeting like this in my country, and if a parent would 
come in raging like that and whoever was administering the meeting would set things 
right.  
Participant  A: You would look to him… 
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Participant  C: Yeah exactly. You would look to him to get everything back under control 
and not just go to the corner and “we’ll [the other faculty will] be your front line for you” 
… that’s just foreign to me what happens here. 
This snippet of their dialogue illustrates the anticipated script—that the principal should “get 
everything back under control”—and that how it has been mis-performed—the principal should 
“not just go to the corner.”  Most critically for this study her explanation is rife with emotion, 
including an emotionally laden phrase, “come in raging,” a moral judgment, “set things right,” a 
war metaphor, “be your front line,” and a strongly stated (even biased) appraisal, “that’s just 
foreign.”  Ultimately, this participant’s9 interpretation shows where the foundations of stereotype 
formation may lie, and ultimately this may offer us a clue as to where to begin to educate about 
this process as well as regulate our own negative appraisals which could lead to negative 
stereotypes. 
The Korean participants also noted dissonance when the scripts were not performed as 
expected.  For example, Participant S struggles to understand Mr. Kim’s literal script when 
accepting the young businessman’s bribe versus the non-verbal cues in a different direction: 
What was interesting to me was the gap between [Mr. Kim’s] facial expression, and what 
he was saying when he received the envelopes. Expression indicated that he was angry, 
because he felt the businessman saw him as a person who would take money from him, 
but he was saying “Thank you.” This was strange. Also, I felt he was in agony – feeling 
conflicted. His hands were hesitant, but his face looked angry, and his words said “Thank 
                                                 
9 I cannot make that interpretation without stating that I am familiar with this individual beyond the setting of this study and know her to be a 
gentle and unbiased individual.  Yet, if we are to believe that words have meaning and value beyond their denotation, it is important to look for 
where those connotations might start. 
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you.” And this was strange. … I felt his conflict/agony began there. Maybe this is my 
cultural stereotype, but I wonder if I can say that bribery is a Korean thing. 
Here, too, all of the elements seen in the previous North American example were present.  She 
describes the behavior that causes the conflict, as well as her own interpretive appraisal of the 
situation, “He was angry, because he felt the businessman saw him as a person who would take 
money,” and ultimately raises the question of whether these distinctions are universal or culture 
specific to Korea.  Later Participant T supports Participant S’s conclusions.  When asked what 
salient parts of the scene indicated Korean specific behaviors, she replies, “the teacher’s facial 
expression when he received the envelopes. The discrepancy between his face and his words.” 
Occasionally, participants would feel dissonance when the script they expected was not 
performed, but not attribute any cross-cultural component to it.  For example, in describing the 
interaction between Mr. Kim and the principal in the faculty meeting when Mr. Kim arrives late, 
Participant S describes the principal’s mis-performance of the script, but in interpreting the cause 
of mis-performance attributes the problem to the specific situation and a specific “sub-script” for 
that situation: 
When the principal and the teacher were interacting, it was different from a usual 
disciplinary situation, because the principal does not look at the teacher straight in the 
eyes.  The reason why I think that the principal’s anger is because he felt he has lost face 
was because he didn’t look at the teacher in the eyes. Yelling at a person without looking 
at him indicates that he is doing this for a selfish reason.  
As in the other cases we have examined, Participant S clearly states that the “usual” script for a 
disciplinary situation is not followed, and states why she draws that conclusion.  Interestingly, 
however, she perceives this to be an example of a specific subcategory script (i.e. disciplinary 
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situations where the supervisor has lost face due to another selfish reason).  Moreover, this 
description lacks the intensifiers found in describing other situations where the participants 
judged that a script was being mis-performed. For example, we often see them use intensifiers 
like “really, really,” or repetition of the word “strange.”  Arguably, Participant S judges that this 
instance, because it is part of a subcategory, is a less striking or perhaps more common mis-
performance. 
The North American groups also had occasions where they did not mention a cultural 
cause for the mis-performance of script.  In discussing the notion of reverse appraisal in relation 
to the intensity of the parent’s angry outburst in the faculty meeting, Participant A suggested that 
the only appropriate script for such extreme anger would be if Mr. Kim had “done something” 
with his daughter—with “something” implying sexual abuse.  However, in interpreting the cause 
of the mis-performance of script, Participant A does not look to a cultural difference: “when I 
hear later it’s about money, I’m like “oh, he’s angry,” but come on its money. That’s my 
judgment.”  Clearly, she is focusing on her personal interpretation of a script, and importantly we 
can infer that she perceives her interpretation to be the “more” universal.  
 The failures in the North Americans attempts at interpreting the Koreans emotional 
communication provide some of the most interesting data in the study. Three important points 
arise from examining these communication failures.  First, the participants of both national 
groups were aware of the importance of scripts and display rules. Second, the failures arose 
predominantly when the display rules required masked, diminished, or contradictory expressions 
of emotion.  Finally, the cognitive dissonance that arose in such cases was not easy to resolve: 
that is to say that many of the North American participants had difficulty accepting the Koreans’ 
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explanations in such cases, particularly when the expressions ran diametrically counter to their 
expectations.  
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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION  
Even fifteen years or so into this current explosion of research in emotion and the 
communication of emotion, the various fields of study engaged in emotion research have yet to 
approach a consensus as to what emotion is, much less how to study it, and what the most critical 
aspects of our experience of emotional communication are.  Consequently, our understanding of 
the communication of emotion across cultures remains in a state of flux. 
The study sets out to shed light on the universalist/relativist debate over emotions by 
examining the cross-cultural interpretations of Korean’s emotional expressions by North 
American women.  In particular, how and when out-group participants’ interpretations matched 
and mismatched those of in-group members, as well as the interaction of those interpretations in 
a broader process of cross-cultural communication. The first research question concerns how 
accurately out-group members interpret the emotional expressions of members of another 
culture. The answer to that question is not entirely straightforward.  When we use the 
“significantly greater than chance” standard established by Ekman (see for example Rosenberg 
& Ekman, 1994), the North Americans in this study were clearly able to recognize basic 
emotions as identified by the Koreans -- on the order of 80% of the time. This finding points 
directly to some level of universality in emotions. Moreover, their judgments of the intensity of 
the emotional displays were also accurate at a level greater than chance, although not as accurate 
as the naming of the emotions they saw. However, the major caveat to this “universal” emotion 
conclusion is this: While the accuracy rate was greater than chance, the inaccuracy rate was 
much greater than zero.  The inaccuracy of the interpretations could be the space in which 
cultural stereotypes are created. This finding, then, provides support for cross-cultural relativism 
in emotional communication as argued by Wierzbicka (2010) and others (see for example 
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Pavlenko, 2008; Planalp, 1999).  A more fine-grained analysis of where the differences in 
interpretation occurred suggests support for a category of emotion that I have labeled 
“secondary,” which is akin to Plutchick’s (2001) “dyads” and Levy’s (1994) “hypercognized” 
emotions.  These emotions, such as guilt and respect in this study, are qualitatively different from 
a basic emotion in that they cannot exist with the feedback loop created by thinking about them.  
The second research question concerning the channels used by each group for emotional 
cue interpretations generated important findings. Indeed, the subtle inquiry into the character of 
the emotional interpretation mechanisms used by out-group members is where the important new 
insights from this study arose. When I examined the relative level to which the participants relied 
on the each of various channels for interpreting emotional communication—situational/appraisal, 
nonverbal communication, or direct communication—I found a remarkably consistent pattern 
across the different focus groups. Regardless of national origin, the reliance on non-verbal cues 
was highest in all of the groups, appraisal was next most common, and direct, lexical semantic 
explanations were nearly non-existent.  More importantly, in almost every instance the 
participants relied on multiple cues to identify the emotion, and more often than not, their 
interpretation was based on a combination of nonverbal and situational cues.  To my knowledge, 
this sort of simultaneous, multiple cue, and multiple channel interpretation pattern has not been 
discussed in the literature. 
In addition, display rules themselves are more likely to come into play when the emotions 
expressed are more highly cognized, and highly cognized emotions are more likely to be 
misinterpreted.  Indeed, the data suggest that when display rules and cultural scripts were 
required the out-group members were more to likely misunderstand. This finding is generally in 
line with Ekman and Matsumoto’s (Ekman, 2003; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Matsumoto & 
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Kudoh, 1993; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006; Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009; Matsumoto, et 
al., 2005) previous research. However, an emergent point was the case of “reverse” situational 
interpretation. Again, I have not found discussion of this phenomenon in the literature. In these 
reverse situational interpretations cases individuals interpret preceding situations from emotions 
expressed. These could prove critical in understanding the difficulties associated with 
misinterpretations, because the individuals become convinced that the emotional display 
witnessed matches a certain situation. Of course, the data in this study shows that in a substantial 
number of cases that the individual’s cross-cultural interpretations will be inaccurate; 
consequently, the individual’s ego will likely be more intensely drawn in when the inevitable 
misinterpretations occur.  Further research is certainly called for in this area. 
The third research question focuses us at the area we predicted at the outset would prove 
most thorny: What happens when people fail to interpret accurately? Fortunately, the data offers 
insights into the processes associated with cultural script and display rule interpretation. 
Specifically, all participants revealed a general understanding that cultural scripts and display 
rules are important in the cross-cultural communication of emotion. Additionally, the data show 
that the two critical factors causing the most confusion in the interpretive process were 
contradictory/masked expressions and diminished/exaggerated expressions.  Ultimately, the out-
group members’ interpretation that the script was mis-performed lies at the root of their 
confusion. Both Korean and North American participants experienced a certain dissonance when 
the cultural/emotional scripts that they anticipated seeing were not performed.  Often those 
feelings occurred when they were watching the same scene. Moreover, the emotions were 
described with the same appraisals—indicating that some similarities exist in the 
cultural/emotional scripts.  However, a number of cases were interpreted differently across 
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groups, which indicates that opportunities for cross-cultural miscommunication arise from 
inappropriate appraisals from one culture or the other.  In addition, these participants often 
indicated that the script performances that they were anticipating might be culture specific. 
However, they were not always aware of their own bias to their first culture scripts, and therein 
exists opportunities for better training and education in cross-cultural sensitivity.  
The final question lurking behind all of the others is: What can we do with this 
information in the field of foreign language education?  I would offer three suggestions.  First, 
substantial areas of similarity were discovered in the naming of emotions in the two cultures.  
Our students need not be too shy in trusting their interpretations of how other cultures intent their 
emotions to be understood—particularly in cases where the expressions are “raw” and 
unguarded.  However, we also need to prepare our students entering into cross-cultural 
endeavors that the social structures of the foreign culture do in a good number of cases regulate 
how the emotions should be expressed. Frequently, different cultures will require similar 
expressions, but often enough to create confusion—and sometimes cognitive dissonance—the 
required expression will be masked or limited in ways that are different from our own culture.  
We can teach students to be aware of those feelings of dissonance and work with them to 
suspend their own reactions to the cultural differences, and to ask questions of the people they 
are interacting with to resolve as much as possible that dissonance.  A second suggestion for 
educators is to use the similarities in the channels of emotional communication to help students 
better read the language of emotional expression.  Given that the channels for emotional 
interpretation proved remarkably similar, we can trust that individuals have an intuitive 
understanding of these mechanisms. However, if we can teach students to move that implicit 
understanding of how emotions are communicated to the explicit level, then, particularly for 
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those in the helping professions and those working in the interface between cultures, students 
will be better equipped to deal with emotionally charged misunderstandings. The third 
recommendation for educators is to learn the characteristics surrounding cases of 
miscommunication.  By recognizing these characteristics, not only can we teach about them, but 
we can also teach with them.  We can recognize our students’ cognitive dissonance, discuss it 
with them and help them resolve their confusion and discomfort. Foreign language educators 
themselves live in a critical interface between cultures and can draw forth their own 
experiences—both successes and failures—to serve as a model for their students cross-cultural 
lives. 
As might be expected, this research raises more questions than it provides answers 
opening new doors for future research.  How precisely does the level of counter-intuitive 
expression required by a display rule affect the ability of out-group members to interpret the 
emotions expressed?  Are there distinct neurological signatures for “secondary” and 
hypercognized emotions different from basic emotions? How can we further refine our 
understanding of the new finding in this study regarding multiple code and multiple channel 
usage patterns for emotional cue interpretation? Perhaps the greatest contribution of this study 
will prove to be allowing both teachers, students and research to see that emotional 
communication across cultures is a complex social phenomenon, that, while resistant to simple 
explanations, has regular patterns and practices which will allow us to better communicate across 
cultures if we approach our emotional expressions and interpretations with sensitivity, flexibility 
and compromise. 
I will end with a brief discussion of this study’s limitations and suggestions for future 
research and ways forward. This study brings with it some inherent limitations. Two issues in 
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particular create limitations for the study: risk in walking the fine line of essentializing lived 
experiences; the code as an essence of foreign language education. In Researching Lived 
Experience, van Manen (1990) states, “phenomenological research is the study of essence” (p. 
10); yet, the richness of lived experience stands in stark and practical contradiction to our 
attempts to essentialize it.  Indeed, both communication and foreign language education rely on 
mutually interpretable and inherently essentialized codes.  To use, to improve teaching, to 
actually teach, from the results of this study requires something essential to teach. For good or 
ill, educational research and particularly phenomenological research is to some extent trapped 
within that framework. Moreover, the research designs sets the cultural constructs of Korean and 
North American in opposition in instances of bilateral cross-cultural interpretation.  Further 
research is needed to explore emotional communication across other cultural dyads. In addition, 
further research should attempt to tease apart differences within these cultural groups. Also, the 
study limited participants by age and gender; thus, further research could explore how 
participants' interpretations varied by age, regional aspects within larger cultural groups, gender, 
and other factors. Ultimately, the greatest risk lies in how the research is consumed and used.  If 
readers take away the impression that emotional communication, particularly emotional 
communication across cultures, is a static and calcified artifact, they will do this research, and 
themselves, a disservice.  Indeed, that sort of stereotype creation is the polar opposite of this 
researcher’s intent.  To combat stereotypes, I urge the reader to focus their attention on the 
mechanisms and processes involved in the interpretation of emotion across cultures and allow 
the details of specific emotions discussed here to serve as illustrations of those processes, not as 
static, unchanging cultural differences.  The goal of the study is to offer readers a better 
understanding of the mechanisms of cross-cultural emotional interpretation, so that they may be 
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less judgmental in cross-cultural interaction, and better able to ask better questions when 
working with people from any different background. So dear readers, take a deep breath and 
embrace the diversity of lived experience. 
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS ASKED TO NL INFORMANTS’ FOCUS GROUPS 
NL informants -- Introductory script 
Thank you so much for your help on this project. I really appreciate that you are taking 
the time to assist my research into this aspect of language learning. Forgive me, but I need to 
start with some administrative work. I need each of you to sign this release form to continue with 
the study. Please read the form carefully before signing, but briefly it says that I will be 
recording the sessions, how I will use the recordings, as well as the goals of research – primarily 
my dissertation or perhaps a journal article in the future - and how I will contact you in the event 
of publication of this material.  Please do ask if you have any questions about this form, OK?  
[wait for reply, and completion of forms]  
 Thank you for filling those out. Let me start off by telling you about the purpose of this 
study.  We’re trying to look at the communication of emotion across different cultures. So the 
basic question is, "do different cultures communicate or show their emotions in different ways?” 
If we find out that there are differences, then perhaps we can make cross-cultural communication 
better by redesigning the way we teach foreign language students. 
Today, we’re going to watch some video clips and trying to decide what emotions are 
being displayed, how strong those emotions are, as well as how and how well those emotions are 
being displayed. In addition, we are going to decide which of the several clips we see today will 
be best to show to Americans to reveal emotions that are particularly Korean.  Once we have 
decided the best clips, I also will need your help to accurately determine a ‘native’ speaker 
interpretation of the way that emotions are shown in the scenes.   Your interpretation of the 
emotions displayed will then be used in the second step of the research, when I show the clips to 
foreign language students. 
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 Do you have any questions so far? [wait for reply] 
 Okay, great.   Next, let me describe the process of our work today.  I have a list of 
questions that we will be exploring in some detail, so let me review those questions: 
  Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip? 
 What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see 
or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]  
  For each individual on the worksheet do you see any of the emotions on the list?  
[sadness, anger, fear, enjoyment, disgust, contempt, and surprise] Please check all 
that apply. [note: include liker scale for intensity of emotion] 
Any questions on the questions? [And wait for reply] 
 OK, now let me explain in a little more detail how we will accomplish the selection and 
description of these scenes.  When we first watch the film clip, I am going to ask each of you 
individually to write some notes on what emotions you see – we will be working with the same 
questions throughout, but I would like you to write down some of your own thoughts before we 
move on to the whole group discussion. Then we will discuss each video clip as a whole group, 
before we decide which video clips are “the best.”   Finally, I want to ask you all if you think that 
any of these emotions are particularly Korean and therefore might be a problem for American 
people. Is that all right? 
Great!  Let’s get started. 
 
Some specific follow-up questions  (or rewording of questions) for each clip:  
∆   What emotions do you recognize?  
  201 
 
∆  How do you know that this is the emotion?  Is it the words, the context 
(setting, social or gender roles, etc.), facial expression, gesture, vocal 
tone, or something else?  
∆   What about those universal emotions - do you recognize any of them?  
∆  How do you know that this emotion is being communicated?  Is it the 
words, the context (setting, social or gender roles, etc.), facial 
expression, gesture, vocal tone, or something else? 
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 APPENDIX B: NOTE TAKING WORKSHEETS FOR KOREAN FOCUS GROUPS 
(English version) 
 
Emotional communication research project 
 
Personal Information: 
 
Name:      Age:    gender:   M   F 
 
Mailing address: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phone:      e-mail: 
 
Education:  High School    College undergraduate  graduate school 
 
Please rate your language skills for the following languages: 
 
Korean   0 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - Fluent 
English   0 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - Fluent 
Other: __________  0 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - Fluent 
Other: __________  0 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - Fluent  
 
How well do you understand American Culture: 
not much - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 - - - - 4 - - - - 5 - - - - 6 - - - - 7 - - - - extreme well 
 
Tell me a little about your experiences learning English: 
 
 
Have you visited English-speaking countries? If so when, and how long? 
 
 
 
Do you have important relationships with native English speakers? (eg. a relative or close 
friend?) If so, explain please. 
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Emotional communication notetaking sheet - Video 1 – the fight 
 
Name: _______________________ 
 
Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch. 
- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip? 
By the teacher By the principal By the parent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or 
understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]  
By the teacher By the principal By the parent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all 
that apply. 
Teacher Principal 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment    No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Parent 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment    No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
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Emotional communication notetaking sheet - Video 2 – Lunch time 
 
Name: _______________________ 
 
Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch. 
- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip? 
By the teacher By the principal By the parent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or 
understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]  
By the teacher By the principal By the parent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all 
that apply. 
Teacher Girl 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment    No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
Boy 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment    No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
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Emotional communication notetaking sheet - Video 3 – Parents meeting 
 
Name: _______________________ 
 
Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch. 
- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip? 
By the teacher By the principal By the parent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or 
understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]  
By the teacher By the principal By the parent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all 
that apply. 
By parents By the teacher 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
fear No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
disgust No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
surprise  No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
anger No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
contempt   No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
enjoyment  No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
fear No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
disgust No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
surprise  No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
anger No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
contempt   No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
enjoyment   No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
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Emotional communication notetaking sheet - Video 4 – Fighting farmers 
 
Name: _______________________ 
 
Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch. 
- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip? 
By the teacher By the principal By the parent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or 
understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]  
By the teacher By the principal By the parent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all 
that apply. 
By farmer #1 By farmer #2 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment    No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
By the teacher 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
fear No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
disgust No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
surprise  No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
anger No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
contempt   No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5  
enjoyment    No  /  yes  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 
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Emotional communication notetaking sheet - Video clip number five – Business dinner 
 
Name: _______________________ 
 
Please use the space below to write notes on the emotions you see in the video clips we watch. 
- Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip? 
 
By the teacher (Kim) By the older man By the younger man 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
- What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see or hear or 
understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]  
By the teacher (Kim) By the older man By the younger man 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
- For each individual character, do you see any of the emotions on the list? Please check all 
that apply. 
By the teacher (Kim) By the older man 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
fear No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
disgust No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
surprise  No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
anger No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
contempt   No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
enjoyment  No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
fear No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
disgust No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
surprise  No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
anger No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
contempt   No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
enjoyment   No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
By the younger man 
 Do you see it? How strong is the emotion? 
sadness No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
fear No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
disgust No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
surprise  No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
anger No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
contempt   No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong  
enjoyment   No  /  yes  weak -1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - strong 
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APPENDIX C: QUESTIONS ASKED TO FL PARTICIPANTS’ FOCUS GROUPS 
FL participants -- Introductory script 
Thank you so much for your help on this project. I really appreciate that you are taking 
the time to assist my research into this aspect of language learning. Forgive me, but I need to 
start with some administrative work. I need each of you to sign this release form to continue with 
the study. Please read the form carefully before signing, but briefly it says that I will be 
recording the sessions, how I will use the recordings, as well as the goals of research – primarily 
my dissertation or perhaps a journal article in the future - and how I will contact you in the event 
of publication of this material.  Please do ask if you have any questions about this form, OK?  
[wait for reply, and completion of forms]  
 Thank you for filling those out. Let me start off by telling you about the purpose of this 
study.  We’re trying to look at the communication of emotion across different cultures. So the 
basic question is, "do different cultures communicate or show their emotions in different ways?” 
If we find out that there are differences, then perhaps we can make cross-cultural communication 
better by redesigning the way we teach foreign language students. 
  So, today were going to watch a couple of short video clips from a Korean reality 
television program called “Love House” – which is similar to “Extreme Makeover: Home 
Edition.”   What you will be doing while we watch is trying to see what emotion, or emotions, 
you see in each of these scenes.   Partly because the program is in Korean, and partly to help you 
see what is going on in the different elements of how people communicate, we are going to 
watch to watch the video in three different ways:  First, we will watch it silently; next, we’ll 
watch with the soundtrack added – in Korean; and finally, we will add English subtitles. Do you 
have any questions so far? [Wait for reply] 
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 Okay, that’s great.  As you are watching the video clips, I would like you to take some 
notes, so that you will be better able to discuss what you saw during the whole group discussion 
[pass out the worksheet]. In a whole group discussion will be discussing the same questions that 
you’re going to take notes on, so let me review the questions for you:  
  Which emotions do you see displayed in this video clip? 
 What makes you say that you saw that particular emotion? [i.e. what did you see 
or hear or understand that indicates the person is feeling that emotion?]  
  For each individual on the worksheet do you see any of the emotions on the list?  
[sadness, anger, fear, enjoyment, disgust, contempt, and surprise] Please check all 
that apply. [note: include liker scale for intensity of emotion] 
Any questions on the questions? [And wait for reply] 
 Finally, after we have discussed the clips as a whole group and come to some sort of 
consensus about what’s going on, I want to talk with you about what native Koreans said about 
these two video clips. I am not sure what we will find, but I’m curious if we will agree with the 
native speakers or not  - and I’m curious what you will think after we discover whether you agree 
with them are not. Does that sound OK? [wait for reply] 
Great!  Let’s get started. 
 
Some specific follow-up questions  (or rewording of questions) for each clip:  
∆   What emotions do you recognize?  
∆  How do you know that this is the emotion?  Is it the words, the context 
(setting, social or gender roles, etc.), facial expression, gesture, vocal 
tone, or something else?  
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∆   What about those universal emotions - do you recognize any of them?  
∆  How do you know that this emotion is being communicated?  Is it the 
words, the context (setting, social or gender roles, etc.), facial 
expression, gesture, vocal tone, or something else? 
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APPENDIX D: PLOT SYNOPSIS OF 선생  김봉두  - MY TEACHER, MR. KIM. 
 Kim Boong-doo (Cha Seung-woo - Break Out aka: Spark the Lighter) is a bad teacher. 
He’s unkempt, constantly late for class, spends more time with his own extracurricular activities 
than his students curricular ones and to top it off, openly encourages parents to give him bribes to 
ensure their children get through his class okay. Unfortunately for Mr. Kim, his life is about to 
take a significant change of direction. While at one of his teacher meetings (which he was late to) 
a disgruntled parent bursts in looking to beat seven shades out of this Mr. Kim who demanded 
money from his son. The principal manages to defuse the situation, but gives Kim an ultimatum; 
retire or accept a vacant teachers role in the country. As you’d expect he is reluctant to leave 
Seoul but has no alternative but to take the job. 
Upon arriving in the small village, Kim is given a warm welcome but all he can think of is trying 
to get out. He tries to get back into his habit of dishing out ‘white envelopes’ to his five pupils, 
but when the parents have nothing, what can they possibly give him? Finally Kim decides that if 
he can get all the kids to transfer to other schools, this small one will have to be closed and he 
too will have to be transferred back to Seoul. Thus begins his efforts to nurture their talents and 
the process of convincing them and their parents that Seoul is the best environment for their 
abilities. In the process of changing their outlook though their innocence and purity changes him 
for the better. (From: http://filmjournal.net/koreancinemahouse/2011/04/10/my-teacher-mr-kim/) 
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APPENDIX E: SCRIPT AND ACTION DESCRIPTION FOR THE TWO SCENES 
SHOWN TO FL GROUPS 
“Video clip number one  – the fight”  
[Scene: a school library. The bookshelves are wooden and filled with books. There are large 
tables in the room, and adults are seated at them with about six teachers per table. A 
young male teacher enters the room wearing a dress shirt and slacks. The meeting has 
already begun. He moves to the last empty seat at the table near the door. His eyes looked 
down, and his shoulders are hunched over. The principal is speaking from his notes at the 
front of the room.] 
Principal: To get better results from the curriculum, we will open special classes for each grade.  
Our school  . . . 
[The principal pauses as he notices the young teacher enter the room and take a seat. Without 
speaking, the principal approaches the young teacher who is looking at the documents on 
the table, not noticing the principal’s approach. When the principal is within about two 
meters of the young teacher, the young teacher looks up at the principal. All of the other 
teachers at the table have their eyes focused down on the documents in front of them. The 
young teacher bows to the principal.] 
[There is a pounding at the door. Everyone looks in the direction of the noise to see a parent 
followed by an administrative staff member enter the room.] 
Male Parent: [yelling] Who the hell is Kim Bong-doo? Where is he?  [He kicks one of the chairs 
a male teacher is seated in.] Is it you? You? Where's that bastard?  [He throws a row of 
books off one of the bookshelves. And moves from male teacher to male teacher 
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searching for Kim Bong-doo] Where's Kim Bong-doo? You? Where's Kim Bong-
doo? This school is a disgrace!  
[The principal tries to intervene to calm the parent down, putting both hands on the parent's 
upper arms.] 
Principal: Please calm yourself down  
Male Parent: How can I calm down?  You make a fool out of my son for not offering 
money? [The parent breaks the grip of the princial’s hands. The principal backs away, 
and the parent moves forward toward him.] Let go of me!  
[The young teacher, Kim Bong-doo, and several other male teachers try to intervene and hold the 
parent back as the principal recoils in shock. A melee ensues. Kim Bong-doo is seen 
jumping up and down. End of scene.] 
 
“Video clip number five – Business dinner” 
[Scene: A bulgogi restaurant. The grill is covered with sliced beef and vegetables barbecuing.  I 
shot glass is extended across the table and filled with soju, a Korean hard alcohol made 
from rice, typically a 40 proof drink. Three men are seated at the table: an older man in a 
tie and sweater vest, a younger man in a white shirt and tie, and Kim Bong-doo in a dress 
shirt and slacks. ] 
Administrator: Say hello. This gentleman is a businessman from Seoul.  
Kim Bong-doo: Hello.  
Businessman: Hi, I'm Bak Soo-il. 
[The businessmen extends his business card across the table to Kim Bong-doo, who takes it, 
glances at it briefly, and puts it in his back pants pocket.] 
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Kim Bong-doo: I'm Kim Bong-doo. 
Businessman: I hope we can work things out. 
Kim Bong-doo : Beg your pardon?  [Talking with his mouth full.]  
Administrator: Actually, he wants to turn the school into a survival game site. I know it won't be 
easy at the moment. 
Kim Bong-du: A site for a survival game?  
Businessman: Yes. [There is a pause. The administrator and the businessman glance at each 
other.] 
Administrator: They decided to shut down the school next year, but they seem to be changing 
their minds after you came. [Pause]  Mr. Kim . . . 
Kim Bong-du: All the kids will transfer soon, so please don't worry. 
[The administrator and businessman react in pleased surprise, showing wide smiling faces] 
Businessman: Is that true?  So the school will shut down automatically?  
Kim Bong-du: Yes.  
Businessman: That's great! [Administrator chuckles] Mister Kim, you're a fabulous teacher! 
Administrator: Of course he is. The students will find it hard to adjust, but the learning 
environment will be much better in Seoul.  
Businessman: Come on, kids need to struggle when they're young. I also had to struggle to work 
my way up.  
[The businessmen and administrator are laughing. Mr. Kim just eats and glances from face to 
face] 
Administrator: You're right, we had to walk 2 to 3 miles to go to school. 
Businessman: Country kids are used to struggling anyway. [Administrator laughing.] 
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[Scene break: Outside the restaurant in the parking lot. Kim Bong-doo is walking to his car and 
taking his keys from his pocket.] 
Businessman: Mister Kim.  [The businessman reaches into his jacket pocket and pulls out a 
white envelop, which he extends Kim Bong-doo.] It's not much, but buy some cigarettes 
with it.  [Kim Bong-doo slowly takes the envelope, and stares at it. Holding it in his hand. 
The businessmen waggles his head and reaches into his jacket pocket and retrieves 
another white envelope, which he extends to Kim Bong-doo, smiling.]  Here's gas 
money.  
Kim Bong-doo: Thank you, and good luck on your business. 
Businessman [bowing]: Yes, thank you.  
Kim Bong-doo: Good-night. [Quickly gets into his car and drives away. End of scene.] 
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APPENDIX F: FLOW CHART OF DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
 
Phase one: Choose emotional communication examples  
Who’s involved: Researcher 
 Tasks: 
A. Choose representative video segment -- In Korean. 
B. Select 7 emotionally significant clips. 
C. Prepare a dub tape of the clips. 
 
 
Phase two: Refine/ Code emotional communication examples with “native 
speakers”  
Step 1: 
Who’s involved:  focus group of NL informants (and researcher) 
 Tasks: 
A. Watch the 7 clips and make notes on emotions seen. 
B.  Following the same questions from the note cheated, the focus 
group will discuss the implications of the video clip. 
C. NL informants and researcher discuss implications of differences 
and similarities between NL and FL.  
D. At the conclusion of the focus group discussion, the focus group 
will recommend 3 clips, from the 7 clips, that are ‘better’ for 
revealing the emotions of Korean people. 
Step 2: 
Who: Researcher  
       Tasks: 
A.  Combine the NL informants’ detailed comments to code emotions. 
Before showing the clips to non-native speakers. 
B.  Create subtitles for the video clips. 
 
Phase three: Present video examples to “non-native speakers”  
Step 1: 
Who:  Focus groups of FL participants (and researcher) 
Tasks: 
A. Watch ‘best’ clip three times. First, without sound and subtitles.  
Second, with sound, but without subtitles.  Third, with sound and 
subtitles. 
B. After each viewing, note emotions and emotional clues. 
C. Discussion of focus group members questions. 
Step 2: 
Who: FL participants (and researcher) 
Tasks: 
A. Researcher describes NL informants responses. 
B. FL participants and researcher discuss implications of differences 
and similarities between NL and FL.  
